Opinion – Helio Beltrão: The center is not a problem, but our ‘centre’ is

A former minister of the Bolsonaro government claimed that the president was “kidnapped by the center”. In fact, the same happened with his predecessors Michel Temer, Dilma Rousseff, Lula and FHC. Collor did not allow himself to be kidnapped (he wanted all the power for his small group), he was overthrown and returned to politics in the heart of the center. Dilma violated tax laws, caused a brutal recession and lost support from the center.

An informal political grouping in the political “center” (neither right nor left) is an almost inevitable consequence of both our political system and the characteristics of the Brazilian voter. A multiparty and presidential system requires coalitions that guarantee governability. In other words, it is by “giving” first and second-rank positions and other goods of political value that the government “receives” the ability to govern and pass reforms (or nonsense) in Congress, forming a certain majority. The less ideologized and more pragmatic the voter, the greater the power of the political center, which will function as the balance between ideological poles. This is the benign, republican version that results from the political process in similar democracies.

From this perspective, the center and pragmatism of a large part of the Brazilian electorate may have been decisive for the Brazilian government not to have adhered to the extreme left package in the last two decades, in contrast to its Latin American neighbors.

However, the model here has become dysfunctional, dominated by amoral physiologism, of pure thirst for power, favors and personal interests. If, on the one hand, the political system legalizes amorality, on the other hand, Brazilian practice does not make it desirable or moral.

The center was conceived during the Constituent Assembly. Its main executor was the federal deputy from São Paulo Roberto Cardoso Alves, known as “Robertão”, creator of the motto “it is in giving that one receives”.

In the FHC administration, much was given and received to guarantee the opportunistic rule that allowed his reelection. In the Lula and Dilma governments, the modus operandi migrated from amoral republicanism to governability bought with public money (mensalão), and finally to uncontrolled corruption (petrolão), respectively.

During the campaign, Jair Bolsonaro fiercely attacked the center. Elected, he was reluctant to negotiate, but decided on marriage. The presence of Ciro Nogueira (PP) in the Civil House, the migration to the PL of Valdemar Costa Neto and the dozens of positions in the government demonstrate the harsh reality.

The parties that support the government do not have a clear political ideology and pursue a personal agenda distinct from that of the citizen. The problem is not the legitimate existence of a political center, but the practice of manipulating the distribution of resources to electoral strongholds in order to determine their vote, the so-called legislative particularism.

Together with the president, they supported an execrable increase in party and electoral funds, concentrating even more power on their chiefs. And they greatly expanded the practice of parliamentary amendments, Union funds (without specific approval by Congress) distributed to mayors and allied local politicians.

To make matters worse, they passed the steamroller in Lava Jato, in the discussions about the arrest in the second instance and the end of the privileged forum, and approved additional expenses such as Auxílio Brasil, gas voucher, amnesty for Fies, 13th in advance, Refis, etc.

In this 2022, more important than the presidential election is the election of a better Congress, focused on State reform. A recent survey by Poder 360 indicated that the percentage of Brazilians who call themselves the center dropped from 25% to 17%. Polarization explains much of the phenomenon.

Let’s keep fighting for less physiologism and more parliamentarians who defend a less intrusive State.​