Counts her wounds Thessaly after the biblical disaster caused by the storm Daniel, with the State putting as first priority the relief of flood victims, individuals and businesses, and the restoration of structures and property damage.

At the same time, however, the debate opens on what should have been done to mitigate the disaster and what was not done. In particular, after his intervention Supreme Courtthey are targeted projects that had been funded and were not carried out, the works that were done, but did not yield due to poor workmanship and those responsible, at all levels.

The prosecutor of the Supreme Court requested the conduct of targeted investigations on specific projects, as well as in-depth research on post-Jan funds that were earmarked for flood protection projects.

The cast includes mainly municipal authorities of Karditsa and his Volos and the Thessaly Region.

The reporters of SKAI were at the places of the works that should have been done after Janos and recorded the situation after the passage of the disastrous bad weather Daniel.

The intervention of the prosecutor of the Supreme Court in detail:

To Mr. First Instance Prosecutors

Volos, Karditsa, Larisa and Trikala

In view of the biblical destruction of Thessaly by the onset of bad weather “Daniel”, with incalculable effects on the economy, the environment, infrastructure, property, etc., primarily as a result of the loss of human lives and regardless of any relationship of this weather phenomenon with the climate change, which however has long been known to all of us, we ask for your own actions to verify any ex officio criminal acts, such as flooding (with possible intent or negligence), manslaughter by serial omission, breach of duty, infidelity, exposure, etc.

In the above context, among others, based on the attached publications, it should be investigated, due to your local competence:

1. What exact measures did the Regional Governor of Thessaly, the competent rural Deputy Regional Governors of Magnesia, Karditsa, Trikala and Larissa, the thematic Deputy Regional Governor for climate crisis and civil protection, the Mayor of Volos and the relevant Deputy Mayors, the Mayor of Karditsa and the relevant Deputy Mayors, take after the bad weather “Ianos” in 2020, at the level of prevention, i.e. the execution of anti-flood works, but also after the accurate prediction of the extent of the “Daniel” phenomenon by the National Meteorological Service, in order to avoid or at least reduce its effects and, above all, to protect the lives of their fellow citizens. That is, before the phenomenon, but also during the phenomenon, at the level of coordination of those responsible for the civil protection of their services.

2. The exact amount of funds allocated for anti-flood projects by the Region of Thessaly and the Municipalities of Volos and Karditsa, in the three years 2020-2023, as well as the amounts allocated for other purposes, such as e.g. for road and sports projects or for communication.

3. Which anti-flood projects were carried out by the Region of Thessaly in all prefectures of Thessaly, as well as by the Mayor of Volos in the Municipality of Volos, and by the Mayor of Karditsa in the Municipality of Karditsa, in the three years 2020-2023, which were not carried out and which were not completed and for what reasons. How effective were the projects that were done, as well as whether their respective studies took into account storms similar to “Daniel”.

4. If the construction of the above anti-flooding works was in accordance with the rules of art and science, as for example the bridge of the stream Xeria in Almyros of Magnesia, which was affected by the floods of “Ianos” and was reconstructed (“upgraded” or otherwise “restored or strengthened”) end of 2022 with Spring of 2023, to finally collapse part of it in September 2023, controlling in case of death, in addition to the other responsible and the contractors of the specific projects.

5. If the projects carried out by the Region of Thessaly and the Municipalities of Karditsa and Volos after “Ianos” were included in an overall study that connects the individual projects with the aim of dealing with the flood problem as a whole, or piecemeal, small-scale , and without control.

6. If the allegations are true that the Region of Thessaly or the Municipality of Karditsa (or jointly) intervened in the dam of the Karambalis River or anywhere else, in order to protect the Municipality of Karditsa from flooding, although they knew that in this way they would flood the villages in the area, which they did not hurry to evacuate beforehand, or that deliberately and in order not to flood the city, the embankments on the upper river in the plain were not strengthened, while the embankments towards the city of Karditsa were strengthened, with the result the river overflowed there and huge volumes of water poured out, which inundated the villages of the plain.

7. If the pumping station of the Old Port Authority and the rainwater collection & discharge tanks in Neapolis were operating in the city of Volos, and in the unlikely event that this contributed to the intensity of the flood.

8. Why was no special hydraulic project built, on the bridge of the OSE on Papadiamanti street, in the Krausidona river, in the city of Volos, and if because of this omission the Krausidona overflowed, resulting in the destruction of infrastructure and properties.

9. For what reasons is the completion of the Enipeas dam project in Farsala delayed, which is estimated to shield the area, with the result that three years after “Ianos”, when the marking of its criticality had been updated, it is in the second tender phase of the study.

10. If of the funding of approximately 12,500,000 euros received by the Municipality of Karditsa for damage restoration and anti-flooding projects after Janos, 60% was allocated for “showcase” projects and “other purposes” and only the remaining money was given for related projects solely with the effects of “Janus” or the prevention of a similar threat in the future.

11. If the respondents proceeded with the construction of showcase projects rather than restoration of the “Ianos” damages, in asphalt paving projects in areas that had not been affected and in contracts with such high discounts as to raise doubts about the quality and adequacy of the projects from the beginning, investigating in this case also the contractors of the relevant projects.