THE President of the Republic Katerina Sakellaropoulou attended the opening of the seminar this morning “Judicial Renaissance”which is co-organized by Council of State, the School of Law of EKPA and the National Judicial College of the USAat the University of Athens.

During her greeting, Mrs. Sakellaropoulou emphasized, among other things:

“Law is rendered and evolves within specific economic and political conditions. However, it cannot and should not be identified with them, especially with politics. Moreover, this is what the democratic principle and the separation of powers dictate.”

He also argued that “despite the differences of the two legal orders, their value proximity to the great and emblematic decisions of the American and Greek courts and their commitment to political liberalism is historically a given.” As he noted, “in this common code of values ​​and beliefs lies not only the core of the correct administration of justice, but more broadly the guarantee of the democratic and liberal character of our polity”.

Sakellaropoulou

The full greeting of the President of the Republic was as follows:

“I am particularly happy to attend the opening of the seminar organized by the National Judicial College of the USA and in which the Council of State and the Law School of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens participate. I would like to warmly congratulate the organizers for this important initiative, which brings together jurists, especially judges, from both sides of the Atlantic.

Traditionally, continental law contrasted with the common law, which was born in Great Britain and passed on to the USA. One of their fundamental differences is found in the role of the judge. In common law countries, case law is officially a source of law and fundamental principles are based on court decisions. The judge undertakes, within the framework of the separation of powers, to co-shape and interpret the rule. On the contrary, in his classic continental model, the judge is the “mouth of the law”, according to Montesquieu’s expression, i.e. he reproduces the will of the legislator, respecting the latter’s democratic legitimation.

However, these two schematic representations prove to be much more complex in legal reality and for this reason comparative examination and study is always particularly useful, methodologically and substantively. This is particularly true in the field of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws, which has greatly changed the representation and institutional role of the judge in continental countries as well.

Greece is at the crossroads of two constitutional traditions. As is known, it is one of the few countries that, long before the consolidation of the Kelsen centralized control model in Europe, had turned to the American tradition of judicial review. For more than a century and a half, there has been a widespread review of the constitutionality of laws in our country, that is, every judge, regardless of his position in the hierarchy, has the authority, but also the obligation, not to apply a law that contradicts the Constitution. The American understanding of the Constitution as a higher law, which must in practice prevail over all others, as formulated in the iconic decision Marbury v. Madison, fundamentally influenced the thinking of Greek jurists in the 19th century and sealed our understanding of the relationship between the Constitution and the common law.

After the war, the consolidation of the Rule of Law in our country and in Europe was directly related to the strong position of the judge in our legal systems. The crisis of law and parliamentary representation reinforced the idea of ​​democracy of counterweights and the protection of minorities from possible arbitrariness and the power of the majority. Especially in the times we live in, when our society has been and continues to be faced with multiple crises, such as the economy, the pandemic and climate change, the judge bears even greater burdens in the interpretation and application of the Constitution. At the same time, the citizens’ expectations of him are increasing. The judicial discourse acquires a wider audience and the so-called hard cases in theory occupy the public sphere intensely. In view of the dangers of our time, the delimitation of the limitations of rights is reduced to a major gamble. The recent jurisprudence, which was called upon to balance in exceptional circumstances, demonstrated the close link of rights with the public interest and the fact that the relationship between judge and legislator is governed by complex juridico-political as well as technocratic weightings.

Especially when exercising the constitutionality control of laws, the judge emerges as a regulator of relations between state bodies, a guarantor of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and other supranational texts and a pillar of the rule of law and democracy, above all when these are imposed. By using the appropriate methodological tools and rules, such as the principle of proportionality in our law, by observing judicial ethics and being committed to principles such as impartiality, neutrality and empathy, the modern judge must harmonize the rule and the sometimes disruptive events, without confusing them. Law is rendered and developed within specific economic and political conditions. However, it cannot and should not be identified with them, especially with politics. Moreover, this is what the democratic principle and the separation of powers dictate.

Despite the differences of the two legal orders, their value proximity to the great and emblematic decisions of the American and Greek courts and their commitment to political liberalism is historically a given. In this common code of values ​​and beliefs lies not only the core of the correct administration of justice, but more broadly the guarantee of the democratic and liberal character of our culture”.