By Stefanos Nikolaidis
The public position of the Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan – that “you say 12, we say 6, let’s talk» for the territorial waters and that “permanent peace in the Aegean is possible– signaled one rhetorical section. For the first time at such a high level, the term “casus belli“, h formal threat of war which for decades constituted corner element her Turkish wording against her extension of Greek territorial waters.
The moment matters: it comes in one moment of repositioning Turkey internationally (diplomatic contacts with USA/EU, need for technological/defense meansand geopolitical realignments in the Eastern Mediterranean). But — as analysts say — the tone is not enough to prove it change of strategy. The question that concerns is simple but critical: we are talking about one true policy shift or for communication maneuver which targets her external image and the internal political games her Ankara;
It is not the first time that Anchor attempts to change “language”. But it is first time who does it visible in one occasion which she herself feels strong — and that changes her meaning of words.
From casus belli to public debate
The casus belli — document resolution of Turkish National Assembly the 1995 — had been for years strong communicator and legal instrument her Ankara to fend off every Greek thought about extension of territorial waters to 12 miles. OR rhetoric she functioned as “political security“, but also as pressure leverespecially in tension phases.
The new wording Fidan —’let’s find them“—, although at the level of speech it seems more “gently”, does not automatically weaken them legal and strategic choices her Ankara. On the contrary, it opens technical/exploratory discussion window which they may legitimize positions and claims under theprotection» his dialogue.
THE Hakan Fidan it’s not “random’ discourse distributor. Coming from the area of secret services and close associate of the leadershiphe knows what does he say and When. OR change of rhetoric shows that the Turkey trying to balance many factors at once: gain access to technologies/weapons and political legitimacy in the West, push for economic/energy opportunities and at the same time mitigate political costs at home.
What emerges is one external “invitation” mix in dialogue and internal policy: o Fidan poses a new story which also serves a possible transition path of power in Turkey — but without being institutionally binding (National Assembly, legal texts) the “residue» her Blue Homeland.
How much substance is hidden in this “peaceful” language – The Turkish turn and American pressures
As the internationalist explains Alexandros Despotopoulosan important parameter is American dimension: the USA and large energy companies (Chevron, ExxonMobil) want access and stability so that they invest in Mediterranean.
“Chevron clearly went to pieces that are based on the Turkish-Libyan memorandum“, notes Despotopoulos — and this is what he practices indirect pressure in Anchor to change tone. At the same time, Turkey seeks to “unlock» technological/defense (eg F-35) and diplomatic openingsbut finds wall in EU and to States that connect security issues with respect in international legalities.
OR energy reappearance of Israel to map and the imminent involvement of American companies intensify it feeling of pressure in Anchor — and explain some of the “gentle» rhetoric.
The Fidan narrative, the casus belli bluff, and the inner game of succession
The professor of International Relations Theory at the University of Macedonia Spyros Litsas places the fact in internal political context. “Fidan is building a political profile of a dolphin. This is not a change in high strategy»
Mr. Litsa’s message is clear: the “end of casus belli” which is shown is mainly rhetorical trick — one bluff which can be used as lever of international legalization or as internal tool in course of succession.
The professor, in fact, warns her Greece to don’t get “trapped» talking to conditions where legitimize Turkish claims (eg 12 mile restriction) and to bring her Ankara opposite with her essence of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine.
The Greek reading — Realism without illusions
Finally, the professor of International Law and Member of Parliament of the ND Angel Syrigos hits him bell of attention. “This seemingly innocent and mild is also the most suspicious of all.»
As he emphasizes, Turkey says now “let’s discuss how to increase your territorial waters” — but the increase in territorial waters it is unilateral right and it is not discussed.
Mr. Syrigos points out that the Fidan movement also works as trap: if the Greece come in negotiation “by 12”can legitimize a procedure which after all restricts Greek rights or it makes negotiable what is not. At the same time, behavior her Ankara opposite to pseudo state and the palinodes in region show that the “soft” rhetoric accompanied by pursuits to convert o dialogue in pressure medium.
Scripts which should be kept in mind Athens:
- Realistic technical approach scenario: Turkey opens space for exploratory/technical discussions — potential to ‘freeze’ tensions at crisis management level. Useful for de-escalation, but dangerous if it becomes a framework for legitimizing claims.
- Tactical maneuver scenario: Ankara changes rhetoric for external coverage (US/EU) and internal management (succession, internal legitimation). The casus belli remains a “tool” in the drawer.
- “dialogue trap” scenario“: The discussion turns into a negotiation on non-negotiable issues (unilateral right of extension), with the risk of “compromises” at the expense of Greek sovereignty.
Who holds the initiative and what is the Greek opportunity
The language of Ankara has changed — and this must be exploited by Greek diplomacy without getting carried away. OR challenge for her Athens is twofold: not to be trapped in dialogues which legitimize Turkish claims and at the same time to utilize each rift at international support her Turkey (energy alliances, policy changes in Libya, EU-US stance) to promote solutions which reinforce it Law of the Sea and her Greek position.
Practical steps required:
- To insist on technical/legal documentation of Greek rights (maritime rights, EEZ, continental shelf) and promote multilateral dialogue forums where the participation of third parties (e.g. USA, EU, Egypt, Cyprus) will strengthen the Greek position
- Don’t convert it casus belli in “bargaining unit’ — that is, not to treat it as line of negotiationbut to describe it as communication tactics her Ankara and to ask institutional guarantees
- To make use of it international investment flow (energy) for benefit her geopolitical stability, creating “facts on the sea» — not with rough compromises, but with agreements who respect it Law of the Sea.
In closing, the rhetoric of Fidan it can be opportunity — but it is first of all test. OR Greece must spend it with composure, legal competence and pstrategic diplomacy: to sit on table when it comes to technical consultations which do not affect unilateral rightsbut at the same time not to leave him dialogue to turn into negotiation her sovereignty her.
The language of Turkey is changing. The question is whether her policy is changing as well — or just the way she serves it.
Source: Skai
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