Putin’s nuclear threat highlights chess in which only one side plays transparently

Vladimir Putin reiterated on September 30, a Friday, his literally terrible threat: to use nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory during the current Ukrainian War. He cited the US precedent in Japan at the end of World War II. But is the Russian leader not bluffing?

It might be. Just in case, however, the US and its allies in NATO, the western military alliance, believe it is plausible that the crazy Russian leader exceeds a limit that Moscow, in the days of the Soviet Union and in the more than four decades of the Cold War, did not dared to cross.

The subject is explored in technical and political detail by the British newspaper The Guardian, in a podcast in which journalists and experts Andrew Roth and Michael Safi participated. Like NATO, they take the threat seriously and talk about possible reactions from the West.

Let’s look at a starting point of the discussion. Nuclear weapons were not meant to be used. They are so incredibly destructive — they can wipe out humanity in a few minutes — that they exist only as a deterrent. That is, I have it but I don’t use it, because I know you have it and you won’t use it either.

Today, a very small group of eight countries have the atomic bomb — or nine if that is already the case with Iran. Their military commanders see their territories as “sanctuaries”. No one would invade them without, theoretically, the risk of getting nuclear payoff.

Putin’s threats are a break from good habits of deterrence. Instead of using the bomb to reiterate the inviolability of his territory, he claims that he would ostensibly go on the offensive. And with nuclear weapons. That is wrong.

Rationally, says the Guardian, there are three scenarios for the Russian detonation of an atomic bomb. For the first, the traditional doctrine of that country would be respected, which sees the warhead as a response to the violation of its “existential territory”. The physical area of ​​Moscow, for example.

The second scenario provides a response to the inviolability of a territory that Russia claims to be its own, but whose possession is not recognized by the international community. This is the case of Crimea, which Moscow annexed in 2014 and which Ukraine does not recognize as a Russian peninsula.

Finally, the third possibility would be in the inviolability of the four Ukrainian territories with the Russian-speaking population whose annexation Putin made official on the same Friday that he threatened to use nuclear weapons. But this possibility is for many reasons problematic.

And that’s because Russia does not have full possession of these provinces, is losing territory to Ukrainian troops and has even lost possession of strategically important cities within them. Detail: Moscow did not release maps. In other words, it does not possess, even for internal use, proof that it exercises sovereignty over a given territory.

As for the bomb itself. Andrew Roth points out that, due to the lack of precedent, it is difficult to discuss the technical details that precede a detonation. But it is likely that the Russian General Staff is considering something with relatively low destructive power, with the 15 kilotons (equivalent to 1,000 tons of gunpowder) that exploded in Hiroshima and today can destroy a small town.

This bomb doesn’t ride around the battlefield on the back of a truck. It is stored in silos from which it would be removed and transported by special train to the explosion site. And this with relative publicity, so that Westerners know what awaits them and can eventually negotiate a diplomatic outcome (eg, recognizing Russian rights over annexed territories, with Ukraine laying down its weapons and ending the conflict).

But this script also has Putin’s bluff embedded in it. He would know that he will not use the atomic bomb and only hope that Ukraine and its western allies will stop fighting and allow Russia an honorable way out. It would no longer be threatened by the military defeat that the Kiev government believes is possible.

In short, we are faced with a chess card in which the stones are moved without knowing what is in the Russian player’s head. NATO players, by contrast, have their moves more transparent in terms of intent.

To recap. NATO has not provided Ukraine with offensive weapons that could be used against Russian territory. The Ukrainians do not have long-range missiles. This makes them inferior in this war. And it is an unpopular war. The proof is in the profoundly negative reactions Putin has aroused to his plans to recruit 300,000 new troops. Russia is a dictatorship, Putin has no opposition. And he can use the nuclear threat irresponsibly.