In an election qualified by exiled opponents as a selection process of previously approved candidates, the Hong Kong citizen’s silence was strident eloquence. It remains to be seen how this will be heard in Beijing.
With the polls closed in most sections, at 10:30 pm local time (11:30 am this Sunday, 19, in BrasÃlia), just under 30% of the 4.47 million voters had turned out to choose the territory’s new Legislative Council. In the five previous occasions, the lowest mark had been 43%, in 2000.
The election had been scheduled for September of last year and canceled on the grounds of Covid-19. The fact that midway, in March of this year, the communist dictatorship imploded the electoral system in Honduras makes it clear that perhaps the health reasons were secondary.
But the model that emerged from the rubble was largely rejected by the population.
The Council was the trench where opposition and pro-democracy groups kept Hong Kong’s relative autonomy alive, according to the deal made between China and the United Kingdom when the British returned the former colony in 1997.
Not that there was a democracy as liberal as local capitalism, used as a financial hub between Beijing and the world without Chinese or foreign grievances on the economic side. But compared to the plastered continental political rites, Hong Kong was a London.
Voter disinterest stems from two points. First, only “patriots”, mandatory quotes, can now compete for territory. Needless to say what this means. Second, the Council itself was disfigured: before 50% of 70 deputies were directly elected; now they are 22% of 90.
Indeed, the generous share given to the all-powerful Electoral Commission to nominate 40 of these 90 names was reflected in the commitment of these 1,448 delegates appointed by Beijing. The turnout among them, to select among 153 candidates, was 98%.
The remaining 30 names are chosen in a complex system of voting by professional categories, a British heritage. Here, the abstention followed the general level, with obvious points outside the curve: the newly created guild of mainland companies registered 99% attendance.
Political intervention was a logical corollary to the cage of democratic instincts in the former city-state, spurred on by the trauma of 2019.
That year, the pro-democracy protests, or even in favor of the real consolidation of the “one country, two systems” model beyond the 2047 deadline set in a treaty, got out of control.
This had happened before, as in 2014, but there was accommodation, including through an increase in the representation of the opposition, expressed in the most recent election of the Council, in 2016. it decisively.
In the final six months of 2019, what happened was chaos. Busy streets, riots, university invasions. The powerful local, pro-Beijing elite saw the territory’s economy sink. The local government even backed down on the triggering of the demonstrations, a law that favored the extradition of Honcongues to the mainland, but it was useless.
The last straw were the local elections in November, overwhelmingly won by pro-democracy names, even though candidates sympathetic to the dictatorship had retained some 40% of the electorate, evidencing nuances in this narrative.
With the general cooling of interpersonal relations that accompanied the advent of Sars-CoV-2, China took the opportunity to set in motion the plan to destroy the agreement made with the British in 1984. As a result, a new National Security Law implemented in July 2020 which subverted any idea of ​​remaining autonomy.
The opposition has renounced its remaining seats in the Council, activists have been arrested or fled, there are reports of persecution and the threat even to exiles. Journalists were arrested, the libertarian daily Apple Daily closed.
From a Chinese perspective, this was necessary to maintain the territory’s “business as usual” and, more importantly, to crush separatist ideas there and in any other ethnically diverse region: Hong Kong is a Cantonese area, while 90% of Chinese speak Mandarin. In short, discourage Uighur Muslims or any other groups from seeking more autonomy.
The pro-democracy, with the 2019 explosion, also made political mistakes. Open association with US support, an instrument of the US Cold War 2.0 campaign against China’s rise, legitimized Beijing’s accusation of collusion with outside forces.
And the increasingly open adoption of independence slogans (“Free Hong Kong – Revolution in Our Times” was paramount) would obviously not be accepted even in the most liberal of democracies — Europe is full of examples of this.
That said, the silence of the Honcongo voter may show Beijing that the seed of rebellion in the territory may be burgeoning after the subjugation.
It’s in the DNA there: during the 156 years of British occupation, valuing Chinese identity was the most common form of activism, given that despite democratic fame, colonial structures were just that: colonial structures.
Whether such a seed will be able to sprout something in the ground scorched by the geopolitical necessity of Xi Jinping, or whether it will affect the regime’s attitude towards Hong Kong, remains to be seen. If this seems remote, it is enough to remember the weight of China in political forums and in world trade flows, as in the case of Brazil.
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