Days go by and the international community observes how uncertainty grows and certainties around the Ukraine crisis are reduced. However, certain aspects remain untouched. For example, there is no doubt that the cold war between East and West is capable of re-emergence in new ways. There is also the certainty that the Ukraine crisis is part of a confrontation between Moscow and Washington that managed to galvanize – and misinform – the public opinions of their respective blocs, to avoid the emergence of an independent perspective of their reports.
The world remains hopeful. Latin America observes the risk of a new military confrontation from a distance, wondering what its consequences could be, and China, far from remaining an observer, has already given its diplomatic support to Russia. In the United States, President Biden has assured that Russian troops stationed on the border will invade Ukraine in February. And in the European Union, it is also not certain that the countries will maintain a united front against Russia, unless Moscow invades Kiev permanently. Among other reasons, because a plan B that involves breaking up the country is maintained for a long time.
In fact, it was the acceptance of Ukraine’s division that was at the heart of President Biden’s lapse a few days ago, when he said that limited Russian intervention in Ukraine would have only a moderate response from the United States and NATO. In other words, if Moscow limited itself to intervening in Ukraine from the east to gather the territories where the Russian population lives, segmenting it from the rest of the country, this would be a problem not as serious as if it intervened in the western part of the country. In the end, Biden points to solution B that has been hovering over this conflict: the division of Ukraine.
That option would avoid the risks to both sides of a full Russian invasion, including Kiev. For Moscow, because if it invaded the western part of Ukraine, it would definitely lose European public opinion, whose division it takes advantage of. For Washington, because it knows that NATO could not respond militarily on Ukrainian territory, because that country does not belong – yet – to the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, limited intervention, dividing the country, could be a solution of last resort.
Certainly, voices are emerging in Europe against the militarization of the conflict. Several minority political groups, such as Podemos in Spain, are against sending national forces into the conflict zone. But his “no to war” only offers proposals for its solution.
A few decades ago, the once powerful European peace movement had suggested a prospect that seemed possible: the path to neutrality. This option brought back the European memory of the 20th century well, especially in countries that had suffered the same circumstance that Ukraine now suffers: finding itself in a sandwich between the forces of the east and the west. These were, for example, the cases of Austria and Finland, which, in addition to Sweden, made good use of their neutral status.
Moving in this direction, Ukraine could belong to the European Union without belonging to NATO, as Austria and Finland did. A neutral status for Ukraine, without many formalities, but recognized by both blocs, would be the best defense of a Ukraine without divisions.
While not entirely to Moscow’s taste, a neutral Ukraine would eliminate Russian arguments about the risk to its security posed by NATO’s advance on its borders, which convinces its citizens. Of course, on the western side, Ukraine’s neutrality would mean abandoning its penchant for the old Cold War Atlanticism; something they don’t seem willing to let go of, especially Washington, which has just responded with a resounding ‘no’ to the Russian request to agree that Ukraine would never be part of NATO.
However, the emergence of a current of opinion in favor of Ukraine’s neutrality in Europe greatly favors a properly European security option, which would strengthen the detente and the interests of commercial exchange with Russia, starting with energy products.
The question is: where could this current of opinion come from? The old peace movements ceased to exist or were transformed into organizations of study or humanitarian assistance. Minority political groups that reject the threat of war cannot let go of their suspicion of favoring Moscow’s interests. Conservative parties undoubtedly absorb the renewed Atlanticist narrative. And social democracy is divided on this issue in the main European countries.
However, it seems evident that the country that would gain the most from this perspective of neutrality is precisely Ukraine. Not only because it would restore stable security, but because it could put into practice one of its biggest economic dreams: to act as a bridge between the Russian and European Union markets (today Ukrainian products are mainly destined for the Russian market). But those advantages must also be clear in Ukraine itself, where public opinion remains divided.
A current favorable to this perspective of neutrality, similar to that of Austria or Sweden, could also be promoted through the good offices of the United Nations. But the words spoken by its Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, were not very fortunate in asserting that he is “completely certain that Russia will never invade Ukraine”.
Guterres’ trust should not be the basis for the United Nations to act in the face of this conflict. It seems that the capacity for initiative, with sufficient audacity and solvency, is not today an attribute possessed by the international organization that should defend world peace. If armed conflict does occur, it will prove once again that the international community — including Latin America — does not seem to have learned much in terms of prevention, even after a pandemic.
