With about two months before the election in France, the current president, Emmanuel Macron, takes his time to make the candidacy official, while polls show that issues such as Covid and the economy worry the French.
For Frédéric Dabi, director general of opinion at Ifop (French Institute of Public Opinion), one of the country’s main research institutes, it is the prerogative of the leader seeking re-election to dictate the pace of his campaign, but that could end up complicating Macron. “He will have to enter the game in a context in which he may be fragile, with disappointments because of the pandemic and especially the purchasing power”, he analyzes to the leaf.
The sociologist does not see as a mishap, however, the recent speech about wanting to “annoy the unvaccinated” – in an interview, Macron used the verb “emmerder”, a colloquial register that can be considered a swear word. According to Dabi, this part of the population is a minority and is in the camp of the ultra-rightists Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour.
“The consequences will be greater if Covid follows and if the French feel that the real problems are not being addressed in the campaign.” Another risk, in this scenario, is record abstention.
like mr. evaluate Macron’s electoral strategy? Is not having officially launched as a candidate part of this planning yet? It’s a normal strategy for a running president. He owns the time, the clocks, he can wait. As long as Covid is not completely over and there are candidates who compete with each other, he is calm.
The campaign will be short, the election will be on April 10th — in other years it was around the 25th, so there are 15 days less. Undoubtedly, he will have to enter the game in a context in which he may be fragile, with disappointments because of Covid and especially in terms of purchasing power.
Even without an official candidacy, his party launched a website at the end of January without fanfare, with the speech of not campaigning against a part of the French. What can be deduced from this message? It’s a classic message, meeting around the outgoing president. It was made by Francois Mitterand [1981-1995]. But one cannot forget that Macron does not have the characteristics of a unifier; it is someone who divides, with the proposal of “irritating the unvaccinated”, who polarizes opinion.
So a rallying campaign would go wrong, it would not be coherent with the image that Macron gives off. In terms of image, it is more associated with authority skills, the ability to change things, and less with proximity to the concerns of the French.
Can this posture change if he feels threatened? Macron is a president who has adapted a lot. It will take into account the health context, the European context, the attacks. We are not in an anti-Macron campaign like we were in 2012 with [Nicolas] Sarkozy. In my opinion, he will use the two levers that made his campaign, distinction (no one would do better than him) and transformation (after all, he changed things in the country).
As for the anti-vaccinations, he adopted a harsh tone. Isn’t it a risk? It may be, but he mobilized the field itself. Most of the French are vaccinated, they took the booster dose. It is true that perhaps he said something that does not suit a president, it is a risk for the second round if there is a logic of eliminating Macron – but not for the first.
He may have gathered his base, spoken to a majority and where his constituency is. Among the unvaccinated there are many abstentionists, voters of Zemmour and Le Pen, and yet they are in the minority. The consequences will be greater if Covid follows, if the campaign is truncated, if the French feel that the real problems are not being addressed. In that case, the danger would be a massive abstention in protest, some of what was seen in regional elections. [de 2021].
Does this speech force the other candidates’ position on vaccination? I do not think so. Candidates who want to take Macron’s place will show their ability to have a vision for the country. The issue of health will be important, but it is not limited to Covid or vaccination.
Important issues include, for example, the salary increase, which the French are protesting. How have candidates reacted to this? There is a rush to promise things like paychecks, minimum wage, aid to young people. There is also purchasing power, which, if it becomes as structuring as in 2017, could have important consequences. It can socialize the campaign and put the current president in difficulty, because if the French are unhappy with that, they will turn against whoever is leaving.
In 2017, it was “easy” for the other candidates, because there was no president running [François Hollande não buscou a reeleição]. Now there is, and he can be weakened — even because there are arguments to oppose his record on this issue.
How do you see the fact that the four best placed in the polls are from the right field? We have a evaporated left, without a strong candidate. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is with 9% to 10%, and the total voting intentions [em nomes da esquerda] is less than 25%, which was never seen in the Fifth Republic. There is, however, one exception. Macron is a president who cannot be described as a leftist, but who nevertheless enjoys the support of a not inconsiderable part of these voters. On average, 45% of French people are on the left, very left or center left. The electoral tradition is to get 25%, so where did those 20 points go? [45% menos 25%]? They are abstaining or with Macron.
But it is true that a major flaw in this campaign is this “ultra-right primary” between Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour, which gives the impression of a campaign with a very right-wing tone.
What is the impact of Zemmour’s candidacy? There is a sociodemographic impact, because he is a candidate who draws on two electoral sources. In our polls, he managed to capture 20% to 25% of the voters of François Fillon and Le Pen in 2017.
It transforms Le Pen’s position and status, even if she is in a position to reach the second round — in a context in which, paradoxically, Zemmour’s presence may have done her image well, as it was heavily taken to the center. She passed the extremism shirt to Zemmour.
How is Valérie Pécresse inserted in the dispute? I wouldn’t say she’s a favorite for Le Pen’s place. She has a vintage right-wing structure, in the sense that she manages to capture this traditional electorate, the older, retired ones. But she fights to broaden this right-wing base, to stand out among young people, who don’t know her, among workers.
She doesn’t have the notoriety that Fillon had in 2017 or Sarkozy in 2012. She needs to have a brand, that the French identify her as the anti-Macron candidate, of the renewal, a woman who could reach the [Palácio do] Elisha.
Last year, Macron sought communication with young people, giving interviews to youtubers, while Zemmour’s supporters have a lot of presence on social media. How do candidates work in this scenario? Youth is an important issue for them. It is an electoral clientele that, even if it counts little, may have the logic of being an opinion leader. With the Covid factor, with Macron’s phrase that it’s hard to be 20 years old (said in October 2020), youth is central to the proposals.
In a presidential election, it is a mandatory ticket, even for those who have no chance with young people. What will be interesting to see is whether young people will vote. The abstentionist cycle encourages prudence, as well as the challenge of this youth to political actions, especially on the climate issue.
Why is Zemmour increasing the extremist tone? In the polls, he filled the vacuum created after his proposals linked to children with disabilities. [defendeu que elas não deveriam frequentar escolas regulares]. It is in a logic of radical distinction in its proposals, mainly on self-defense [implementar uma chamada “defesa escusável” para a população combater criminosos]a bit like [Jair] Bolsonaro.
In other words, there is a real radicalization to try to win the vote of the right and the ultra-right with a double speech, on the one hand saying that Le Pen does not have the strength to defeat Macron, as in 2017, and on the other the idea that Pécresse will not go deliver on its promises, as Sarkozy did not in 2007.
Two months before the election, the scenario remains undefined. How does this impact strategies? The campaign is not over, it has barely begun. Covid freezes things, maybe prevents the campaign from happening normally. And the risk of record abstention is possible, perhaps probable.
What can she mean? That France is in an abstentionist electoral cycle never seen before, because in all elections after 2017 the French did not vote. If abstention goes from 25%, 28%, reaches 30%, which is possible, there will also be the idea that the first party in France will not be that of the candidate in first place, but that of the French who do not vote.
Frédéric Dabi, 52
Director General of Opinion at Ifop (French Institute of Public Opinion), one of the main ones in the country, is a specialist in political sociology and political communication from the Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne University. He is the author of the book “La Fracture” (The Fracture), about the relationship between youth and politics.
