The July 31 assassination of the head of Hamas’ political wing, Ismail Haniya, in downtown Tehran came as the Biden administration and Egyptian and Qatari mediators believed a Gaza truce was a matter of days. Benjamin Netanyahu had just completed his contacts in Washington, giving the impression that he had secured the green light to focus the Israeli military machine on the anti-Hezbollah front in Lebanon, subject to an imminent settlement of the situation in Gaza. At the same time, Mossad chief David Barnea delivered the final revised Israeli response – something that had been expected for months. Thus, everything predicted that, immediately after the return of Ismail Haniya from Tehran – where he was invited to attend the inauguration ceremony of the newly elected Iranian President – Hamas would submit its own written final response within the next few days.

However, in the Middle East the optimistic scenarios are not confirmed. Regardless of the heavily rumored Israeli involvement in the well-planned Haniya assassination – the details of which we may never know – there is no doubt that the Israeli side believes that complete military dominance over Hamas – inside and outside Gaza – is the only condition for forming a very specific desired “next day” in which the current leadership of this particular Palestinian organization should have no place whatsoever.

Surprisingly, a few hours after the assassination of Haniya, it did not take long for those around the White House to express optimistic assessments, expecting the strengthening of “more realistic voices” within Hamas. American assessments overlooked (or chose to overlook) that the profile cultivated by Ismail Haniya, gradually and systematically from the first behind-the-scenes negotiating contacts until his assassination, was the most moderate that this particular organization could present in wartime.

“Hamas Abroad” vs “Hamas Domestic”

The human geography of the Hamas leadership group has its own reality, and the vacuum left by Haniya had to be filled as soon as possible. On the other hand, if anything has hampered the outcome of the negotiations over the past ten months, it has been the strict barriers that existed between the political and military branches of Hamas. Specifically, when during the negotiations the political branch of “Hamas abroad” under Haniya and his entourage tended to accept the persuasions of the Qatari mediators, the leaders of the military branch of “Hamas abroad”, who were in one of the many Gaza tunnels adopted more radical positions, reminding in every direction that the reality on the ground was very different from the hosting conditions in Doha and elsewhere. Based on these data, the removal of the barriers between the political and the military part of the organization, was practically the direct goal of those governments that were involved, directly or indirectly, in the negotiation process.

Although a three-day window was informally set until Ismail Haniya’s successor emerged, external factors were reportedly involved in the internal processes – a phenomenon the likes of which had never before been noted with such intensity for the organization’s data. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates openly promoted Khaled Mashal, the second-in-command of “Hamas abroad” and Haniya’s right-hand man during negotiations. On the other hand, the candidacy of Khalil Al-Hayya, who also permanently settled in Qatar, expressed the positions of “Hamas internal” and Yahya Sinwar, head of the organization’s military branch. The criterion proposed by the Sinouar environment was simple: Haniya’s replacement must maintain close relations with Iran and the deep state of the Revolutionary Guards, who after Haniya’s assassination in central Tehran are expected to be its natural ‘patron’ Hamas, at least for the foreseeable future.

The Saudi “white smoke” did not prevail

While the differences did not seem to be bridged, on the afternoon of August 6, ‘white smoke’ appeared from the Saudi Al Arabiya TV network, which reported that the ‘interim leader’ of the political wing of Hamas had ’emerged’ as Mohammad Ismail Darwis, a low-key figure of “Hamas Abroad”. It remains unknown what exactly transpired seven hours later, when it became known that finally the head of the military branch of the organization (and leader of “Hamas internal”) Yahya Sinuar replaces Ismail Haniya, now becoming the sole master of the internal power game. According to the view (or the aspirations) of the Sinuar environment, the previous ‘tightness’ in the process of determining tactics regarding the negotiation process is a thing of the past. In fact, based on the current data, the current Hamas of Sinwar is strengthening its strategic ties with the Iranian factor – of course, it is enough for Tehran to decide exactly how it intends to manage such a difficult role.