The term of the newly elected Iranian president, Massoud Pezeskianbegan episodically with the assassination of the head of the political wing of Hamas, Ismail Haniyajust a few hours before the official inauguration ceremony. Since then the international community has been anxiously watching what will be the ‘appropriate’ Iranian response to Israel, accused by Tehran that he planned the execution of Haniya. However, as the days pass, the adversities that Pezeskian is called upon to face increase.

The Iranian president announced yesterday the composition of his 19-member government, in order to receive a vote of confidence from the National Assembly (Majlis). Indicative of Pezeskian’s willingness to open a new page in his country’s relations with the West is the choice of the person destined for the position of foreign minister. This is the 61-year-old experienced diplomat Abbas Aragchiwho had been the main negotiator in the talks to control Iran’s nuclear program from 2013-2021. Aragchi was chosen by the then president Hassan Rouhani, a typical exponent of the reformist tendencies of the domestic political scene.

An important peculiarity of Iranian parliamentarianism is the need to give a vote of confidence to each of the proposed ministers separately. It is a four-day process, during which a public debate takes place in the Majlis Plenary focusing on the suitability of each of the proposed ministers, followed by a vote, covered by the local media. Under the current special circumstances, the confidence vote process begins next Saturday, August 17, and effectively “buys time” for the Iranian political leadership in order not to be forced to make hasty decisions about the manner and timing of the retaliation, which it has already announced against Israel.

It is a fact that from July 31 until today there has been an interesting bilingualism on the part of the Iranian decision-making centers – a fact that could be interpreted in various ways.

Pressure is exerted by the Revolutionary Guards

On the one hand, Revolutionary Guards officials reiterate that “the military response against Israel will be harsh”, leaving open the possibility of hitting “Mossad substations located in other countries in the region”. On the other hand, at the diplomatic level, during the recent extraordinary meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Khani, at the end of his introduction, repeated the familiar formulation that his country “will decide on the appropriate time and manner of reaction’ – creating the impression that there is room to lower the treble. At the same time, Iran’s Permanent Mission to the UN made it clear that Iran will retaliate, but “hopes not to make it difficult to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza”, pointing out that “whatever decision Hamas takes on the issue, Tehran will respect it.” ». Finally, on August 8, the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that he would avenge the death of the head of his organization, Fouad Shukr, while making sure to emphasize that “it is up to Iran to decide how to avenge the death of Haniya”.

Combining these data, it is concluded that President Pezheskian is called upon to manage multiple decision-making centers, taking seriously the institutional seals of the Iranian political system. The newly elected Iranian president certainly did not forget (and cannot forget) the auspicious recommendation indirectly addressed to him on July 7 by the Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, just two days after the final second round of the presidential elections, when he had emphasized in public his position that the foreign policy of his predecessor, Ibrahim Raisi, “was based on the principle of dignity” – a concept evaluative and extremely familiar in the political language of the priesthood. At the same time, it cannot ignore the open channels maintained by the Revolutionary Guards with the forces of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” and above all with the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is de facto not completely bound by Tehran’s parliamentary timetables.

Rumored resignation of Vice President Javad Zarif

However, the adversities that Pezeskian has to face are not limited to managing the regional crisis in Gaza. A few hours after yesterday’s announcement of the composition of his new government, rumors abound that his newly installed vice-president of choice, a moderate and former foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has submitted his resignation, with it still not being clear whether Pezeskian he accepted her. Zarif reportedly disagrees with the selection criteria for the new ministers, which do not reflect Pezeskian’s reformist pre-election pledges. Their ideological past, their relatively advanced age, the inclusion of only one woman in the new cabinet and the absence of middle-class representatives are said to be among his objections.

And while it has not been confirmed whether Javad Zarif’s rumored resignation was finally legally submitted or accepted, as of yesterday a taped excerpt of a recent speech by him has been making the rounds online, claiming that “the Iranian people are tired of being ruled by governments that are trying to become more Palestinian by the Palestinians themselves”, adding that “the country’s Constitution stipulates that Iran must protect the oppressed, but not fight on their behalf”.