Russia’s military command had anticipated Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region and had made plans to prevent it several months in advance, according to documents the Ukrainian military seized from abandoned Russian positions in the region. .

The documents, shared with the Guardian website, also reveal Russian concerns about morale in the ranks in Kursk, which intensified after the suicide of a soldier at the front who was said to be in “prolonged depression due to his service in the Russian army.”

The Guardian was unable to independently verify the authenticity of the documents, although they bear the hallmarks of the Russian military. In late August, the Guardian met the Ukrainian special operations team that captured Kursk, hours after they had left Russian soil. The group said it had taken Russian Interior Ministry, FSB and military documents from buildings in the Kursk region. Some of these documents are paper orders distributed to various units, while others are handwritten records that record events and concerns at specific locations. The earliest listings date to late 2023, while the most recent documents come just six weeks before Ukraine launched its invasion of the Kursk region on August 6.

The documents are mostly from units of the 488th Guards Motorized Rifle Battalion of Russia, specifically the second company of the 17th Battalion.

Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk took Kiev’s Western partners and many in the Ukrainian elite by surprise, as the planning had been limited to a very small number of people. But Russian military documents contain months of warnings about a possible invasion of the region and an attempt to seize Shuja, a town of 5,000 people that has now been under Ukrainian occupation for more than a month.

An article from January 4 spoke of “the possibility of a major breakthrough on the state border” by Ukrainian armed groups and ordered increased training to prepare to repel any attack. On February 19, unit commanders were warned of Ukraine’s plans for a “rapid thrust from the Sumy region into Russian territory, at a depth of 80 kilometers [50 μίλια]to create a four-day “corridor” before the arrival of the main units of the Ukrainian army with armored vehicles.”

In mid-March, border units were ordered to reinforce defensive lines and “organize additional unit and strongpoint leadership exercises on proper defense organization” in preparation for a Ukrainian cross-border offensive.

In mid-June, there was a more specific warning about Ukrainian plans “in the Yunakivka-Sudzha direction, aiming to bring Sudzha under control,” which indeed happened in August. There was also a prediction that Ukraine would attempt to destroy a bridge over the Seym River to disrupt Russian supply lines in the area, which also happened later. The June document also said that Russian units stationed at the front “are only 60-70% full on average and consist mostly of poorly trained reservists.”

When the Ukrainian offensive came on August 6, many Russian soldiers abandoned their positions, and within a week Ukraine had taken full control of Shuja. “They ran away without even vacating or destroying their documents,” said a member of the special operations team that seized the files.

During Moscow’s chaotic retreat, Ukrainian forces captured hundreds of Russian soldiers, many of them conscripts.

The documents give insight into Russian tactics by talking about the need to create trenches and decoy positions to confuse Ukrainian reconnaissance drones. They also say that some soldiers should be sent to the decoy sites to light fires at night and walk with torches, and that Russia should set up radio conversations about the decoy sites, with the aim of intercepting them. It is unclear whether such positions were ever created.

Buried in the dry, tortuous official language are signs of serious problems with morale at the front. “Analysis of the current situation regarding suicides shows that the issue of military personnel dying as a result of suicide incidents remains tense,” reads one entry. It recounts an incident that allegedly took place on January 20 of this year, when a soldier entered the summer laundry on guard duty and shot himself in the abdomen.

Further instructions for maintaining army morale come in an undated, typewritten document which explains that soldiers should receive 5-10 minutes a day as well as an hour once a week of political instruction, “with the aim of maintaining and increasing the political, moral and psychological status of the staff”.