Taiwan always comes to the fore in analyzes of China’s position on the war in Ukraine.
Both Ukraine and Taiwan are objects of territorial claims by a power — Russia and China, respectively. There is speculation about the island’s future in light of the situation in the Eastern European country. Some believe that the lack of more decisive Western support for Kiev would have the effect of encouraging a Chinese military venture into Taipei.
Interestingly, despite major differences, both the US and China reject the comparison. For Americans, Taiwan has a strategic value that Ukraine does not. In relation to the island, there is the well-known policy of ambiguity: in order to deter Beijing, Washington deliberately does not make it clear whether it would militarily defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
Regarding Ukraine, there is nothing equivalent. On the contrary, in a policy of crystal clear clarity, the US announced since before the Russian invasion that, if there was one, they would not send troops to help the European country. Given the difference, China should not draw the wrong lessons from the nature of US involvement in Ukraine.
Just in case, in the early days of the war, Washington sent a delegation of officials to Taipei, reiterating its support and conveying the message to Beijing.
For China, the analogy does not hold because the circumstances are radically different. Ukraine is an independent country. Taiwan, by contrast, is recognized by only about a dozen nations. The principle of territorial integrity counts in Kiev’s favor, but it favors Beijing in its claims on Taiwan.
The Chinese want to avoid parallels with Taiwan, as it treats the issue as an internal matter, but they are especially eyeing robust sanctions on Russia, as well as the sending of war material to Ukraine, local resistance and the global repercussions of the conflict.
Despite being rejected by the US and China, comparisons thrive, including in Taipei. “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” is a slogan circulating on the island. Taiwanese see weapons and humanitarian aid entering the European country, but not foreign troops — and they wonder if this is just the kind of support they would be offered in the event of a Chinese military action.
There are fears in Beijing that the invasion of Ukraine will encourage the West to increase its support for Taiwan. The aim would be to dissuade China from doing what Russia did — this, however, would upset a delicate balance that has avoided confrontation in the region for four decades.
The Chinese fear the formation of a “Pacific NATO” turned against itself. The Quad, an arrangement involving the USA, Japan, India and Australia, could be its embryo. South Korea is considering joining the group. The secretary general of the military alliance himself began to treat China as a threat.
Beijing attributes responsibility for the current conflict to NATO and, in suggesting a Pacific NATO, suggests that it could reproduce the same problems as the original. That is, incurring enormous risks by disregarding China’s security interests — which NATO would have done to Moscow by expanding to Russia’s borders.
On that basis, condemning NATO, military alliances and the Cold War mentality is a central element of the Chinese narrative about the war in Ukraine.
Although Washington and Beijing agree that Ukraine and Taiwan are not comparable, the two great powers look to the European chessboard with their heads in Asia as well.
