“OR Eastern Europe no longer is at the center of American foreign policy … people dispute if the NATO It would be willing and could defend. ” One would expect to hear these views in Brussels, with European leaders missing by Donald Trump as he prepares talks about Ukraine with him Vladimir Putinwhile increasingly shifting the burden of security to its allies.

However, the above words were written more than 16 years ago, in a 2009 letter to Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, by top personalities from former countries Curtain such as Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Even then, the fear was that the US’s impulse to return with Russia, while turning to Asia, would make the east side of Europe more vulnerable. Today, when the Trump government says it is unlikely that Ukraine will return to its pre -2014 borders and that the biggest priority of security is China, one can imagine that US allies feel a feeling deja vuas well as anger.

In fact, there are so many examples of “first America” ​​that it is surprising to see Europeans so surprised. In 2013, hours before USA and France start a combined blow against Putin’s Syrian ally, Bashar al -AssadObama left Paris in a green clay with a turn at the last minute. In 2021, the chaotic unilateral departure of the Biden government troops from Afghanistan betrayed and enraged European allies, such as France. These events encouraged Putin and fueled his expectations for a post -American world. His push Trump For his … Russian restoration, along with his threats to duties in the EU worth $ 1.3 trillion, he will do the same.

The question is therefore not whether the US will throw their allies under the bus, but what will finally do the leaders of the European Union for it when it happens.

The demands for a place on Putin and Trump’s table, no matter how justified they are, are not enough. They reinforce US views that Europeans are as unprepared for peace and war. The EU has supported the Ukraine Economically, military and morally without defining its own plan or interests in fear of discord. This may have helped maintain the pressure of sanctions on Moscow and military assistance to Kiev. However, the cost was the absence of a strategy in the face of Trump or a clear policy to boost morale between the war -tired voters who expelled governments associated with high inflation in times of war and weak economy.

It is as if European leaders have just assumed that the early wave of public support for Ukraine would last forever, such as the applause for nurses during Covid-19. On the contrary, in many countries, support for ceasefire in exchange for territorial concessions has increased. Financial markets are already taking the slogan of Trump and bet on rewards, including falling energy prices. EU diplomats are worried that by talking about a more dynamic Europe, they have led to complacency. Initiatives such as the wider European political community Or the start of EU accession talks with Ukraine failed to change the game.

Given the urgent need to determine and defend their interests and Ukraine, it is time for leaders to leave aside building consensus throughout the EU and forge more flexible coalitions.

The EU should also exercise a coordinated impulse in defense – its greatest weakness and the greatest apple of Washington – to show that it can strategically act without orders from the US. This will mean that we will not swamp in a German -centered debate on money or in a French debate on leadership. Given the trillion dollars required to prepare for a post -war Ukraine, the maximum flexibility must be the basis of the game: the rules of the EU budget could be more lenient, the rescue chapters could be re -evaluated and could be re -evaluated To encourage more lending for initiatives such as air defense.

Europe has reasonable reasons to worry about the outcome of talks Trump-Putin. But it is also deeper than it seems. More than a quarter of the century, after the EU began its own geopolitical course, America First can not just mean Europe … as usual.

Of Lionel Laurent