Donald Trump’s decision to bomb the Iranian nuclear facility in Fordo could not have a better outcome. Operation, it was impeccable, and the reaction it caused by Iran was the best that the US president could hope for, without casualties and with the aim of escaping. Most importantly, Trump then attempted to push Israel and Tehran into a ceasefire. Wherever they should, they deserve congratulations.

And yet, the issue has not ended. There will be other difficult decisions that the White House will have to make, with profound implications to prevent nuclear propagation.

The problem here is not that the ceasefire announced Monday night was violated in a matter of hours. This is not uncommon – and, in this case, there is a serious chance that it will be consolidated in the coming days. Israel has exhausted, if not all, most of its goals and Iran is out of ways to respond in a substantial way without endangering the survival of its regime. Nevertheless, we are not where Trump says.

Trump says his truce will last forever, but there will never be peace between the Islamic Republic and Israel. Undoubtedly, top leader Ali Khamenei and his politically powerful generals will take time to rebuild and heal their wounds. They have undergone a serious military humiliation and there will be some form of accountability inside. But hostility to Israel is integrated into their political DNA. There is nothing “once out” here.

Nor, of course, the Iranian nuclear program has disappeared from the face of the earth, as Trump claims. Suppose all the enrichment equipment at points bombed by the US and Israel over the last ten days has been destroyed. This is something that only the Iranians know so far, but it seems very likely. The question, however, has always been that Iran has the knowledge and ability to replace anything that is being destroyed.

We also do not know where the Iranian stock of Iran is enriched at 60%, which is short of the weapon level. Mosad was also sure that there are no other facilities that were not hit because they were simply not known. These are just some of the reasons why previous US presidents avoided bombarding Iran’s nuclear program, preferring to gain delays and visibility through diplomacy.

In other words, the risk of acquiring Iran nuclear arsenal remains. It will continue to exist until the day that either the present regime or a successor will decide not to seek this. And right now, there is no doubt – even if hard -core officials do not say publicly – that the argument in favor of acquiring nuclear deterrence from Iran has never been more convincing. After all, no one is bombarding North Korea.

The advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons have been clearly for a long time and not just for Iran. That is why there is a 1968 nuclear weapons condition (NPT). They ever signed, the list remains fortunately small.

NPT’s main tool was the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) in Vienna. Although disgusted by many “hawks” in Washington and Israel, it has become a unique institution of know -how and provided the means of surveillance the Iranian nuclear program. Of course, Iran could – and did it – to avoid complete compliance, and the threat of violence was always present in the background. It also needed the action of national intelligence services to reveal, in 2002, that Iran had uranium enrichment program to be monitored by IAEA.

Nevertheless, NPT and IAEA together provided a restrictive framework for the spread of nuclear weapons, which will be extremely painful if lost. At a time when the logic of “power makes the law” and every nation is only looking at itself, this system is already under pressure. It may not be able to survive, as almost all the control agreements of the Cold War period have been abandoned, with the only exception of New Start, which also expires. The choices that Trump now make will play a crucial role in whether the NPT collapse or slow down.

One direction is the substitution of diplomacy by intelligence services and military action to address dissemination. This has always been the logic behind Trump’s decision to collapse the 2015 agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. The same scenario was sketched on Monday by Vice President JD Vance, warning that if Iran “want to build a nuclear weapon in the future, he would need to deal again with a very strong US military”.

The exclusive dependence on the threat of violence also presupposes that Iran will not take some critical lessons from the recent bombing. The first is to “clean his home”, uprooting the Israeli intelligence networks that made air strikes so effectively. A period of intense internal repression is expected. The second is the purchase of a much more sophisticated anti -aircraft system. The third, the replenishment of the rocket arsenal and drones. Without a diplomatic process, there will also be no incentive for Iran to allow further international inspections. He is already blaming IAEA of complicity in US and Israel attacks.

Other countries will draw their own conclusions. The agreement was based on a large compromise in which the five existing nuclear forces agreed to disarm, while non -nuclear states pledged to remain so. Disarmament has made significant progress, but in recent years it has been reversed. The actions of the US, first the default of the 2015 agreement with Iran and then the bombings, will not inspire confidence.

The alternative course that Trump could follow is to restart nuclear negotiations, with a clear awareness that the Iranians are not simply to retreat. Something should be offered to them. This means that Trump and his team will face many of the same questions they had in the past. Among these questions are whether at least certain economic sanctions should be lifted and whether a strictly supervised Uranus enrichment program for political use can be accepted, limited to 3.5% (a percentage of nuclear factories).

Of course, it is possible that the Islamic Republic will collapse and be replaced by a less -fanatical leadership. It is a possibility that few would mourn, but the strategy cannot be based on luck. Trump has to assume that Iran will now draw lessons, re -arrange and re -focus his nuclear program to build a weapon as quickly and quiet as possible. Diplomacy and inspections remain the best – and less dangerous – ways to prevent this.