The Russian Defense Ministry announced the first non-humanitarian ceasefire since the start of the war in Ukraine on 24 February. The folder says it will “drastically reduce military activity around Kiev and Chernihiv”.
The motivation is to facilitate the peace negotiations that resumed in person in Istanbul, with the presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself, this Tuesday (29). But the move, if it pays off, also gives the Kremlin time to adapt its war speech and allow Vladimir Putin to try to claim victory in the much-criticized action.
Ukrainian negotiators made the offer of military neutrality — one of Russia’s central goals in the conflict, to prevent its neighbor from joining NATO, the Western military alliance. To this end, they demand an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian forces.
In return, they ask for external guarantees of security, something quite uncertain in its form. Turkey, a mix of rival and ally of Putin and sympathetic to Volodymyr Zelensky’s government in Kiev, is a candidate — but it is also a member of NATO, which makes the equation difficult.
Erdogan’s presence in the conversations in the magnificent Ottoman palace of Dolmabahçe, however, puts a weight hitherto unheard of in the negotiations. Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinski even said that a Putin-Zelensky summit could take place if there is an agreement text ready and approved by both sides.
Ukrainians also agree to discuss the status of Crimea, the historic Russian region annexed by Putin in 2014, within 15 years. already signaled to accept the debate.
Putin has always left his options open in war, never having admitted to a full-fledged invasion for the purpose of occupation, even though the action suggested it. On Tuesday, before the ceasefire was announced, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Choigu said the “main objective” was “the liberation of Donbass”.
“The main objectives of the first stage of the operation have been completed. The combat potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has been significantly reduced, which makes it possible to focus our attention and efforts on achieving the main objective, the liberation of Donbass,” the minister said at a meeting. that was televised.
Last week, the Russian Armed Forces were already talking about the first stage of the war. On the field, what has been seen since then were three movements. First, Russian disengagement from cities around Kiev, which Ukraine claimed as military victories, even though vital Chernihiv (northeast of the capital) was besieged.
Second, the destruction of residual Ukrainian resistance in Mariupol, making the smoldering cluster of ruins a central point of the land connection between the Donbass and Crimea.
Finally, as Choigu made clear, a tactical turn aimed at attacking the center of Ukrainian forces along the Donbass borders. If there have been enough reinforcements to the south from the Crimea, it is possible that the Russians will try to encircle these fighters – who can either flee west to Kiev or try their luck. Or just the threat of it helps to reach an agreement.
The example of Mariupol shows that, despite its incompetence in many respects, the Russian offensive is unreservedly betting on a war of attrition when necessary.
What does that mean? That Putin may be seeking to end the conflict on terms that allow him to claim victory at home. In the West, the bizarre flaws and logistical problems of his campaign will be pointed out, but if Donbass ends up independent and physically united with Crimea, the nationalist dream of New Russia on the Black Sea coast will be delivered.
The problem for the Russian is that the scale of his war, with multiple fronts of attacks and the attempt to encircle Kiev indicate that he at least wanted Zelensky’s capitulation by coercion. It didn’t work out and his forces were too scattered to deliver a definitive blow.
From a rhetorical point of view, the Kremlin will be able to say that everything Putin announced on the first day of the war will have been fulfilled – it remains to be seen what they will do with the promise to “denazify” their neighbor, which in the first days of the campaign became a request. of the president for the Ukrainian military to overthrow Zelensky and his government of “neo-Nazis and junkies”.
Those days are long gone, and it will always be possible to say that the military pressure on Kiev has always been mild compared to the obliteration of Mariupol and even the siege of Kharkiv. In fact, the Russians have hit the Ukrainian military infrastructure hard, even destroying the country’s defense industrial base.
Therefore, Putin’s defeat in the Western view may be a victory enough to retain his domestic support. It remains to be seen what this design will be in the midst of negotiations and how willing Kiev will be to accept the excision of the so-called New Russia.
“It seems likely that the demands [de Moscou] be more extreme. They seem to have waged a general war, not just to formalize an area they already controlled. They fight a war designed with greater ambitions”, says George Friedman, of US consultancy Geopolitical Futures, one of the main US strategic analysts.
It could all be a cover-up, of course, and Moscow is only trying to buy time to remake its tactics towards the strategic goal of overthrowing Zelensky and installing a puppet regime in Kiev. Popular resistance, however, suggests the plan is unpalatable, although Russian state TV talk-show hosts are already openly talking about “having Ukraine whether they want it or not.”
Kiev also conceals its intentions, as would be expected. One hour Zelensky is crying out for arms and support in virtual visits to parliaments around the world, at another giving sober interviews saying he can recognize the reality in Donbass and accept the neutrality demanded by Moscow.
Again, it’s a play on words: with the degree of territorial conflict it has with Russia, Ukraine would never be part of NATO unless the Brussels gang wanted to contract World War III. But what neutrality does Zelensky speak of?
Friedman is betting that he only has the option of adopting the Swedish model, which is not formally NATO but has been on the right side of the West-Russia dispute since the Cold War. A central point is such a request made by third-party security guarantees to accept surrender without that name.
