THE Saddam Hussein It could have changed everything. But it is ironic to think that Iraq’s dictator who is responsible for countless deaths throughout the Middle East had the opportunity to exterminate the leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhalhah Khomeiniand may save the region from 46 years of Islamic Republic, the crisis of hostage in Iran, and even the war between Iran and Iraq.

In the complex political scene of the Middle East, there have been times that have now faded, as they have never been recorded but still remain engraved in the memories of spy, ministers and monarchs.

Such a moment was in the 1970s, when Saddam Hussein, then Vice President of Iraq but already leading the regime, is considered to have made an excellent proposal to the Shah of Iran: to assassinate Ayatollah Ruhalhah Khomeini, the exiled clergyman who warned the status of the Pachlavi from a secluded corner of Najaf.

Shah refused.

According to exiled Iranians, veterans of the intelligence and biographers of the period, Saddam made his proposal very discreetly, probably even through a secondary communication channel to the United Nations.

The message, however, was clear: Saddam, having already been upset by Khomeini’s influence on the Shiite population of Iraq, was willing to “solve” the problem of “Khomeini” faced by Shah Mohammad Reza Pachlavi. The Shah, however, refused to get involved in a political murder, said: “We are not dealing with the murder of clergy.”

This is an incident that has been forgotten, disrupted in the official records, but remains engraved in memory and is sneezed by the lips of those who lived in the last days of Iran’s monarchy.

Conflicting reports make it impossible to determine exactly what happened. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the key points in history are true.

And this is a historic moment with constant consequences, one of those rare moments of ‘What would happen if’where the story rings between truth and visuals.

Khomeini had been exiled from Iran as early as 1964, having strongly condemned the “white revolution” of Shahi, declaring that he was betraying Islam and serving the West imperialists.

He temporarily found refuge in Turkey, and later received asylum from Iraq and settled in the Sacred City of Shiites, Najaf, which was a Center for Hierarchical Studies.

The rise of Khomeini, threat to Hussein

Although the Shah probably hoped that Khomeini had now been convicted of obscurity, the opposite was essentially. From a simple house near the mosque of Imam Ali, Ayatollah recorded his sermons to cartridges that were smuggled to Iranian territory. These cartridges, often distributed to bazaars and mosques, have evolved into a “political dynamic”.

And as his influence increased, so was the concerns of Saddam Hussein. The Baath regime in Iraq was secular, Arab-nationalist and becoming more and more authoritarian. Hominini’s Pensioner Rhetoric was now straight threat to Iraq control over the Shiite majority.

It was therefore a matter of time for Saddam to realize that Saddam’s “hospitality” was no longer worth it.

According to one version, Saddam’s proposal to Shah was transferred from a Iran diplomat to an Iranian envoy to the United Nations as part of the re -heating of the two spaces following the Algerian agreement, which resolved the territorial differences between the two regimes.

The latest Ambassador of Shah in the United States, the Ardessir Zachendirecalls: “I was at the UN. Iraq’s foreign minister conveyed a message from Saddam. Saddam offered us a choice: either to expel Hominini or eliminate him ».

In his book, “The Spirit of Allah”, the Amirformerly the author of the daily newspaper Kayhan, describes a dramatic moment in September 1978: an unpaid flight of a Boeing by Iraqi Airways landed in Tehran, carrying only one passenger, Barzan al-TikritiSaddam Hussein’s heterosexual brother and head of Iraqi intelligence. He was led directly to the Niavaran Palace of the Shah, which was then illuminated in the midst of the continuous power vacation ordered by Khomeini’s fans.

Barzan handed over to Shah a message from Saddam: “The same majesty must remain strong. Iraq is ready to help in every way ». It was strongly implied that Iraq could launch the “natural extermination” of the troubled mules.

“Shah, expressing his gratitude for President Hussein’s concern and hand, excluded any suspicion of organizing an accident for Khomeini.”writes the tacher. “On the contrary, he asked the Iraqis to force Ayatollah to leave their country. Barzan agreed immediately. “

The Shah, although seriously threatened by the growing influence of Khomeini, rejected the offer. His decision has since caused many discussions. Some believe that it was the result of moral restraint, of the belief that the political murder, especially a respected clergyman, was inconceivable. Others argue that it was a matter of optics and inheritance: the Shah He wanted to be considered a monarch modernist, not mobster.

The widow of Shah, Queen Farah, who has spent 46 years in exile, has told the BBC in an interview: “In those days, we believed that if someone unloaded Khomeini, there would be a witness or something higher.”

The tagari agrees. Specifically, he writes in his book: “The reason why Shah refused to assassinate Hominini was quite clear: such a move would have triggered uncontrollable passions in Iran.”.

Whatever his motive, his decision proved to be fatal.

Although Savak’s archives, the infamous Shah intelligence service, were largely destroyed after the revolution, former officials of the service confirmed that they were watching every Khomeini move.

THE Parviz sabeta top Savak official, has admitted in interviews that the service was aware of Iraq’s frustration by Khomeini and that Saddam “may have been willing to move further”. But, as he says, the Shah was indifferent: Iran did not participate in murders abroad.

There were definitely other ways in which Shah was pressured in Iraq. Diplomatic telegrams suggest that Tehran pressed Baghdad to limit Khomeini’s access to the press and his students. The Baath regime, always alternative, obeyed for a while. However, the Shah never sought to be a permanent solution.

In October 1978, under increasing internal turmoil and new Iranian pressures, Saddam expelled Khomeini from Iraqhoping that this would solve the problem.

But the result was the opposite: it expanded its influence as ever.

Khomeini fled to Nofl-La-Satos, just outside Paris, from where he had unlimited access to the press and international media. There, his daily statements were sent by fax and broadcast to Iran, while giving five to six interviews a day to foreign media. Young Iranians, scattered all over the world, began to flock to the Nofl-La-sauté to “join” with Khomeini and to be part of history.

Najaf’s “whispers” evolved into a “roar” in Tehran.

Within four months, the Shah had left the country.

But why was Khomeini, an elderly clergyman in a Spartan lifestyle, was such a big threat? On the papers, it was just a religious exile in exile, without an army, no political party and no territory. But in fact, he had a much stronger power: they addressed those who were unhappy with the Shah regime. It was an ideology based on Islamic purity, and a message echoed in all Iranian classes and regions.

He combined the theology of the Shiite martyrdom with the anti-imperialist revolutionoffering a worldview that presented the Shah as a heretic and a puppet. He did not need to be charismatic, as his rigor and refusal to compromise were his main advantages.

Saddam realized the magnitude of the threat that was Khomeini before anyone else. So is Savak. But the Shah, either from pride or in the matter of authorities, could not act decisively.

When Saddam invaded Iran in 1980, declaring the Iran-Iraq war, he believed that the new Islamic Republic was weak and divided and would fall within a few weeks. He was wrong.

The war kept eight brutal yearsit claimed the lives of more than a million people, caused the recruitment of children-milkers and the use of chemical weapons. Saddam finally executed dozens of Shiite clergymen inside Iraq, trying to erase the ideological flame that Khomeini had stabbed.

As for the Shah, he died in cancer in 1980, without ever returning to the country he ruled for nearly four decades.

If he had accepted Saddam’s proposal, could things have evolved differently? Could Iran have followed a different path? Perhaps to democracy, a constitutional monarchy or at least a less theocratic state?

It is not possible to know. But what is certain is one: a decision, which was quietly taken, wisely and with the best of the intentions, shaped the fate of a nation and the whole region.