Among voters receiving Auxílio Brasil, 45% considered the government of Jair Bolsonaro “bad or terrible” in May. In the Datafolha at the end of July, it was 40%. Given the survey’s margin of error for this group, this variation may be negligible.
The money from the new Auxílio Brasil begins to pour in this month, with one more payment until the first round. Although many people should be aware of the increase in the benefit, it is possible that the cash in hand can make a difference in the vote. How much?
Judging by other Datafolha numbers, not much. If this was the biggest card that the Bolsonarista campaign and its allies had no hand, they will need to put their hand in the deck in order to change votes.
Overall, 71% of voters say they are “fully decided” about their vote. Among those who receive Auxílio Brasil, the decision is firm for 69%. Among both Lula da Silva (PT) and Bolsonaro voters, those who declare an irrevocable decision are 79%.
A possible change of vote would not generally favor Bolsonaro. Of the mutant votes, 24% of the total would go to Ciro Gomes (PDT), 19% to Lula and 14% to Bolsonaro, who in this case would not win more than 4 percentage points, still far from the PT. Among those who receive Auxílio Brasil, 21% of those who can change their vote would choose Lula as an alternative.
In addition, there is a considerable portion of voters who can exchange Lula for Bolsonaro and vice versa, perhaps with some advantage for the PT. For 25% of Bolsonaristas who can still change their vote, the alternative would be Lula. For 19% of Lulas, the alternative would be Bolsonaro.
Bolsonaro’s rejection is another problem for his candidacy. Overall, it’s 53% (voters who wouldn’t vote for him “no way”), which hasn’t significantly changed in a long time.
An interesting aspect of the rejection is that, even in the large regions of the country where Bolsonaro at least draws with Lula, given the margin of error, as in the South and Midwest, there is almost a majority with aversion to the president: 48% do not vote for him “no way”.
In addition, Bolsonaro loses a second round even to Ciro Gomes, by 51% to 38% (in the case of the dispute with Lula, the defeat is 55% to 35%). Note that, in the first round, Lula has 47%, Bolsonaro 29% and Ciro 8% (in valid votes, Lula has 52%; Bolsonaro, 32%). Even in the event that Lula vanishes into thin air, there would be a stampede for Ciro, against Bolsonaro.
It is not a matter of prognosticating or saying that the election is decided or such nonsense.
There are elements that draw attention, in fact: still almost no effect of Auxílio Brasil and electoral fraud, the high degree of vote decision, the low number of nulls, whites and undecided and the rejection of Bolsonaro.
In addition, the government’s positive assessment has never been good, never exceeding 37% of “great or good”, at the height of the fat emergency aid, in 2020. Bolsonaro never lost the support of at least 22% of the electorate, those who gave him rated “excellent or good”, which helped to avoid their impeachment.
As for prognoses, this locked picture can give a clue to think about what the Bolsonarista campaign can do. Can’t wait to see if Auxílio Brasil will make a difference. The economic situation will not change significantly until October and even less the perception of what the government has done about it.
As for electoral fraud (favors), there would only be time for the wildest, although hallucinating is the keyword here. For Bolsonarism, there is little more left than to barbarize even more in the campaign.
I have over 8 years of experience in the news industry. I have worked for various news websites and have also written for a few news agencies. I mostly cover healthcare news, but I am also interested in other topics such as politics, business, and entertainment. In my free time, I enjoy writing fiction and spending time with my family and friends.
