Opinion – Rodrigo Tavares: Does Portugal need Brazil to be Portuguese?

There is no other similar case in history. After having been the architect of the independence of a former colony, D. Pedro returned to the metropolis to assume the colonizer’s crown, adding to the royal title the expression “perpetual defender of Brazil.”

In the last 200 years, celebrated this Wednesday (7), the relationship between the two independent countries has been shaped, over time, according to fluctuating national interests, unexpected circumstances, cyclical ideological views and personal affections between some leaders. .

Nothing unusual in international relations between States. But, in the case of Brazil and Portugal, there is an immaterial element that makes the relationship incomparable and complex: Portugal’s self-induced awareness of its exceptionalism.

As Brazilian republicans taught, collective identities can be shaped. And, over hundreds of years, Portuguese identity has been forged around the idea that the country’s vulnerability (poverty, territorial smallness and geographic isolation) can be overcome by the heroism of its people.

The messianic function of the country, as a pluricontinental, miscegenating and multiracial nation, is a structuring element of its identity. Camões, António Vieira, Pessoa, Freyre celebrated it without undertones.

Just as all contemporary Portuguese rulers, of all partisan hues, celebrate it, who emphasize, in public speeches, the Portuguese impulse towards universalism. Contemporary public works with names of navigators who gave “new worlds to the world” are also recurrent.

From 1974 onwards, with the end of the colonial empire and the territorial downsizing of the country, Portugal appropriated the idea of ​​Lusophony to continue to radiate its influence throughout the world. He created the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries), based in Lisbon and currently with nine member countries, including Brazil.

Portugal is also a European and European country, but in Europe it flies without leaving its place; their influence is directly proportional to their vulnerability. It is only in the field of lusophony that Portugal has managed to consummate its universal identity. Which means that Portugal, in order to be Portuguese, needs to believe that it exerts some kind of influence over Brazil, and that it has its respect.

But that doesn’t happen. Brazil is a superlative country that has never recognized Portugal as a long-standing priority. And whenever Brazil shows more coldness, Portugal writhes, twists, is uncomfortable and sour while under the tone to speak “in the bonds of friendship that unite two brother peoples.”

Bolsonaro, Temer and Dilma showed a lot of indifference to Portugal. The passages through the country were few and fleeting. How did the current president of Portugal, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, react? Making six visits to Brazil in six years, a record that violates diplomatic codes of reciprocity.

Marcelo, as he is affectionately treated by the Portuguese, was born in the cradle of Portuguese universalism. In the 1960s, his father, Baltazar Rebelo de Sousa, was appointed governor-general of Mozambique. After the Carnation Revolution, he took refuge in Brazil.

Marcelo’s grandfather, António Joaquim, lived in Angola, after having also worked in Rio de Janeiro. For the Portuguese president, the Portuguese capitals, from Dili to Luanda or Maputo, are not chapters in Portuguese history, but pages in the family album. Brazil is a matter of State, but it is also a personal memory.

These weeks, the idea that the presence of the president in the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of Brazil’s independence was a historical inevitability was consensual in Portugal. Relations are between states and non-governers and Brazil cannot be exhausted in the person of Bolsonaro, a leader consensually disdained by the Portuguese.

But would Marcelo’s presence be inevitable?

Did the King of Spain participate in the 200th anniversary of the independence of Colombia (in 2010), Chile (in 2010), Argentina (in 2016) or Venezuela (in 2010-2011)? Not.

There are countless examples in which heads of state from countries with a colonial tradition do not participate in this type of ceremony.

Marcelo’s presence in Brazil is a rhetorical gesture by a president who is particularly sensitive to the importance of keeping Brazil within his sphere of influence. His sixth visit to Brazil is more important for the Portuguese than for the Brazilians.

But is the relationship between Brazil and Portugal doomed to be a lacework of insignia, a permanent past tense, a panegyric discourse?

In the column, former Chancellor Celso Lafer (1992, 2001-2002) points out that the two countries have always managed to find “useful convergences” around specific topics, especially when there is personal affinity between Luso-Brazilian leaders.

FHC was very fond of Prime Minister António Guterres and President Jorge Sampaio, which facilitated Portugal’s intervention in the European Union, so that Brazil was not harmed by the outbreak of the “mad cow” disease in 2001-2002.

The good relationship between Lula and Prime Minister José Sócrates or between Chancellors Celso Amorim and Luis Amado and Celso Lafer and Jaime Gama are other examples. But Brazil is pragmatic and transactional. It is condescending to Portuguese universalist rhetoric only when it sees the possibility of extracting specific dividends.

And the future? An eventual victory for Lula will open a field of new opportunities. If the electoral program is fulfilled, its foreign policy will be vigorous. While Alckmin will fix the inner house from Jaburu, Lula will try to fix the world from Planalto.

Speaking to the column, former Portuguese foreign minister Luis Amado (2006-2011) stressed that we are going through a “large-scale geopolitical reconfiguration”.

While the global north obeys a binary logic that opposes democratic countries to autocratic states, the global south has a more utilitarian and less principled vision of international relations.

When Russia’s expulsion from the UN Human Rights Council went to a vote in April, 82 southern countries pulled the brakes, including Indonesia, India, Mexico and China.

These countries have shown a neutral position in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Estimates from European banks and consultancies indicate that, by 2030, 7 of the 10 largest economies in the world will be in the global south, including the first two (China and India). Lula’s public statements are in line with this new context, facilitating his rise as a leader of the global south. Today the throne is empty.

There is an opportunity here for Portugal to forge a future alliance with Lula’s Brazil, serving as one of the countries in the global north that is capable of building bridges with the south.

If currently the two hemispheres are the counterpart of each other and are enveloped by a cloak of animosity, Portugal and Brazil can be strategic interlocutors in a mission that goes beyond the bilateral relationship.

Giving Portugal access to new spaces of influence in the south, Brazil would help, now with other contours, the Portuguese to invigorate their universalist idealization and to realize that the ideas of Lusophony also have limitations.

The Portuguese language is a powerful instrument of unification between countries, but it is also a currency that separates peoples. Portugal and Brazil can be bigger than your common language.