For disastrous mistakes and multi-layered criminal negligence, which led to the tragic Tempe train wreck they talk about what is happening in the classes of OSE and TRAINOSE.

Speaking to ERT, Christos Retsinas, former train traffic safety director of TRAINOSE, commented that “when you make traffic, whether you are a station master or a train driver, there are two key words – “normal and rise”, “opposite and descent”. Nobody said them. Therefore the General Traffic Regulation was not applied” he emphasized, among other things, commenting on the recorded dialogues on the fateful night of the accident in Tempi, which saw the light of day.

Referring to the relaxed atmosphere evident in the dialogues, he noted that “this is the responsibility of the companies. There was never a communication protocol, but even if there was, they wouldn’t have followed it.”

“The point is to tighten them up the internal operating regulations of the companies. When we have such behaviors they go directly to the disciplinary and they are fired” write down.

He pointed out how “there should be the possibility for the drivers of the Hellenic Train to be able to communicate with their own call center 24 hours a day”, commenting on the fact that the driver of the passenger train was trying to contact potential train drivers of the commercial train on his mobile phone.

Asked about the detained station master, Mr. Retsinas argued that “he didn’t know how to do automatic routing” and how “they are fairy tales his excuses for the key.”

In fact, he revealed that “I am being attacked because I am talking about the safety valves removed by TRAINOSE”.

For her part, a source who spoke to SKAI explained that the mentality of the OSE’s lax regulations is to blame. “The regulations were a joke” he said characteristically, no one was afraid that he would go through a disciplinary process, that he would be held accountable. If they had checked they could have prevented the tragic accident.

“The barrio paper normally doesn’t go through me but now… Let it go, I can’t go into details because I’ll mess up. Everything is under investigation, investigative and prosecutorial authorities have been contacted, I have not been called yet” said one of the inspector’s superiors.

It is noted that the journalist of SKAI Christos Nikolaidis did an autopsy in the railway tunnel of Tempi, where he encountered complete disintegration.

Empty fire hydrants, non-existent lighting and fire detectors… this is the situation prevailing in the railway tunnel of Tempe, a few hundred meters from the site of the tragic accident, as the SKAI autopsy reveals.

The policemen’s first questions to the station master

Wednesday March 1 at 19:20. The station master B.S. is sitting across from the two Larissa Traffic Police officers in order to give a statement. At that moment, the number of dead had reached 37, while the injured numbered 127. The station master’s lawyers are also in the same area. He moves in his deposition on the axes.

– I did not give the train driver a written model for the double ascending line that would follow. – I didn’t tell him that it is circulating in a double ascending line.

– The train driver said ok to the signal I gave him. – I do not consider it possible that the key turned from the rise to the descent due to my wrong handling. In his first statement he attempts to recall details from that night but fails in all respects. He even reports it to the police.

The newspaper “Country» reveals the questions that the 59-year-old station master received in those first hours of the unimaginable tragedy and also the answers he gave:

“I reserve to recall more details”

Question: Before train number 62 departed from the railway station of Larissa with final destination Thessaloniki, did you tell the driver of the train in question how it would operate on a double uphill line?

Station master: No.

Question: In this case, what do you think went wrong and the accident happened?

Station master: I am psychologically devastated by the accident and beyond what I have mentioned above I reserve the right to recall more details.

Question: What exactly contributed to causing the accident?

Station master: I can’t say anything at the moment I’m very bad.

Question: Did your non-written and verbal information to the driver of train number 62 contribute to the accident?

Station master: Probably yes. However, if the train driver had informed that he had entered the descent line, I would have informed him that he was on the wrong line.

Question: Could the driver have noticed this?

Station master: Yes of course as the train driver is boarding in front of the train, he has visibility and could have realized that the key was not on the main and was entering from a diagonal on a descent line.

“Why didn’t I give model 1001, it was my negligence”

Question: Why did you not give a written notice, model 1001 to the driver of train number 62, informing him that it would be running on a double up line?

Station master: It was my negligence, as there were other trains in the station and they had to arrange how they would leave and which line they would enter.

Question: Which key(s) related to the traffic of train number 62, on the line it was running on?

Station master: 117 and 118 key is for main ascending line. The 118 key (double) must be in line for traffic on the ascending and descending line.

Question: What is the direction of rotation of these keys, how do they work and which of them creates a bypass with the descent line?

Station master: 118 is the key that can change the rise with the fall and vice versa.

Question: Describe for us, what was the handling of these keys by you, and in particular key 118, when train number 62 departed from the railway station of Larissa?

Station master: After train 2597F passed the Key 118 which was from the descent to the riser and 117 from the riser on the third line I brought the keys back to the main and commanded with key 117 and 118 that 62 should come on the main riser line. From then on, how it happened and what happened, I don’t remember at all, but I was complacent, thinking that the keys had been electronically locked, as indicated by the light indicators of the panel lights.

“I trusted the clues”

The policemen insist their questions very much on the technical part of both the license plate and the keys.

Question: After your operation in question, did you check to make sure the main line electric switches number 117 and 118 were actually turned to the main line?

Station master: I did not consider it advisable, trusting the indications.

Question: What are the confirmation keys as you mentioned above and what is their function?

Station master: There are three confirmation keys. One is that we turn from the main to a siding, the second is the lights on the panel which flash and should stay on permanently as an indication that he has locked the key normally and the third safety key is for the stationmaster to instruct the locksmith to operate the key manually.

Question: Are there any of those confirmation keys you mentioned above where it confirms the rotation of the other keys?

Station master: There is the confirmation key on the top of the panel as well as the indicator or fault light, which confirm the turning of the key.

Question: Did you notice the key turn confirmation indications?

Station master: I definitely noticed the confirmation key (1) as well as the confirmation key (2). For this reason I did not have to resort to the confirmation key (3) i.e. send the locksmith to the point.

Question: Do you think you know enough about the key circulation table?

Station master: As proficiently as I could obtain during the time of my training.

Question: Then how did you decide to perform normal service and not auxiliary?

Station master: This question can be answered by management.

Question: At traffic control panel how long did you train -— apprentice?

Station master: It was one week after the theory, one week after the end of the exams and practice and one day before I started my shift normally.

Question: Any specifics of the traffic board, were you aware of them either yourself or from other former station masters and if so, what were they?

Station master: The only thing I know from the older ones is that some keys didn’t turn on the first try but on the second or third try, while some keys that had a problem have been fitted with grippers (key 101) to keep them stable and can only be operated manually. Also, key 116 on Monday to Tuesday, i.e. 27 to 28-02-2023, turned with the fourth attempt, while for confirmation and before clicking I had instructed the locksmith to go to the point to check it. Along the way he bolted – locked and I informed the locksmith to go back. Then train 1571 from Volos to Larissa reported no problem with the key.

Question: Did you find any damage to the key board?

Station master: Yesterday the keys 115 and 116 had presented some malfunction, as a result of which the train driver of the suburban 2597 informed me that the keys were upside down.

Question: How do the other station masters, if old, deal with any particularities or faults of the board and in particular with what necessary manipulations do they possibly eliminate them?

Station master: When the stationmaster sees the fault light on a key or somewhere else, he notifies the locksmith to go on site to check and in case they fail to repair the fault, they notify the appropriate technician, who has undertaken the maintenance.

“I didn’t feel unwell and I wasn’t worried about anything”

Question: Before taking over and during the execution of your service, in general, did anything concern you?

Station master: No.

Question: Did you feel any discomfort?

Station master: No.

Question: What were your activities during the day, were you rested?

Station master: In the morning I went to the Larissa Inspectorate to leave some documents for the secondary earnings of the month of February, then I took the car to the workshop, left it for repairs, went home and in the afternoon I went, took the car from the workshop which was ready and returned to my house.

Question: Did you sleep?

Station master: Yes, three o’clock in the afternoon and five o’clock in the morning.