The overthrow of Papadopoulos was decided long before the Polytechnic. After the events, however, the gears are put into operation. The coup is entering the final stretch.

Who planned the overthrow of Papadopoulos? Did Ioannidis order the assassination of Makarios? Did the Americans send a message to Ioannidis not to overthrow the archbishop of Cyprus? Who was assuring him that the Turks would not intervene? What does the son of agent Gust Avrakotos reveal for the first time? How did Makarios escape? What did Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit say to American diplomats in the crucial negotiation a day before the invasion? Why didn’t Kissinger come to negotiate with Turkey himself?

All these questions find answers in the fifth and penultimate episode (watch here or on hybrid TV by pressing the red button on your remote control in the documentary menu) of the new long documentary series “Dark Decade 1964-1974”, by Alexis Papachelas,

Watch here the first episode, here the second episode, here the third episode and here the fourth, or on SKAI’s hybrid TV by pressing the red button on your remote control in the documentary menu

The overthrow of Papadopoulos has been decided long before the Polytechnic. After the events, however, the gears are put into operation. The coup is entering the final stretch.

“Greek people, after yesterday’s anarchist demonstrations by an organized minority, I decided to declare martial law throughout the territory in order to restore the disrupted order. The events of the last few days proved the existence of a conspiracy by the enemies of democracy and normality. Greek people, the desired inner peace of every honest citizen will be restored and the priceless good of public order will be secured in the country’s path towards smooth public life” says Papadopoulos in his speech.

When was it decided to overthrow Papadopoulos?

It seems to be a common secret. Pattakos finds out and tries to alert his friend, the dictator Papadopoulos.

November 25

Charalambos Palainis undertakes the plan to arrest Papadopoulos.

The arrest of Papadopoulos

Papadopoulos is overthrown by Dimitrios Ioannidis, who, however, does not assume any public office. He is the most powerful man in the country. But he is also the invisible dictator.

The first crisis the new regime will have to face comes in the fall of 1973. The Ioannidis junta receives the first confidential reports on oil in Prinos.

The discovery of oil in the Aegean and the dark background

John Day was then in charge of Greek affairs at the State Department.

The crisis de-escalates and then Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit meets with Androutsopoulos. Etcevit draws his own conclusions about his Greek counterpart.

“I tried very hard to establish a dialogue with him to solve the problems between the two countries, especially those concerning the Aegean, but he could not express any opinion on any issue. Obviously, as prime minister he had no political power and even for very formal details had to be arranged by phone with Athens, so we couldn’t get anywhere.” Etcevit states.

The junta of Ioannidis is preparing to open a new front in Cyprus. The experienced diplomat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Angelos Vlahos, is in a difficult position: “At that time we had many indications that something bad was brewing, and at that time I had made a document in which I demanded that a joint meeting of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be held to determine policy. We were in favor of continuing the dialogue with the Turks, and of Makarios remaining in power. The others did everything they could to shake Makarios from power, and perhaps remove him. But, in any case, what I was sure of was that the Turks were waiting for the right opportunity to intervene. And I resigned on June 29, 1974.”

The diplomat Pavlos Apostolidis, who served in the Greek embassy in Nicosia, remembers how intense the anti-Macarian climate was among the Greek officers in Cyprus: “Of course, we at the embassy realized very quickly that the Greek military in Cyprus were clearly waging war on Makarios. On the anniversary of the Greek coup, ELDYK invited us to have the whole embassy go for a celebration ceremony. Makarios and the Archbishop had also come and then he took the microphone but the microphone went silent, it broke. They didn’t let him speak Not at all. Characteristic of the climate, how it kept getting worse from month to month.”

Makarios then sends a harsh letter to the president of the Greek republic Phaedon Gizikis, with which he requests that all Greek officers leave Cyprus. Makarios had previously sent the letter to the exiled King Constantine and Constantine Karamanlis.

Makarios’ ultimatum provokes Ioannidis’s fierce reaction.

“He told us that ‘with what Makarios is doing, we will lose Cyprus, the Turks will come out and overthrow him,’ Palainis narrates.

Ioannidis implements the plan to overthrow the leader of Cyprus. He was convinced that the overthrow of Makarios would not provoke a reaction from the Turks.

The then head of the Navy, Petros Arapakis, is worried about Ioannidis’ plans. She calls him into his office and warns him.

“He says to me, ‘Mr. Chief, did you ask for me?’ I say ‘I asked you because I’m worried’. ‘Why are you worried?’ “Don’t worry about these things,” I say, “don’t do anything against Makarios, because that’s written.” is that I say it in hindsight, it will be a crime. And what did Ioannidis answer at that time? ‘I don’t agree’ and he got up and left.”

Ioannidis puts forward the coup in Cyprus.

The news reaches the ears of Washington. Diplomat Thomas Boyat, responsible for Cyprus, drafts a secret memo for Henry Kissinger that explains very simply the criticality of the situation.

But Boyat’s memorandum is lost in the bureaucracy.

Finally the Americans try to send a message to Ioannidis about Cyprus through ambassador Henry Taska. This is what the diplomat Angelos Vlachos vividly remembers.

CIA to Ioannidis: “You will be in Istanbul in three days as a prisoner of war”

At that time it is the time of double messages. The big bluff. Ioannidis tells the Americans otherwise, officially. He tells his close associates otherwise.

A few days before the coup, Ioannidis sends a message to the CIA through one of his own people. This time he claims to have changed his mind and will not overthrow Makarios.

Coup in Cyprus

The coup against Makarios

“There were two papers there, one was the CIA briefing which said that Brigadier Ioannidis was no longer interested in intervening in Cyprus and that there was no need to worry about a coup, and the other was a report from the embassy in Nicosia which said that the coup was in progress. So, you know, we were completely surprised by Ioannidis he was definitely misleading the US government and using the CIA as a conduit for that. Whether the CIA was involved in that or not, or who in the CIA was complicit in that, I don’t know enough to answer that question. “ says Boyat.

On the morning of July 15 and while the coup against Makarios has already taken place, Ioannidis and his colleagues are in the Pentagon waiting for news from Nicosia. At some point, his assistant, Giorgos Stavrou receives a very strange phone call.

“With papa, are you finally done?”

Makarios escapes and finds refuge in the British base at Akrotiri. Far away in London, then Foreign Minister Callahan is informed.

Ioannidis gets angry when he learns that Makarios was not arrested and that he escaped from Cyprus.

To this day it remains a mystery whether Ioannidis had given the order to execute Makarios.

In America they realize Ioannidis’ bluff.

The Americans realize Ioannidis’ bluff in Cyprus

Had Ioannidis ordered the assassination of Makarios?

The coup was planned militarily, but there were many outstanding issues. The most crucial: who would take Makarios’ place.

How was Nikos Sampson chosen as President of Cyprus?

On July 15, as the hours pass without an official Cypriot government, the president of the republic in Cyprus, Nikos Sampson, is finally sworn in. Everyone knew and Ioannidis was the first that he was a red flag for the Turks.

The overthrow of Makarios causes alarm in Washington. Kissinger sees that a possible Turkish invasion of Cyprus could ignite the entire region, war with Greece and destabilize the West with the involvement of the Soviets. He immediately sends Deputy Secretary of State Joe Cisco to London and from there to mediate in Athens and Ankara.

Why didn’t Kissinger himself go to prevent the Turkish invasion?

In London, Etcevit tries to convince the British Foreign Secretary to give the go-ahead for a formal military intervention.

The British refuse to consent but Turkey does not back down. Sisko meets with Etcevit.

On July 19, Makarios delivers a controversial speech to the UN Security Council. “The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, from the consequences of which the entire Cypriot people, both Greeks and Turks, are suffering. I appeal to all members of the Security Council to do everything they can to end this abnormal situation , which was created by the Athens coup.”

In Athens, the American diplomat meets the dictator Ioannidis.

Ioannidis’ answer to the Americans

The unrepentant dictator does not change his mind. Thus opens the door to the Turkish invasion.

“I informed the staff that there was a landing in Cyprus and they did not believe me”

At the same time Sisko leaves Athens for Ankara to meet Etcevit. He waits for a long time while the Turkish prime minister talks to Kissinger on the phone. The meeting starts after midnight and while the cabinet, together with the generals, meets in an adjacent room.

The Americans are trying to convince the Turks not to invade Cyprus

There is unrest in Cyprus. Foreign correspondents flood the Ledra Pallas hotel. A few kilometers away, on the Five Mile coast of Kyrenia, life continued as normal.

“We had assurances from the GEF that these are supposed to be for exercises and not to worry”

Alexandros Simaioforidis was the KYP officer in Kyrenia and watched the Turkish ships approach.

At the same time in Athens the political and military leadership was sleeping the sleep of justice.

The next day, July 20, 1974, would change the history of Greece and Cyprus once and for all.