While the Turkey expands its regional influence, diplomatic mobility of Athens and Nicosia is asked to fill in the blanks. The Cairo Tripartite was only the beginning. Although the word “Turkey” was not mentioned even once in the official statements of the leaders of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, there is no doubt that regime change in Syria and the expansion of Turkish influence were the main issues that occupied the Tripartite Summit in Cairo last year. Wednesday, January 8.

It was a tripartite meeting different from those we have been used to in recent years, the usefulness of which was mainly focused on “maintaining positive momentum” for the prospects of their energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, amid a relative stagnation of their common investment goals. Then, with the strong aftermath of the terrorist attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023 and the war developments that followed, it was next for the leaderships of the three countries to focus on the aspects of the war, which touched more on their home.

In particular, and throughout 2024, Cairo focused on preventing a possible large wave of refugees from Gaza, as well as on the effectiveness of its mediation efforts in order to reach a ceasefire agreement, with the ultimate goal of ending the war at least in this the forehead.

Nicosia focused on the “Amalthea” project to effectively address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, while making efforts to maintain the delicate balances at the European and international level, taking into account the special strategic relationship it has cultivated with Israel since 2010 and from there.

Athens, for its part, managed the aftermath of the war developments with particular care, aiming not to damage the special strategic relationship it maintains with Israel, smoothing the differences at the EU level on the occasion of the strong critical voices against the Israeli operations in Gaza and Lebanon, but also in view of the start of her term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council – a capacity that will fatefully bring Greek diplomacy to front line of the developments of the current year, which is expected to be just as episodic as the previous one.

The aftermath of a disruptive December

The last month of 2024 turned out to be particularly disruptive. The collapse of the Assad regime, the seizure of power by the Sunni Islamists Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the new de facto strongman of Damascus and leader of the group Ahmad Al-Sara’a (or Abu Mohammad Al -Jolani) turned Syria into a country that today appears to be under complete Turkish political control. This development is perfectly consistent with the broader neo-Ottoman regional architecture of the Erdogan administration – an ambition that Ankara has never hidden.

In addition to the Syrian rebels, Ankara’s side includes Qatar and the government of western Libya – representatives of which went to Damascus to congratulate the new Syrian leader -. Just a week after the official reopening of the Turkish embassy in Damascus (12/14), the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, officially announced that the construction of a Turkish ballistic missile launch base from his country’s territory has begun (12/21). On 8/1 there were increased indications that Turkey is going to strengthen its ties with the

government of Chad, replacing France’s strong military presence and, at the same time, declaring its willingness to mediate an end to the civil war in Sudan – thereby choosing to gain a role in the soft underbelly of both Libya and Egypt respectively. In the meantime, the Turkish nervous rhetoric against Israel continues and with regard to the Cyprus issue, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, persistently promotes the “two-state solution” with international recognition of the “TRNC”. At the same time, the Turkish military exercise “Blue Homeland” in the Aegean includes island-occupation scenarios.

The phenomenon of “opposite crowding”

The sudden expansion of Turkish influence in Syria caused the immediate mobilization of Israel, which did not hesitate to place under its control the territories of the southern provinces of the country, raising, indirectly but not clearly, the issue of autonomy or even independence of the (more Israel-friendly) minorities elements of the Druze and the Kurds. The Syrian developments worried the pro-Western Jordanian monarchy, as well as President Al-Sisi’s Egypt, which recalled how the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of his predecessor, Mohamed Morsi, had been supported by the Erdogan administration.

At the same time, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain observe with suspicion Qatar’s growing involvement in Syrian affairs, generously funding Turkish pursuits. Finally, Saudi Arabia, despite placing its hopes in the international effort to neutralize the Iranian “Axis of Resistance” -focusing mainly on the fight against the Houthis of Yemen-, the possibility of the appearance of one new Turkish “geopolitical vise” in the region, is anything but reassuring Riyadh.

It is now clear that while the gradual spread of Turkish influence is observed in “key points” of the geostrategic puzzle of the region, at the same time an “opposite coalition” of countries that do not hide their concerns is beginning to develop. Characteristic was the hasty invitation addressed by Cypriot President Christodoulidis to his newly elected Lebanese counterpart, Joseph Aoun, to participate in the upcoming Summit of 27, in an attempt to “keep” the Land of Cedars away from corresponding Turkish influences, which succeeded in changing active way the Syrian balances.

Thus, at a time when important EU member countries are going through a period of political instability, fatally Greece and Cyprus, mainly due to their geopolitical proximity, are called upon to assume the role of “coordinator” between those countries that are troubled by the power imbalance environment, which is gradually disappearing in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The recent Tripartite in Cairo, the private meetings that Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulidis held in Nicosia a few days ago with the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, and with the Emirati Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, as well as tomorrow’s visit by Hellenic Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, at Saudi Arabia (13/1), demonstrate the sensitive reflectors that have been activated in Athens and Nicosia.