Ten years are completed by the peak of Greek financial crisis and the events that set a whole time: the referendum, the intense negotiations, the threats to Grexit. Following the footprint left by the memorandums, we attempt an account of what was really left, after a decade of harsh changes and social vibrations.

The well -known inspectionist satirically satirized the rhetoric of that time by saying to *”We are on the brink of the cliff, but now we take a step forward” *. This is a picture that gleefully concentrated the feeling of insecurity just before the 2015 referendum.

Today, though the banners They continue to dominate public debate, it’s time to attempt an analysis from its point of view economic rationale. After all, in 2032 the 90 billion repayment of the second memorandum begins, with Greece committed to high primary surpluses by 2060 – an element that defines the country’s future for the coming decades.

The valuation of the memorandum decade

Was the Memorandums finally a successful crisis management tool? The answer requires a complex analysis. Success Greece is now believed to be borrowed from international markets with its own strengths, and sometimes better than stronger economies such as Italy, a member of the G7 and a third of the eurozone. However, the increase in public debt from € 300 billion in 2010 to € 370 billion in 2023 raises questions. At default prices, however, today’s debt is numerically smaller and, above all, as a percentage of GDP, it has a downward trend – an example that the economy is growing. * At least the numbers are prosperous* and this is not negligible.

The Development Model: The Exceeding Wise

The greatest challenge, however, remains the transition to a New, viable model of development. This would require utilizing both the reforms of the Memorandums and the inherent advantages of the country, while giving opportunities to those who are still on the sidelines. The “not having” are often highlighted * Hidden Champions * who can change the terms of the game. Nevertheless, the Greek productive model continues to adhere to consumption, contracting, post -transactional activities, “internal devaluation” and their constant hunting European subsidies. Characteristic: 6 out of 10 employees live with less than 1,200 euros gross – a trend that reproduces poverty.

A bold tax reform – a * “tax bing bang” * – for the benefit of mid -income, could overturn the data, but for the time being a statement remains an act. In general, there is an intolerance to change, which often prefer the maintenance of old structures. * Do you need a new troika?* Ideally, no. However, self -criticism remains necessary: ​​Did we have to reach international intervention for clear anchors, such as the exclusive sale of baby milk to pharmacies or the privilege of the ovens to serve customers in table seats?

The controversial contribution of the troika

The presence of the “troika” left a strong imprint, without it meaning that all the interventions were apt. Often the auditors, either as *”Troika” *, *”institutions” *or in the context of *”post-Memorandum” *, caused significant social upheavals, as the Spanish rapporteur of the European Parliament Alehandros Therkas also pointed out in 2014. The recipes of fiscal adjustment focused on taxation and shrinking social spending.

There were no voices missing that in the critical negotiation of 2010 the country could have a tougher stance. In fact, as emphasized, the position of the borrower who needs the largest loan in world history leaves no room for great demands – unless there was the will to departure from the euro and return to the drachma. A scenario that, as highlighted, would radically convey the country’s competitiveness, with uncertain consequences.

Instead, Greece insists on seeking the golden intersection between the stability of the common European currency – and the terms it entails – and its national economic prosperity. As it is observed, Switzerland did not become competitive because it had a “hard currency”, but on the contrary: *it acquired a hard currency because it was already competitive *.