Since the imposition of the first sanctions in 2017, the dominant structure of the Chavista regime in Venezuela has been able to read the unfavorable international context and decided to use the resources it had in its favor: entrench itself in power internally, seek help from international allies also engaged in overthrowing the US leadership in the world and look forward to better conditions in the future.
Conditions today look better.
In recent years, the Chavista regime has advanced in the consolidation of authoritarianism and is currently strengthened in the face of a divided and exhausted opposition.
In economic terms, disorderly, government-driven liberalization has indeed paid off even with Venezuela in the gap and record levels of poverty and inequality.
At the end of 2021, the Venezuelan economy returned to growth after seven years of GDP reduction by more than 80%, and, in early 2022, the country showed signs of having emerged from hyperinflation.
Externally, since 2021 Nicolás Maduro has been working to improve his image as a dictator and trying to regain the recognition lost since the questioned 2018 presidential election.
Also in 2021, Joe Biden’s inauguration as president of the United States came with new foreign policy priorities, such as the noisy exit from Afghanistan, the consequences of Trump’s diplomacy, political tensions in different parts of the world -Iran, North Korea , Cuba and Venezuela – and the reformulation of the strategy to contain the Chinese advance in the dispute for global leadership.
At the regional level, the turning of the ideological pendulum in the governments of the region in recent years has been accompanied by positions of distance from the United States and its policies for the hemisphere, and greater tolerance for left-wing authoritarianism in Venezuela, Nicaragua and in Cuba.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine as a watershed
The Russian invasion of Ukraine demanded attention and priority on the agenda of the United States and Europe.
Contrary to many predictions, the allies reacted to the Russian invasion with the imposition of a sanctions regime that includes, among other measures, the end of oil and natural gas imports from Russia.
The measures come amid a slow recovery in oil and natural gas supplies, stemming from the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
In this sense, sanctions pressured the international and regional prices of these resources even more, generating economic impacts on a global scale and serious challenges for Europe’s energy security.
In order to contain the impact of sanctions, last March, the United States and other member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed to release part of their strategic reserves.
This decision, however, is not a sustainable solution over time and runs the risk of not impacting the price per barrel as desired.
In this context, Venezuela once again appeared on the geopolitical board as an option to contribute to the replacement of part of Russian oil exports.
The idea puts Biden in a bind. From a strategic point of view, Putin is a much more dangerous adversary than Maduro.
Under this logic, the lifting of sanctions on the South American country would help to reduce the internal pressure resulting, in part, from the increase in fuel prices, and the external pressure from European allies concerned with security in the supply of hydrocarbons.
However, the lifting of sanctions proved problematic for the Democratic administration with legislative elections looming, particularly in the swing state of Florida.
Looking at recent decisions, the Biden administration seems to have chosen to reduce expectations regarding major political changes in Venezuela and take the initiative to throw the carrot.
The proposal, still symbolic, to lift sanctions against a nephew of Nicolás Maduro and allow Chevron to negotiate the terms of possible future activities in Venezuela, seeks to persuade the regime that it is possible to reach agreements with Maduro and his collaborators, whenever there are concessions to allow for a reinstitutionalization of the country and an orderly transition to democracy.
On the other hand, the progressive lifting of sanctions would make it possible to improve the economic conditions of a Venezuela in ruins, mainly from the entry of foreign operating companies to promote a recovery of the oil industry.
The initiative also seeks to reverse Russian influence in Venezuela and even have the potential to generate friction between Maduro and Putin.
Since the sanctions came into effect, Russia has begun to compete with Venezuela for share of the Chinese market, selling oil at a more discounted price than the South American country.
The coercive measures also hamper the Chavista regime’s ability to move funds deposited in sanctioned Russian banks.
Open questions about the new approach
Although the maximum pressure policy was not enough to produce a political transition to democracy in Venezuela, sanctions remain one of the few things that encourage Chavismo to talk.
However, these measures seem insufficient to achieve a change in behavior from a regime that continues to advance in the deepening of its authoritarian project, even after the unexpected reception of White House officials in Caracas last March.
Chavismo does not hide its lack of interest in negotiations with the opposition either.
Upon learning of the possibility of lifting sanctions, the resumption of talks to reactivate negotiations in Mexico was announced.
Almost immediately after the announcements, Jorge Rodríguez reaffirmed the demand to release Alex Saab to form the Chavista delegation.
Added to the above, a few days ago Maduro expressed his rejection of resuming negotiations with Norway as a facilitating country, in a clear gesture to Russia, which adds to the recent appointment of the former Venezuelan ambassador to the Eurasian country as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
In case they are resumed, Mexico’s talks also start with new difficulties to work on points of the memorandum defined last year, such as the restoration of the rule of law, since the Parliament elected in 2020 has already renewed the TSJ magistrates ( Supreme Court of Justice) with people trusted by Maduro.
Other actions that go against the “spirit of Mexico” is a bill that Parliament is discussing to control the funds received by NGOs from abroad, with the clear objective of strangling them financially and closing even more civic space. in the country.
In the medium term, the recent experience of the elections for governors raises serious doubts about the possibility that, in 2024, Chavismo will allow sufficient integrity conditions to hold a competitive presidential election that is capable of threatening the control that Maduro exercises over the Executive Power and, with it, the unity of the constellation of key actors around him.
Finally, it is important to question the sustainability of the strategy with a medium and long-term vision that is sought with this initiative of the Biden administration.
The internal political polarization and the current economic context in the United States open the possibility that a Republican may reach the White House in 2024, accompanied by new foreign policy guidelines for Venezuela.
