The visit of influential US congresswoman Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan had global repercussions and, therefore, her gesture did not go unnoticed on social networks, in the media and, of course, in the political and diplomatic spheres.
Much less for the Chinese.
Although this has only happened recently, much has been said and written about its meaning. And the “recklessness” of the “speaker” of the US House of Representatives.
This alleged lack of containment was directly linked to the possible reaction of the Asian giant and the consequent increase in the global conflict. But this argument is reminiscent of the fruitless prescriptions against bullying, based on “don’t piss off the big guy” to avoid aggression, knowing that, in the end, it will happen whether or not you provoke it.
The Chinese response sought to reinforce the victimist position that sustains part of its national narrative: “We are an emerging country, part of the global south that always responds peacefully to aggressions from the imperialist superpower.”
In fact, this discourse –certainly anachronistic– permeated a large part of the press, academic and political circles around the world, especially in Latin America.
Therefore, before proceeding with this analysis, it is necessary to define the context in which the facts are produced: we are facing two superpowers, the most powerful in the world, faced with a specific conflict within the framework of a greater dispute for global power.
Here, there are no victims or asymmetries, except for Taiwan itself, the conjunctural setting of the drama.
Archeology of a political gesture
With Pelosi’s trip, the US made a “political” gesture and, given the reactions it produced, a very effective one. I emphasize “political” because it contrasts with the Chinese reaction, which was primarily linked to military action. It was not the only possibility that the Chinese authorities had; however, it was the one they chose.
In fact, the Chinese government’s constant and undiplomatic prior warnings that the speaker’s trip did not materialize (“Whoever plays with fire will get burned”, among others) put the US government in a dilemma, since suspending the visit would be seen as a gesture of great weakness and fear.
At the same time, the Chinese decision to stop cooperation on issues of global interest – for example, climate change – was also a misguided action.
More than punishing the US, this decision shows in the eyes of international public opinion the detachment and merely tactical character that the Xi Jinping government gives to post-material agendas that also support a part of its political support in other parts of the world.
If we look even more closely, we can continue to find the nuances that the American political gesture contained, namely: the visit was made by a congresswoman, at the end of her political career and in a country where Congress does not receive orders from the president .
Furthermore, the historic reach of visits did not increase, since in the 1990s Taiwan had also received the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, Republican Newt Gingrich.
The political character of the gesture is reinforced to the point that, at the same time, the White House (through John Kirby, coordinator of strategic communications for the National Security Council) reaffirmed the “one China” policy.
Even President Biden himself staged a kind of “separation” from the veteran Democratic representative’s action.
What unnerved the Asian giant
The impact of Pelosi’s visit on Chinese authorities made it impossible to respond to the American gesture with proportionality and intelligence.
This was possibly due to pressure from the upcoming Chinese Communist Party congress and the need to show solid leadership. Or by the excessive diffusion of a nationalist ideology in the population, fueled by Xi’s government.
And this could also be explained by the fact that they did not expect Pelosi’s arrival in Taipei to finally materialize.
Possibly what made the Asian giant more nervous was to observe that US policy is beginning to show continuity from within and a certain strategic intelligence.
A few months ago, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (popularly known as Quad) met, which includes, in addition to Japan and Australia, another major regional and potential Chinese rival: India.
At about the same time, and as a prelude to Pelosi’s trip, the US pragmatically reconstructed the link with Saudi Arabia, including the much-discussed photo of Biden with Mohammed bin Salman, accused of murdering journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Simultaneously, a US drone killed al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan, suggesting something along the lines of “we left, but we’re still there”.
The initiative in Taiwan was surgical and powerful, so it caused its rival to lose track. For years, Xi has maintained a speech about peaceful cooperation, community of interests, common progress, and the Silk Road as a framework for non-imperialist and non-violent expansion.
Pelosi’s arrival at the strait destabilized the Chinese government, which showed a face it had worked hard to make up.
The moral is that, to claim the throne of the superpowers, muscle is not enough.
Has China learned its lesson?
Text originally published on Political Dialogue
