The first 100 days of government constitute a classic time lapse in which government officials, opposition forces and analysts focus on evaluating what has been achieved.
It is an exercise that lies halfway between accountability and propaganda. It also serves to verify whether what was predicted after the electoral triumph and the moment of departure, once the new government was set up, consolidated the projections made. But beyond that, it’s useful to contrast what happened in a particular country with the dynamics that arose in the neighbourhood. Are regional trends consolidating? How correct is the idea that each country is exceptional?
In the Latin American context, Costa Rica is a country that attracts little attention and has three characteristics that make it an unusual case.
Its democracy is the most enduring in the region, since for seven decades it periodically elects its rulers without interruption. Since 1949, after a brief civil war, it has not had an Armed Forces. And, consistently, the different indices that assess the quality of democracy place it among the most advanced countries in Latin America. However, his last elections brought with them the validation of common political patterns in the neighborhood.
Within the framework of worn-out democracies, defined by society’s unease with politics and the rampant crisis of representation that particularly affects the performance of increasingly numerous, volatile political parties with multiple and discontinuous identities, Costa Rica is a case that , by breaking with certain past practices, such as the two-party system and the survival of a traditional political class, is fully in tune with the new times of politics. A time when, in addition, the common and exponential denominator of the digital configures new scenarios that break with the relatively stable frameworks that existed until just a few five years ago.
There are four elements that make up an agenda that is less and less alien in a region in which there is a clear constant, which is presidentialism as a form of government. First, the winning candidate is someone outside the country’s usual political life, with very little experience in state management and with political skills to demonstrate. This set up a government and a public administration in relation to the approximately one thousand trusted cadres, recruiting personnel through unclear co-option criteria.
Second, the new president’s relationship with the party universe is distant and purely instrumental. First, because the political party, which was once a necessary mechanism for articulating the candidacy, has become a straitjacket from which the new president gradually moves away.
And, secondly, because the very reduced parliamentary strength of the party in question, as a result of the timid electoral momentum received in the first round of the presidential elections (there were 25 candidates) prevents it from building a parliamentary majority. After taking office, the president, thanks to the power resources at his disposal, begins to build a support group based on individual memberships.
Third, the traditional political class, which has accumulated years of disrepute as a result of a series of corrupt practices, impunity and inability to connect with new generations, unconsciously provides arguments for the new Executive Branch to build an alternative discourse.
Furthermore, its refuge in the traditional media and, on some occasions, its connivance with intellectual elites, contributes to the new narrative being fed by a “popular” logic that is accompanied by business sectors aligned with the government.
Finally, encouraged by the management of a communication protocol in the hands of specialists, the president develops a media agenda in which the management of affective polarization in a friend-enemy logic favored by presidentialism stands out.
For this purpose, the management of social networks is essential, as well as, in your case, the use of fictitious accounts that help to achieve high levels of popularity. On the other hand, weekly attendance after cabinet meetings, where second questions or requests for clarification of initial responses are generally not allowed, marks the weekly political agenda.
President Rodrigo Chaves, away from the country for three decades and today with an approval rate of 70%, is a vivid image of the first 100 days of Costa Rica’s current policy that projects a state of affairs identified with the aspects described above.
But no less important is his de facto political partner, the very popular communicator for years, Pilar Cisneros, now a stellar deputy in the Legislative Assembly. This one brought her a huge amount of votes thanks to her notoriety, and that, unable to handle parliamentary oratory spontaneously, she uses in her congressional interventions, a teleprompter acquired with her own resources.
All this constitutes a scenario similar to that existing in other Latin American countries, which is heading towards the dangerous stage of chronic fatigue, accentuated in the region after the pandemic and the current economic crisis, and which could be a precursor to a dramatic deinstitutionalization. A political order on the edge of a precipice dominated by the extreme personalism of narcissistic leaders, the blurring of parties in a social environment of multiple identities, as well as individualist paroxysm, and the exponential development of the digital society with its new forms of interaction, of access to information and the empire of the algorithm.
*Translation from Spanish by Giulia Gaspar
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
