The summer of the war in Ukraine, while brutal for soldiers and civilians on the front lines, was experienced from afar as a stalemate, depressing enough in its terrible sameness to escape American headlines for a time.
Autumn and winter will be different, bringing answers to the two questions that will determine the duration of the war. First, how much territory can Ukraine free from Russian occupation? Second, how bleak and hopeless will the European winter be with Russia’s power supply cut off, and what will be the political consequences?
We are at the beginning of both stories. The long-promised Ukrainian counteroffensive is finally under way — at one end of the front line, a sudden and dramatic eastward thrust around Kharkiv, Ukraine, and at the other a slower advance towards occupied Kherson, Russia’s only major bridgehead west of the Dnieper River. The Kharkiv offensive apparently left the occupiers in disarray, liberating key cities and territories and sowing disappointment and fury on the Russian side.
At the same time, the Russian response to Ukrainian courage and Western weaponry is about to take effect. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline is closed, Europe’s leaders are struggling to prepare for a potential $2 trillion rise in energy costs and everyone is trying to predict the consequences – from a shallow recession to a “total disruption” that threatens deindustrialization, from stoic support for Ukraine to a populist rebellion.
In times of war, there is a dynamic relationship between events on the front and the political situation behind the lines. Some Western pessimists, conditioned by years of elite failure, hope that the European home front will be the crucial theater, the place where aggressive arrogance breeds an internal rebellion against an unfettered compromise with Ukraine.
This is certainly the hope of Russian President Vladimir Putin, but my hunch is that the interaction will be in the opposite direction — that events on the battlefield will be decisive, determining how the war is lived politically in Germany, France or the UK. of King Charles III.
If Ukraine continues to make military advances, if Russia’s complete defeat seems possible, Europe can withstand its winter of discontent without a rebellion against the war. On the other hand, if Ukrainian advances stall and the war seems destined for a multi-year stalemate, the Western political establishment will either be forced to push harder for peace, or find itself pressed from below.
There were already good reasons to expect progress ahead of the apparent Ukrainian advances. While Putin’s government appears to be resisting sanctions, Moscow is unwilling or unable to launch a general mobilization, has obvious difficulties with ammunition and morale, and the traditional Russian advantage in winter combat does not apply in a situation where the Russians themselves are the invading power.
It is therefore plausible to imagine a positive political-military feedback loop, in which Ukraine’s consistent gains bolster European resolve and drive the alliance de facto through the winter to a better 2023.
But there are a number of scenarios within this expected future, and each presents dilemmas where realism and pessimism can be as important as optimism and determination.
In the military best-case scenario, where the Russians end up retreating in disarray from the current front lines, the danger is that desperation will push Moscow toward nuclear folly — especially in the face of Russia’s strategic stance that calls for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to reverse defeats in battle. .
As the United States learned to its cost in the Korean War, when the American advance to the Yalu River came under unexpected Chinese intervention, the question of how far a victorious army should advance is not an easy one, and whether in the Crimea or the Donbass can there is a dangerous line to cross.
Alternatively, there is a scenario in which a Ukrainian counteroffensive has some success but still falls far short of pre-war lines of control. For example, the Ukrainians may push the Russians back down the Dnieper, freeing Kherson, but be unable to regain territory on the east side of the river.
In this kind of situation, with victories followed by a return to stalemate, the arguments for seeking a ceasefire would be strengthened — not out of any optimism about Moscow as a partner in peace, but to maintain Western support in a sustainable and balanced way and give Ukraine space for economic and demographic recovery.
Throughout the war, the Ukrainian hawks’ immediate policies were generally justified, even if their long-term strategy remained more dubious. This will likely be the season when that gap closes, when the speculative becomes reality and we learn more about what war will mean in the long run.
In that case, we should look forward to both rapid Ukrainian advances and wisdom, care and caution accompanying the victories they may achieve.
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
