Analysis: Putin Turns To Xi At His Worst Moment Since Ukraine War

When they find themselves on the sidelines of a China-backed Asian security forum in Uzbekistan, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will have plenty to talk about. Whether they will do so in the same language, metaphorically of course, is another story.

The Chinese leader makes his debut on the international stage after the pandemic with a visit to the mythical Samarkand, not by chance a center of the Silk Road, which Xi sought to revive under his government in the form of a massive multinational infrastructure project that even bears the name. the old trade route between China, Asia and Europe.

But his agenda for the meeting just over a month from now of the Chinese Communist Party, which will bring him back for an unprecedented third term and further enshrine his worldview in the Constitution, will be overshadowed by the shadows around his Russian counterpart.

Putin is at his worst political moment since the start of the Ukrainian War, 20 days after his last meeting with Xi in February, when they both sealed Moscow’s entry into Cold War 2.0 between Beijing and Washington.

A century has passed since then. In Xi’s ideal world, Putin would have quickly killed the bill in Ukraine and subjected the US-led NATO to a historic humiliation, playing cards in the energetic game in which he still has several aces up his sleeve.

This would crystallize China’s position as a leader in a polarized world, and woe betide Taiwan. The island seen as rebellious by Xi is immersed in a different historical context than Ukraine, but Western fears that Beijing would be tempted to force annexation of the territory with a triumphant Putin are not entirely unfounded.

Russian support in the most recent crisis, with Nancy Pelosi’s provocation visiting the island, reinforced that impression.

As ideal worlds fail to withstand the heat of battle, six months later Putin finds himself dealing with a crisis in Ukraine’s northeastern region. Of course, the western news is “Kiev-dependent” and fan, but it seems evident that the Russians are in trouble leaving Kharkiv province.

Whether this means a turning in the tide of war cannot be ascertained now. Moscow’s positions in eastern and southern Ukraine appear stable, and reports of Russian officials fleeing annexed Crimea sound far-fetched.

That said, even because of the opacity of the Russian decision-making process, the impression that comes across in conversations with analysts in Moscow is that of the proverbial “fly cockroach”. When a Kremlin ally like the Chechen Ramzan Kadyrov harshly criticizes the conduct of the war, something is out of the ordinary.

None of this means that Putin is one step away from being overthrown by a palace coup, as propagandists on the other side dream. So far at least, he seems to have tightened his grip on the country’s political structures even further, although any assertions here need to be cautious.

It is no accident, however, that this weakened leader is just now facing a second crisis on one of its strategic borders, in this case the South Caucasus, in the form of renewed fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

This Wednesday (14), the Ministry of Defense in Yerevan warned of the risk of a war between the two countries, given the degree of violation of the ceasefire between them in the Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh, a legacy of the Soviet collapse in the middle. of Azerbaijani territory.

In 2020, Baku won the second war over the place, but did not fully regain it because the Russians, historical allies of the Armenians, although crossed with the political leadership of the country, mediated an unstable truce and sent peacekeepers.

The US has even suggested that the crisis was instigated by Putin, aiming for a diversion to show force, as it did when it sent troops to help Kazakhstan’s autocracy in January. It doesn’t seem very doable.

The not-so-hidden subject here is Turkey, guarantor of the Azeri government, keen to regain the influence it once had as the Ottoman Empire across the region — a historic route of invasions against Russia, as well as its western borders in Ukraine and Belarus. , now a Russian appendix.

Turkish autocrat Recep Tayyip Erdogan came out strengthened in 2020 in the Caucasus and, in Ukraine, is a supporter of Volodymyr Zelensky’s government while maintaining ties with Putin. Now, he seems to test his ambiguity, as he sees Baku attack Armenian interests in the midst of the European war.

Azerbaijan has also maintained a good relationship with Moscow, but it is equally a fact that its natural gas-rich government is keeping an eye on European markets that are slowly closing off Russian oil. Good deal for Baku, increase in regional power for Erdogan – who will also meet Putin in Samarkand, where another king of the double game will also be, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Here comes Xi. The Kremlin re-balanced its alliance with Beijing ahead of the meeting, as if to remind the world that it is not alone. Photos will be taken, and support signals will be issued by the Chinese. What will come out in terms of effective aid is anyone’s guess.

In marriage to China, Moscow’s dowry was its military might, not just nuclear but conventional. Economically, Russia is ten times smaller than its neighbor and seems destined to be treated as an energy province in the relationship.

With the Russian military musculature challenged and exposed as ineffective, even if punctually, in theory Xi could take advantage of the situation and establish himself as the alpha male of the relationship. He would do well domestically, but a very worn-out Putin doesn’t suit him in the game he introduces to Joe Biden and friends in the West.

On the other hand, with a serious economic crisis to resolve, the Chinese still cannot give up the interdependence they maintain with the US and allies, which explains their moderate position in the Ukraine crisis. It’s a plaid of multiple overlapping layers, and they’ll meet right in the middle of the mythical Silk Road.