When Lula assumes his third term as president of Brazil in January 2023, it will be tempting to think (for those who see him from the outside) that the government of Jair Bolsonaro, with its pro-military radicalism and questioning democracy, pluralism and the autonomy of institutions, was no more than a brief detour.
The “barbarian parenthesis” hypothesis will wash consciences despite its tragedies, such as the return of hunger for 33 million Brazilians or the almost 700,000 deaths caused by Covid-19 – in part, the result of the government’s disinterest, if not denialism. . This hypothesis will serve to argue that society never abandoned its progressive pretensions, but only tried different means to the same end.
In short, instead of being reversed, as Bolsonaro intended, public consensus was strengthened, valuing gender equality and female empowerment, the defense of the environment and responsible business, and the independence of the judiciary and other professional state institutions. , such as the Unified Health System or the Health Surveillance. Did Brazil recover its Camelot lived between 1994 and 2016 and as soon as it lost it?
The social and cultural manifestations of these years and the electoral balance of the recent elections break with the illusion that the Bolsonaro years were an abnormality that we can quickly get out of. The crystallized political order reveals many legacies that will condition the way of doing politics and the political results that will influence the course of society. One of them is the radical moralization of public life and political action. Another is the freezing of the renewal of current political leaderships.
radicalized moralization
The moralistic credential is historically the lever of outsiders for their success in politics. Taking advantage of allegations of corruption, characters far from traditional parties come to power promising cleanliness and dignity (this was the case with Bolsonaro, but also with Quadros and Collor de Mello in Brazil in the past). But by reducing the public performance of leaders and their decisions to problems of a personal nature, this radicalized mobilization goes beyond bribery and kickbacks to include behavioral deviations such as social prejudice, political incorrectness or verbal incontinence.
The simplification of authorities or leaders in angels and demons from the influential evangelical reading, the result of its massive legislative presence and its co-option of the media, reinforces this interpretive moralism. With exacerbated moralism, secularizing pretensions centered on the substance of projects and the palpable progress of their results die.
This perspective should shape the representation of the conflict: the right accusing the Lula government of corruption and anti-Christianity, the left accusing the opposition of being misogynistic, hateful or intolerant of minorities. The emotionalism underlying these readings is a real stumbling block to return to the agenda and the modernizing mentality that characterized post-dictatorship Brazil.
oxidized leaderships
Lula’s imprisonment for almost 600 days froze the renewal of leadership in the center-left, along with the obstinacy of the PT leader.
Thus, the only strong party anchored in citizen militancy and in the progression of political careers beyond state sponsorship, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), still depends on its founder 40 years ago. Other parties on the left spectrum repeat this oxidation of their leaders (Ciro Gomes today in the PDT, previously in the PSB and PPS among other parties). Cases such as the PSOL expanded their sources of recruitment and renewal of elites through links with social movements and civil entities, but without advancing towards the highest levels of power.
The former opposition to the PT, centered mainly on the PSDB, disintegrated its management by losing its connection with the demands of society and was absorbed in an eternal internalism, pulverizing the projection of its leaders and encouraging the departure of others such as Geraldo Alckmin, four times governor. from São Paulo and current candidate for Lula’s vice-presidency. On the right of the political spectrum, the professional party vanguards outside the State were not renewed either.
Bolsonaro himself (proposed as outsider) is an example of this, with his 27 years as a federal deputy before being elected president. Stranded without a common modern narrative to lead Brazilians to a promised land, Brazil will reach the year 2023 with less optimism and more disbelief compared to the first PT government at the beginning of the century. The hypothesis of having overcome a brief “barbarian parenthesis”, followed by the resumption of Brazil’s modernizing promise and vocation can be as comforting as it is mistaken.
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
