Opinion – Boris Perius Zabolotsky: What Russia can expect from Lula’s new government

by

The Brazilian presidential election, one of the most anticipated and watched in recent times, was described as the “most important in decades”. In a fierce dispute, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) won the current president, Jair Bolsonaro (PL).

Never before in the history of Brazil has the country faced a scenario of such polarization and political violence. These elements, perhaps, are reflections of a country that has lost relevance in recent years and that now needs to seek its international insertion in an increasingly challenging and unstable world.

Relations between Brazil and Russia are historically marked by periods of estrangement and approximation. A central and constant element that guides this link is the US influence in Latin America. Thus, the nature of the relationship (closeness or distance) between Moscow and Brasília is often conditioned by political and ideological changes in the international scenario.

Bolsonaro’s government was marked by this trend. During the early years of the administration, there was an inflection towards the US, an automatic alignment with Washington’s policy in the Trump term.

During this period, Brazil became a non-NATO ally and dismantled the main regional integration projects of previous governments, submitting Brazilian regional leadership to the auspices of the OAS, an organization whose main feature is circumscribed by North American influence. In addition, Brazil gave up the character of a developing country when applying for admission to the OECD.

Another aspect that indicates this alignment with Western structures, in the first part of the Bolsonaro government, was the support for the free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union. In this sense, the initial years of the Bolsonaro administration were characterized by a readjustment to the Euro-Atlantic system, which collides with the very reformist and contestatory nature of the BRICS countries.

In this aspect, if during the PT governments the Brics was seen as a catalyst that aimed at greater insertion and international protagonism of Brazil in the search for changes in the western structures of global governance, in Bolsonaro’s term the Brics lost importance in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda. and was downgraded to a platform for bilateral trade.

Russian diplomacy was quite skillful in dealing with the change in Brazilian foreign policy stance and sought to attract Bolsonaro into bilateral partnerships. This rapprochement was contextualized by the relative isolation of the Brazilian president when Trump was defeated in the US elections.

The Kremlin recognizes Brazil as an important partner in Latin America that cannot be lost due to bad weather, thus seeking to position it as an essential ally in the design of a multipolar world.

Pragmatism and Brazilian regional leadership during the Lula administrations were responsible for laying the foundations for a strategic relationship between Brazil and Russia that is now more mature. Moscow’s position becomes even more relevant in the current context of Western sanctions on Russia, as Brazil must play an important role that can benefit both countries. In view of this, the Kremlin is not interested in a weakened Brazil that is subordinate to the United States.

In this sense, it is important to note that the Lula government is recognized for initiating a series of South American integration projects that limited and/or diminished US influence in the decision-making process in South America. These factors were viewed favorably by the Russians. But the world in which Lula ruled Brazil from 2003 to 2011 no longer exists, and the former Brazilian president will have to make even more concessions if he wants to guarantee governability.

Such circumstances may prevent the resumption of a Brazilian regional protagonism in a period in which Lula will have to focus more attention on the domestic context. The economic challenges facing Brazil, and the election of a Congress with a majority of opposition, will force it to seek foreign support and investment. This reality, then, can lead to greater interference by the US and the EU in the Brazilian international policy agenda, thus holding back Brazil’s participation in an order that challenges neoliberal and Western structures of global governance.

Brazil’s official position on the conflict in Ukraine will remain pragmatic under Lula. This fact can be attested by the Brazilian votes at the UN during the PT governments’ positions on the unfolding of the Maidan crisis of 2014. It is unlikely that Itamaraty will assume a more assertive position, supporting either side of the parties involved in the conflict.

Brazil needs Russian fertilizers and, at the same time, is dependent on trade with the US and EU. The possibility of a dialogue between Volodymyr Zelensky and Lula is also quite unlikely. The president-elect is considered “persona non grata” in the Ukrainian government for pointing out Kiev’s responsibility in the current conflict, and Bolsonaro has also been criticized for Brazil’s neutral stance.

At this point, Zelensky and the West managed to unite adversaries as antagonistic as Lula and Bolsonaro, forcing a cohesion among Brazilian political elites that is not favorable to a sign of a change in posture towards Ukraine.

Thus, the future of Brazil-Russia relations is also conditioned by the Russian capacity to deal with the Western pressure to which Lula’s new term will be submitted, in addition to the Western diplomatic incapacity to build a fruitful dialogue with Brasília.

You May Also Like

Recommended for you