Almost four years after the popular proclamation in which deputy Juan Guaidó was sworn in in an open town hall as president in charge of Venezuela (disrespecting the legality of the 2016 presidential election), the so-called interim government of Venezuela ends, with more pain than glory.
An unprecedented political maneuver that sought to constitute itself in a unitary instance that would lead to the “cessation of the usurpation, a transitional government and free elections” that never came. From those renewed expectations of political change, contrasts the feeling of frustration, division and uncertainty that permeates all segments of the Venezuelan opposition.
In the last days of December 2022, amid extensive and heated parliamentary deliberations, the interim’s immediate fate was sealed.
Two factions of the National Assembly, in office since 2015, presented divergent proposals to reform the statute that governs the “transition to democracy”, which has been in force since January 2019 and which, among other operating guidelines, stipulates a duration of four years for the interim. That is, until January 5, 2023.
The proposal that obtained the most votes (63%) was that of the opposition parties Acción Democrática, Un Nuevo Tiempo, Primero Justicia and Movimiento por Venezuela. This proposal calls for the end of the interim government headed by Guaidó.
The debates, in turn, highlighted the mutual distrust, fragmentation and profound internal lack of coordination of an interim government, which, for 2019 and 2020, managed to gather the most important national and international political capital that the opposition has achieved in recent history. .
Guaidó and his party, Voluntad Popular, sought to extend the term of the interim government and, by extension, that of his “presidency” for another year.
However, the questioning of his political performance did not come only from Chavismo, but also from the opposition itself. These are criticisms that range from its precarious capacity to generate consensus and administrative disorder to the opacity and corruption in the handling of Venezuelan assets seized abroad.
However, the main reason for the loss of support is the inability demonstrated by the interim government to become the main instrument of cohesion and preservation of the “democratic unity” that the political forces that resist the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro have been demanding for years.
Changes in the political context from 2019 to 2022
The unwillingness to render accounts, the inability to promote inclusive agreements and an erratic strategic management of forms of resistance to the dictatorship undermined, over the years, the legitimacy of the interim government. Added to this was the aggravating factor of a changing global and regional context, radically opposed to what existed in January 2019.
In addition to the lack of attention to the persistent and complex “humanitarian crisis”, aggravated by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the country’s demographic depletion, there is a global context also marked by an energy crisis, due to the invasion of Ukraine, and a oil-hungry world economy.
Furthermore, the new turn to the left in much of the region has meant that Venezuela is no longer among the hemisphere’s diplomatic priorities.
This impacted international support for the interim government itself, which contrasts with the diplomatic recognition received in 2019 by more than 60 countries, as well as by international organizations such as the OAS (Organization of American States) and even the United Nations.
However, despite all these adversities, it is fair to recognize that the interim government achieved important achievements in the international visibility of the dictatorial nature of the Maduro government, in the international freezing of assets, as a result of corruption, as well as the support of its ambassadors in promoting documentary relief and humanitarian attention to the forced migration of Venezuelans.
Also noteworthy was the articulation of several delegations that promoted several rounds of negotiations with Chavismo, with emphasis on the recent meetings in Mexico, which led to the creation of a “social protection agreement” that could channel humanitarian aid to the country with the management of United Nations and the mediation of the international community.
These achievements remain uncertain for the year 2023, when the existence of the interim government ends.
In short, with the turn of the year, the country faces a new scenario of uncertainty, especially given how the interim government ends without having managed to unite political unity and determine candidacies for the elections that Chavismo could bring again to 2023.
Even more, in the knowledge of the implosion of the interim government and given the environment of crossed accusations that prevails today in the Venezuelan oppositions.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian emergency continues, the devaluation of the bolivar and the economic stagnation that haunts the most humble and drives the mass departure of Venezuelans who are forced to emigrate in search of a place in the world where they can prosper.
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
