Opinion – Ian Bremmer: Maximum power of Xi Jinping has become a global problem

Xi Jinping emerged from the 20th National Congress in October 2022 with more control over the Communist Party – and thus China – than any leader since Mao Tse-tung.

He can now pursue his statist approach to the Chinese economy and his overtly nationalist foreign policy, facing even less domestic resistance than he encountered when he began consolidating his power a decade ago. As a result, their ability to make arbitrary decisions that impact the lives of billions of lives is unrivaled.

And because China is now exponentially more important to global economic stability and geopolitical balance than it was during Mao’s reign, Xi’s power has become a global issue.

Consider some of your recent decisions. Its refusal to import foreign-made mRNA vaccines has left the country’s 1.4 billion people far more vulnerable to Covid than they should be.

Covid deaths in China to date represent only a small fraction of those recorded in the US and Europe, but there is good reason to fear that this astounding success (albeit at a high economic and social cost) will not last long. Add to that the failure to vaccinate the population adequately, even with Chinese-made vaccines, and millions are at risk of becoming seriously ill or worse.

The Chinese leader’s quest for control has had considerable harmful effects in other areas as well.

A covert crackdown on private-sector technology companies, likely driven by fears that these firms exert excessive influence over the flow of information in the country, undermines China’s ability to produce innovative new digital technologies and undermines international investor confidence in the country. as a safe place for your investments. Thus, it takes US$ 1 trillion of market capital from one of the most efficient areas of the Chinese private sector.

In the area of ​​foreign policy, Xi’s announcement of “boundless” Chinese friendship with Russia, made just three weeks before the invasion of Ukraine, exacerbated fears in America and Europe that Xi shares Putin’s deep desire to redesign the international system.

In all three cases, Xi’s authoritarian personality, his effort to exercise tight political and economic control, and his hard-line approach to foreign policy spoke louder than the prudent advice he might otherwise have received from voices in the state bureaucracy. .

And that was before November, when Xi crowned himself emperor, filling the Politburo Standing Committee with loyal supporters and scrapping the post-Mao consensus of rule-by-committee China. Now that Chinese policy emanates directly from a single, all-powerful leader, there is even less transparency in the political process, less reliable information coming from the top to inform that process, and less room to admit mistakes, change course or even make concessions.

The problem posed by “Xi Maximo” will increase in 2023. For starters, the appalling decision to end the Covid-zero policy suddenly and without careful preparation could kill 1 million or more Chinese people. This abrupt decision to allow the virus to spread unrestrained, especially given the low vaccination rate of the elderly, was taken without prior notice to the population or even local governments and will create a lethal chaos that the Xi government will try to hide from the public. outside world and the Chinese population itself. Only an emperor could execute such an extraordinary reversal of course — and one that will come at such an extraordinarily high cost.

In the event that a new and dangerous strain of the virus emerges, “Maximum Xi” increases the likelihood that it will spread rapidly across China and beyond. China’s ability to identify this new variant would be compromised by Xi’s order to quickly and drastically reduce testing.

We also need to fear that Chinese hospitals are not prepared for the flood of seriously ill people they have begun to receive. And, given the origin of Covid, the world can’t trust China to share information it needs to protect lives outside the country either.

For the economy, the effort to control the state will produce decisions that will not be contested by expert opinions and will provoke an increase in political uncertainty. That’s bad news for an economy already weakened by two years of lockdowns, falling confidence in China’s all-important real estate sector and debt defaults that could weaken China’s financial sector.

Beijing’s manipulation of economic statistics has also been questioned. The sudden decision to delay the release of economic data, long slated to be made during the party congress, was a less than positive sign of things to come for global markets.

Finally, on the foreign policy front, Xi’s nationalist stances and assertive style will define Beijing’s relations with rivals, allies and a host of governments that are deeply reluctant to risk becoming one of those things. .

Given the scale and urgency of the domestic economic challenges, Xi knows his country cannot afford a short-term crisis. But “warrior wolf” diplomacy will intensify nonetheless, with diplomats echoing Xi’s aggressive foreign policy talk. Affinity with Putin and his worldview will limit engagement with governments that support Ukraine. More aggressive Russian behavior, something that looks certain in 2023, will affect US and European attitudes towards Xi and China.

The last time a Chinese leader wielded such unfettered power, the result was widespread famine, economic ruin and the deaths of millions. There is no Cultural Revolution or Great Leap Forward on the horizon, and the size of China’s educated urban middle class forms one of the few brakes on Xi’s ability to take such drastic measures. But “Xi Maximo” has already cost China and the Chinese people a lot, and will likely cost them even more in 2023.