With talks that have dragged on since 2019, the governments of Brazil and China were unable to renew in time the two main documents that define the guidelines and priorities of the bilateral relationship.
In December, both the Ten-Year Plan for Brazil-China Cooperation and the Joint Action Plan — valid for five years — signed between the two countries in 2012 and 2014, respectively, expired.
While the Ten Year Plan brings common principles that should govern the partnership, the five-year document is more detailed. It gathers goals and appoints interlocutors in several areas, such as agriculture, science and technology, financial cooperation and education, among others.
Both documents serve as a compass to guide the long-term bilateral relationship.
The goals in the Joint Action Plan that has just expired include encouraging visits by authorities and working together on certain topics in international organizations. The text also defines the objective of encouraging the participation of Chinese companies in bids in Brazil and ensuring the exchange of information on phytosanitary measures to avoid unnecessary retention of goods at ports.
Although the end of validity of the texts has no major practical effects, the failure of diplomacy by both governments to update them by the end of last year is a symbolic reflection of the cooling of Sino-Brazilian relations during much of President Jair’s term. Bolsonaro (PL).
According to interlocutors, different factors contributed to the two governments reaching the end of 2021 without a consensus on what should be included in the new documents: the Covid-19 pandemic and the holding — by Chinese demand — of practically all meetings in virtual environment; Beijing’s immense bureaucratic apparatus, which requires multiple approvals in different instances when negotiating documents; and the successive frictions that marked bilateral relations until the resignation of former minister Ernesto Araújo (Foreign Affairs).
Internal consultations and the exchange of proposals coincided with some of the most tense moments in Brazil’s relationship with its biggest trading partner.
In early 2020, for example, federal deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro (PSL-SP), son of the president, published a text comparing Covid-19 to the Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986), in the former Soviet Union. In the publication, the parliamentarian also stated that the Chinese regime was responsible for the spread of the disease.
The demonstration generated a reaction from the Chinese ambassador in Brasilia, Yang Wanming, who called the speech a “malefic insult” and accused the deputy of having contracted a “mental virus”.
The episode involving Eduardo was not isolated. On different occasions, President Bolsonaro himself endorsed the thesis that the coronavirus was created in a Chinese laboratory and lashed out at the Asian country to criticize the immunizing Coronavac — a political asset of one of his opponents, the governor of São Paulo, João Doria (PSDB). ).
Ernesto, in turn, even asked Beijing to replace the Chinese ambassador to Brazil. He was ignored. According to people who follow the subject, the climate of conflagration that only began to be reversed with the arrival of the new chancellor, Carlos França, spilled over into the calendar of negotiations for the two plans within the scope of Cosban (Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation).
Interlocutors point out that, at the lowest points of the relationship, there were losses on the flow of information that travels between Brasília and Beijing, with reflections also on the conversations that took place at Cosban. The body is the main institutional coordination mechanism for the Brazil-China relationship, led by Vice President Hamilton Mourão (PRTB) and by the number 2 of the Chinese regime, Wang Qishan.
The governments of Brazil and China continue to discuss the documents anyway. An attempt to reformulate the structure of Cosban itself is also on the table, but the issue faces resistance from the Chinese. The objective is to try to make the negotiations move forward so that the impasse does not affect the holding, still in the first semester, of a planned meeting between the vice presidents.
The virtual meeting has not yet been scheduled, but interlocutors fear that the failure to hold the event will represent another negative sign in Sino-Brazilian relations.
The window of opportunity to try to save the Cosban meeting is short. In Brazil, presidential elections should mobilize the authorities’ calendar from the second half of the year; meanwhile, the Chinese are already preparing for the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for October.
President of the CEBC (Brazil-China Business Council), diplomat Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves explains that the Ten Year Plan and the Joint Action Plan “aim at an order of priorities” in the bilateral relationship and, essentially, “beacon the government and serve guidance for the private sector”.
Former Brazilian ambassador to China, he credits the delay exclusively to the effects of the pandemic and sees no political component in the non-renewal of plans. “The Chinese understand very well that in relations there is a discourse and a reality. At no time has Brazil-China trade been harmed by non-trade issues,” he said, when asked about the history of attacks by Bolsonaro and allies against Beijing.
Sought after, Itamaraty informed that one of the results of the last high-level meeting of Cosban was a determination to start “discussions to improve the structure” of the mechanism and “prepare a new document to guide bilateral relations”. The meeting took place in May 2019, in Beijing, and was attended by Mourão and Wang Qishan.
Brazil sent the first restructuring proposal in December 2020, according to the ministry. The last Chinese counter-proposal was received in January 2022.
The ministry also highlighted that the negotiations on the two plans involve topics ranging from “politics, economy and trade” to “infrastructure, agriculture, culture, information technologies and space cooperation”, among others.
“In a process of this magnitude, it is natural that the evaluation period by Organs technical bodies from both sides is long. In the current circumstances of a pandemic, the process has been lengthened even further, mainly due to the impossibility of face-to-face meetings”, justified the chancellery.
“On issues that sometimes involve internal sensitivities, face-to-face meetings would allow for greater speed in the exchange of perceptions. The negotiating process continues in 2022, through virtual meetings, and Brazil hopes to conclude it as soon as possible.”
Itamaraty also stated that it would not share details of the ongoing negotiations.
.
