In the days and weeks following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, a consensus emerged on the best way to prevent similar catastrophes in the future. Political authorities have warned that large areas of territory not controlled by any government become training and breeding grounds for extremists.
In this way, some countries that produce little of value can start exporting violence, refugees and turmoil. That was the logic that led to the nearly 20-year US-led war in Afghanistan, which came to an end six months ago.
The lesson could have been re-learned when the Islamic State occupied areas of Iraq and Syria where there was no security. Its militants have threatened to wreak havoc on several continents, and intense turmoil in the Middle East has produced waves of refugees that have created new kinds of political and economic burdens in Europe and countries like Turkey.
Today the US is far less willing than it was just after 9/11 to accept the costs and risks of waging endless conflict in faraway places. The Biden administration is much more focused on the challenges created by China than the problems of the Middle East. Europe, understandably, is much more concerned about Russia at the moment.
However, today there are more large unruly areas of territory than there were before 2001. Several countries have considerable territories that we could describe as “empty lands”, areas controlled mainly by armed men rather than by law. The most obvious example of this is still Afghanistan, where the fall of the government, followed by the chaotic withdrawal of US forces last August, returned Kabul and parts of the country to an extremist, disorganized and inexperienced Taliban.
This new government will struggle to stop the local Islamic State affiliate from attracting militants from other parts of the world to settle in parts of the country where the government is absent. While the US and China are interested in peace and stability in Afghanistan, neither wants to be directly involved in its future.
Terrorism risks are also acute in the sparsely governed Sahel region. Conflicts with Islamist fighters have spread from Mali to the entire region, triggering large-scale terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Chad. And they have created a remarkable degree of political instability: in the last 18 months there have been successful coups in Mali (twice), Guinea and Burkina Faso, failed coups in Guinea-Bissau and Niger and a less violent putsch in Chad.
In each of these cases, political instability has opened up opportunities for extremism, and extremism, in turn, has deepened political chaos.
Here, too, external actors are increasingly reluctant to intervene directly. The US pulled back after 2017, when four US soldiers were killed in Niger. Also France reduced its military presence. An escalation of these insurgencies still has the potential to greatly worsen the situation in West Africa and that of all who may fall victim to the militants who train there to launch attacks elsewhere.
Yemen’s seven-year civil war has grown more dangerous in the past month since Iraqi-backed Houthi rebels resumed missile fire against the United Arab Emirates, a country that has allied itself with the Saudi-led coalition.
After reducing US military support to the Saudis, a Biden administration faced with multiple domestic headaches and being challenged by Moscow over Ukraine has done little to promote a ceasefire in Yemen or alleviate the suffering of civilians trapped by the fighting.
The effects will extend beyond Yemen. Houthi attacks have already damaged Saudi oil facilities crucial to the world economy and heightened regional tensions with Iran. Attempts at counterterrorism action in Yemen continue to fail, leaving room for an efficient al Qaeda-affiliated entity in the country.
Myanmar and Ethiopia have much stronger governments than Afghanistan, Yemen or the Sahel countries, but they are beset by civil strife beyond their control. In Myanmar, the ruling junta in power for more than a year has still not been able to contain a movement of civil disobedience and resistance by armed organizations of ethnic minorities.
The United States has treated Myanmar as a low priority, and China, while supporting the junta, has not invested much in restoring order outside the country’s biggest cities. India and China face the risk of greater flows of refugees as internal conditions worsen.
Ethiopia faces many of these same problems. In a state of civil war for more than a year, the military advantage still oscillates between government and anti-government forces. The US approach has been inconsistent. China has provided the government with diplomatic cover and some weapons, fueling the risk of a conflict that could generate refugee flows with the potential to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.
Finally, the never-ending crisis in Venezuela and Haiti has already sent waves of refugees to North America and Latin America. Political repression and economic meltdown in Venezuela have driven more than 6 million people to leave the country since 2014.
The US has made little effort to seek a political solution to Venezuela’s economic misery. Haiti remains mired in endemic corruption and often violent internal political disputes that have already driven millions of Haitians to try to reach the US.
In a “G-zero world” where there is no single power or strong alliance of powers capable of providing global leadership, these diverse fires are likely to burn longer and more intensely. Over the past two decades, the world has seen time and time again that international borders are incapable of containing political violence, economic suffering and human misery. In 2022, the world’s richest and most powerful governments continue to pretend that the turmoil “out there” can be ignored without further consequences.
