When Russia declared war on Ukraine, military analysts around the world thought of Syria.
They remembered that Russian President Vladimir Putin had been training his troops and testing his arsenal in that Arab country since 2015. He was, in theory, more than prepared to take Kiev by surprise. Such was the surprise, however, when they saw Russia ignore, one by one, the lessons learned in seven years of military intervention in the Middle East.
“We’re flabbergasted,” says Mason Clark, chief analyst for Russia and Ukraine at the US-based Institute for the Study of War. “These are errors after errors, contrary to their own military doctrine.”
Clark is the author of a detailed report on the Russian experience in Syria and its lessons, published in January of last year.
Putin’s hesitation to use strategies tested in Syria is all the more astonishing because outside observers know that Russia has sent some of the military leaders who previously served in the Middle East to Ukraine.
Moscow entered the Syrian civil war in September 2015 at the country’s behest, when it looked like rebels could overthrow Putin ally Bashar al-Assad. Russian support was instrumental in turning the tide of sand and keeping the regime in power — where it remains to this day.
One of the first victories was the retaking of the historic city of Palmyra, which had been captured by the Islamic State terrorist group. The trump was celebrated with the performance of an orchestra in the ruins of a Roman theater.
Russia also guaranteed the retaking of Aleppo, which is fundamental to Syria’s economy, and the stabilization of Deir Ezzor, a strategic point in the desert halfway to Iraq.
Putin’s campaign in Syria was crucial to the broader project to upgrade his army, which has been ongoing since at least 2010. It was in the Arab country, for example, that Russia corrected the calculations of its Kalibr cruise missiles, increasing accuracy. and impressing NATO, the western military alliance.
One of the pillars of Russian strategy in Syria was the intense campaign of air strikes from the base of Hmeimim, south of the Syrian city of Latakia. The bombings, which destroyed parts of the country and left thousands dead, quickly dismantled the forces opposing dictator Assad. There is no longer any risk of falling, but Russian forces are still in the country, apparently with no deadline for withdrawal.
With that track record, says Clark, analysts were surprised to see the — proportionately — limited number of Russian air strikes in Ukraine. It was also surprising that Putin did not make large-scale use of planes he had already tested in the Syrian war, such as the Su-25 and Su-34 models.
It is also striking, says the analyst, that Russia ignores its own doctrine by sending “a weird mix of small units, without a unified command and logistics structure” to attack Ukraine. One of the main lessons Putin learned in Syria, according to the Institute for the Study of War report, was the development of a well-oiled chain of command, capable of making quick decisions and outmaneuvering the enemy. That’s not what has happened so far.
The Russian president may have calculated that the declaration of war and the movement of troops alone would cause the Ukrainians to lay down their weapons and surrender. On the contrary — in recent days, what has been seen is the militarization of civilians and resistance.
“Lessons learned in Syria were not implemented because Putin expected Ukraine’s forces to quickly collapse,” says Clark. “The Russians thought they were going to fracture the Ukrainian forces, demoralize them. But the Ukrainian army still has a unified command.”
None of this, of course, means that Russia will lose the war. Recent moves, such as a convoy heading to Kiev, indicate that Putin has learned from his mistake and is adjusting his strategy. Analysts are already talking about a new stage in the Ukrainian war, and the world is braced for shock.
“They are conducting this war in a much less professional and competent manner than we expected after Syria,” says Clark.
“This is good for Ukraine, of course, but we fear that Russia will recalibrate its campaign and ultimately use the tools it has tested in Syria,” he says. This includes more robust aerial bombardment, more cohesive units, and better inter-leadership. Russia may also step up its cyberattacks against the Eastern European country.
One area where the war seems definitively lost, however, is that of narrative. Russia has endeavored to conceal its actions in Syria, which have included bombing civilian targets and displacing masses of refugees. It achieved. Even today, years later, it is not necessarily public knowledge that Putin has strengths in the country. The Ukrainian conflict is a topic of intense debate around the world and the target of protests. “They have completely lost control of the narrative of this war.”
