Russia and Ukraine faced each other in a trade dispute at the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 2016 and 2019. I remember perfectly: all sensible people wanted to avoid that dispute, seen as politically explosive for an organization that, after all, had not been created to deal with national security issues.
For decades, trade and security were treated separately. The WTO had never been forced to say what countries could and could not do in the name of their security.
Kiev claimed that its commercial interests were being harmed (and they were) because Russia hindered the transit of goods through its territory when they were destined from another country to Ukraine. Moscow claimed to act for reasons of national security and, in his view, that argument allowed it to do as it pleased.
Ironically, the US supported Russia in this dispute with Ukraine. Washington sided with the Russians because it had an interest, like Moscow, in using the national security argument to freely flout trade rules.
Especially under Donald Trump, trade barriers of dubious legality began to be presented under this justification. The then president said it was all a matter of national security — including the fact that there were too many German cars on Fifth Avenue.
Like the Russians, the Americans defended the position that the mere claim of national security was enough for the WTO “court” to be unable to rule on a trade issue. Brazil, the European Union, China and others disagreed with the argument.
In the end, Russia won the dispute — but the thesis that it would suffice to invoke national security to disrespect trade rules defended by Moscow and Washington did not prevail. The case was won by examining the concrete elements of the problem.
The trade dispute that began in 2016 was a harbinger of the growing importance that national security issues would gain in international relations.
The invasion of Ukraine will put an end, once and for all, to the typical post-Cold War view that it would be possible to isolate international security concerns and concentrate efforts on the economic agenda, allowing, given the relative stability of the global scenario, the optimization of production and the intertwining of economies.
Gone are the collective enthusiasm for economic cooperation, for international law, for the Kantian belief that trade serves the cause of world peace — which marked the creation of the WTO in 1995.
The securitization of international trade gained momentum with the pandemic, due to the feeling of vulnerability associated with the scarcity of critical inputs and the excessive dependence on some supplier countries. But it also grew with the perception in the US that the rise of China poses a threat.
With the war in Ukraine, anxieties of this nature only increase, having repercussions on trade policy choices around the world – not just in terms of Russian gas or fertilizers.
Concerns about self-sufficiency in strategic sectors and the resilience of value chains in the face of geopolitical challenges are gaining new importance. The view that it is necessary to reduce external dependence in sectors such as semiconductors, rare earths, active pharmaceutical ingredients, in addition to energy and food, gains extra impetus.
The security agenda is eating away at the perception of the benefits of international trade. Politics trumps economics — and, in many parts, international trade is no longer seen primarily for the opportunities it represents and increasingly for the security risks it entails.
Anticipated by the other civilized dispute between Russia and Ukraine in the WTO, the securitization of trade relations is a clear sign of a change of era.
