By Mark Champion

The key to all magic tricks is distraction, and that’s the best way to understand Russian President Vladimir Putin’s latest round of nuclear jabs, including Thursday’s use of a new-generation missile to strike a target in Ukraine.

After an initial statement by Ukraine’s air force that Russia had launched an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, Russian President Vladimir Putin later said in a televised address to his nation (suddenly mediated by new threats) that the strike had actually tested a new, shorter-range, hypersonic missile called the Oreshnik. These are primarily designed to carry multiple nuclear warheads and would require missile defense systems that Ukraine does not have to shoot them down.

Fired from the Astrakhan region at the northern end of the Caspian Sea, the missile hit a factory and surrounding buildings in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, about 1,000 kilometers away.

Putin made it clear in his speech that this was in response to US and UK decisions to allow Ukraine to use ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles against targets in Russia. However, the choice of weapon was also an attempt to lend credence to his currently “inflationary” nuclear threats.

Russia has very few of these expensive missiles, and will not dent its nuclear deterrent by using many of them in Ukraine. So whatever damage was caused — and initial reports say it was slightly greater than that caused by other ballistic missiles Russia uses — Thursday’s strike is less a harbinger of further Oreshnik missile strikes and more an attempt to convince European capitals and Washington that Putin this time means it when he says he is willing to turn this war into nuclear conflict.

But it is necessary to keep a perspective. We are not on the brink of a nuclear conflagration. Putin talks about his massive nuclear arsenal because it has proven to be a highly successful tactic in making the Biden administration and European leaders self-censor and slow to channel aid to Ukraine. If he can now get Trump to frame the peace talks with the question of whether Americans and Europeans would like to: a) avoid World War III and a nuclear Armageddon, or b) continue to support Ukraine until a settlement is reached viable agreement, they will definitely choose option A.

So, what conclusions can we draw from all this? One is to stop heart palpitations every time Putin talks about nuclear weapons. The modified public doctrine on the use of nukes that (Putin) signed this week was another communication, rather than operational, tool, and it does not remove any of the enormous hurdles and costs involved in pushing the red button. Notably, Russia informed the US of Thursday’s strike in advance. The “equation” for a nuclear move made no sense when Russia was losing in Ukraine in 2022, and it makes less sense now that it is winning and a more receptive US president is about to take office. The use of a test missile on Thursday does not change that.

If the “nuclear noise” is a distraction, Putin with his other hand is escalating the war in very specific ways. These include the deployment of North Korean troops and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that caused Washington to change its mind about using ATACMS. On Monday, submarine cables connecting Sweden and Finland to Lithuania and Germany respectively were cut. Investigations are ongoing, but the leading case for now must be Russian sabotage. Unlike the attack on the 2022 Nord Stream gas pipeline, it is hard to see who else would be motivated.

Meanwhile, Israel has been surprised by the quantity, sophistication and recent manufacture date of the Russian weapons it finds in Hezbollah caches in Lebanon. In Yemen, Moscow reportedly provided targeting data to help Houthi rebels strike merchant ships in the Red Sea. According to reports in the Wall Street Journal and Reuters, among others, the Kremlin has also considered an Iran-brokered deal to give the Houthis anti-ship missiles that could threaten US warships. That didn’t happen at the time, but Putin made it very clear that if Ukraine’s allies allowed it to use its cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to strike Russia, it would give its enemies in the West the means to do the same. There is no reason to doubt him.

Expect more of this, especially attacks on undersea cables. Simple geography means that Russia, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, doesn’t have or need many of these cables, unlike the West. This creates a “vulnerability asymmetry” that Russia, thanks to one of the most capable submarine fleets, is well placed to exploit, reaching the cables of other nations.

Any conflict that distracts from Putin’s invasion or reduces US military and financial resources so that they cannot be sent to Ukraine works to his advantage. So he does what he can, where he can, to cause chaos and logistical strain. Some of it is retaliatory, but mostly it is part of his wider war effort and is unlikely to stop after the ceasefire in Ukraine. Putin has made no secret that his ultimate goal is to restore Russia to the top of the world as a great power.

However, the sudden reversal of US policy on ATACMS has him worried and indeed makes things more dangerous. The prospect that the next US president will try to force a quick end to the war makes it vital for both sides to ensure they are in as strong a position as possible when the ‘music stops’. If Putin’s forces are no longer advancing because Ukrainian drones, US ATACMS and British Storm Shadow cruise missiles are destroying Russian ammunition depots and energy infrastructure, he will be in a much weaker position to deal with the ceasefire negotiations as a tool for to demand the surrender of Kiev.

That’s the bottom line. Putin is trying to turn the tables on Russian territorial influence. He is as reluctant to give up the power that comes with an empire as the British, French, Austrians and Ottomans were before him. I don’t hear anyone suggesting that the world would be better off with Algeria still a French colony or Hungary still ruled by Vienna. If these empires could threaten the world if it wasn’t theirs, you can be sure they would. However, none of this means that Putin is ready to accept the radical risks and concrete costs of a nuclear strike.

* Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously the Istanbul bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal.