If President Vladimir Putin uses nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine and wins the conflict, that will encourage other actors with atomic bombs to use the weapon to solve their territorial disputes, North Korea ahead.
The analysis is done by Sharon Squassoni, 59, a professor of international relations at George Washington University (USA) with 30 years of experience in nuclear disarmament issues and a member of the Science and Security Council of the prestigious Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
The entity was created in 1947 by those involved in the construction of the American atomic bomb, concerned about the risks of its invention. In addition to promoting research, the Bulletin publishes every year the position of the Doomsday Clock – which has come to encompass, as an existential risk to humanity in addition to nuclear weapons, items such as climate change and disinformation.
This year, before the war, he was kept at 100 seconds of midnight, the closest level to the apocalypse in his history. Putin put his nuclear forces, the most powerful in the world alongside the Americans, on alert and suggested that he will use the bomb if any nation interferes in the conflict, which left NATO (Western military alliance) without direct action, despite supporting to Ukraine.
Analysts speculate whether the Russian could use a less powerful tactical weapon in case it finds itself on the brink of defeat or to hasten the end of the conflict. NATO has been discussing how to react if that happens, considering that there could be radioactive contamination from members neighboring Ukraine.
“Nobody knows if Putin sees any advantage [em usar a bomba]. Rationally, there are none,” the professor said. She is moderately optimistic, believing the situation is unlikely to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons or a confrontation with NATO, but considers the risk present.
For her, Russian difficulties in the war can discourage conflicts between countries that may eventually use nuclear weapons, such as China, India and Pakistan. But she says that everything changes if Putin uses the bomb, even if it goes to an uninhabited place to raise a warning, and wins the war.
There, she points to the dictatorship of Kim Jong-un as a candidate to try to resolve its disputes with South Korea, with whom it has lived in a ceasefire since 1953. Last week, Pyongyang tested a nuclear-capable intercontinental missile that, when is operational, it can reach the entire American territory —Washington is the nuclear guarantor of Seoul’s security.
The professor points to the West’s mistakes in the post-Cold War period, such as allowing the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons and not having integrated Russia into Europe’s security architecture, which could have avoided the current crisis. Squassoni spoke to sheet by email.
What is the risk of a nuclear escalation in the Ukraine crisis? There is always a risk of escalation when countries with nuclear weapons engage in conflict, as we have no “firewalls” in the war. The fact that Russia is at war with a neighbor, close to NATO countries, and that Ukraine has asked for assistance from the West increases the risks that the Russians will escalate the conflict. No one knows whether Putin sees any political or military advantage in moving closer to the use of nuclear weapons. Rationally, there is none. Using nuclear weapons to scare NATO or coerce Ukraine into surrender is unlikely to work.
The end of the Cold War brought a false sense of security, even with the warnings that Russia gave in 2008 and 2014, about the risk of a nuclear escalation. Was there complacency on the part of the West? I think the West missed the opportunity to design a different security architecture in Europe, one that would encompass Russia, and also drastically reduce nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones. But democracy never took root in Russia and Putin grew bolder over time. The window of opportunity didn’t stay open for long.
like mrs. assess the impact of the conflict on other theaters that could see a nuclear escalation? Some analysts have suggested that China may be punished for Russia’s experience in Ukraine. The US is very likely to help Taiwan, particularly if the Chinese use military force without justification, as Russia has done, and the Taiwanese are likely to respond with as much enthusiasm as Ukraine.
It’s hard to see how Russia’s experience will affect India/Pakistan/China. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine resembles Russia’s in some ways. Pakistan has suggested it would use nuclear weapons on its own soil to stop a conventional Indian advance. Perhaps Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine will make India think twice about the usefulness of its conventional superiority over people who defend their homes, even when they are not armed with nuclear weapons.
Of course, if Russia uses a nuclear weapon and stops the conflict to its advantage, it will be all worth it for potential nuclear escalation in other cases where territorial disputes trigger conflict. In that case, maybe I’m more inclined to worry about the Korean peninsula.
Russian doctrine of 2020 predicts the use of nuclear weapons if the state is at existential risk, even in a cyber attack. Putin said in his war speech that Russia was at existential risk and then made the threats known. Considering he spent four months denying the invasion while rallying his soldiers, how serious can this seeming bluff be? I don’t think anyone believes Russia is at existential risk, but it won’t matter to Putin if he decides it is. What matters is whether military officials will follow an order to launch a nuclear strike.
They may not have a problem with a demonstration attack, for example, in a remote area over water, but they may find it difficult to carry out an order that would target civilians or that would contaminate a large area or affect countries beyond Ukraine. I am hopeful that Putin will limit his nuclear activity to coercion and threats, rather than use. He must at the very least understand that breaking the nuclear taboo will make him an outcast forever.
Tactical weapons were not under the umbrella of control agreements. Was this a mistake? The US and Russia have withdrawn tactical nuclear weapons since early 1991. It was easy to do and willingly done by George Bush and Boris Yeltsin. The first priority at the end of the Cold War was to ensure that strategic agreements were implemented and that Russia’s vast nuclear weapons complex was secure so that materials and weapons did not disappear. And, of course, to ensure that the ground weapons of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were dismantled and destroyed.
Tactical nuclear weapons were less of a problem. Although they became a priority for the US, particularly Congress, Russia never agreed. In hindsight, it seems a mistake not to have eliminated them, as we have until recently eliminated land-based intermediate-range missiles under the INF treaty, assuming they are more employable than strategic nuclear weapons.
I don’t know if that’s true, but I hope we don’t find out. In any case, it was a mistake not to address several of the arms control agenda items that Russia has proposed over the years, such as limits on missile defenses.
One of the criticisms of NATO in the crisis concerns the lack of military alternatives to deter Russian aggression, due to the obvious risk of escalation. Is there any way out of this trap? Deterrence is a matter of perceptions: Putin clearly believed that he would face no viable opposition in Ukraine, that surrender would be swift, and that the Russian economy would resist sanctions, but eventually they would be lifted.
He didn’t count on NATO involvement — one reason for taking Ukraine now is to forever close the opportunity for her to join the alliance. NATO has a wide range of military options should Russia attack a member country. Russian nuclear threats against an alliance that contains three nuclear-armed states would indeed be very ill-advised.
However, if some of the arms control treaties that were abandoned had been in place and working, it might have been more difficult for Russia to invade Ukraine. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [abandonado pela Rússia em 2007]the Open Skies Treaty, the INF [de armas nucleares intermediárias na Europa, abandonados assim como o Céus Abertos pelos EUA a partir de 2018], these were all mechanisms to regulate military conduct and inject transparency to build trust. It is also possible that nothing would have stopped Putin, that he is simply bent on trying to go back in time to restore the Russian Empire.
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American Sharon Squassoni, 59, is a member of the Science and Safety Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. She has worked in the area of ​​non-proliferation and disarmament for 30 years for both the US government and Congress. She was director of research programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Carnegie Center, both in Washington. She is a research professor at the Science and Technology Policy Institute at George Washington University.
