Donald Trump used to be joking that he could shoot someone on the fifth avenue without losing support. The same could be said about the Royal Palace in The Hague, where the US president has received a heroic host, despite the fact that he has uninterruptedly attacked, has humiliated and questioned the usefulness of NATO and European allies.

Even as Trump expressed his reservation as to whether NATO’s commitments were still in force, alliance leader Mark Rutte took care to welcome him with diplomatic heat and positive climate. The US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, despite the obvious rejection of European diplomatic efforts of the last decade, was praised as “truly excellent”. The decision to overflow the defense spending targets, another Trump’s obsession, was described as a “great success”. Even German Friedrich Mertz described Iran’s bombing as the necessary “dirty work” that had to be done to limit Tehran’s nuclear vision.

This is obviously called politics, that is, what Europeans consider necessary to maintain an alliance in which the US represents 70% of the potential. His rhetoric of Vice President Jay Di Vance in February has been forgotten, in front of what seems to be a US conversion from the isolation of the Maga world. After all, Trump gave the green light to throw perforated bombs, publicly declared that it is “safer world” and presented the kind of strong deterrence that Europeans are looking for, as Russia continues to bomb Ukraine. “Chapeau,” as the French say. Perhaps the world gendarmerie may eventually be persuaded to delay its “retirement” if Europe dramatically increases its defense spending.

However, this is in danger of being an incorrect reading of the “memorandum” from the Middle East. Foreign Policy expert Steven A. Cook has argued that Trump’s intervention in Iran was a victory of opportunism over ideology – “Trump loves the winners, and then the Israelis made it famous.” It was also a victory of monomers over alliances, with Europeans staying in the dark and marginalized by the most powerful person in the world, as put by French diplomat Silvi Berman. And in terms of priorities, Iran has set over Russia. The imposition of restrictions on a regional aspiring ruler is not a general model, as has been shown by Trump’s later “very nice” conversation with Vladimir Putin.

It is, of course, difficult to determine exactly where we are between Pax Americana, who for decades has maintained a world -leading world under the leadership of the US, and the Alternative of Maga, which has preferred self -restraint and reduction, especially in Europe. Trump is neither consistent nor careful. He may not be able to achieve the divergent he says he wants.

But at first glance, there are still many elements here that are in line with a removal from the old model of global hegemony and to what is called “offshore balancing” – intervening only when it is necessary to keep the aspiring rulers limited and dependent on the periphery.

Given the lack of clarity of where US politics are really directed, European allies would do better to wonder about their strategic dependencies, instead of increasingly following the Rutte line for their maintenance. “This is an unhealthy relationship,” says Christopher Leine, a distinguished professor of international relations at Texas A&M University. The promise of 5% of GDP costs for defense can be a victory for Trump, but it is not realistic for European countries who have only now managed to reach 2%, nor does it help to understand exactly where this money must be directed to fill the gaps of a reliable, European. In this sense, Spain’s reaction says loudly what others think silently.

Instead of leaving the baton to Trump to define the tempo of the re -equipment, Europe has to discover its interior de Gaulle – or at least worthy leaders of the name. Mertz and Emmanuel Macron show a single attitude, but this must go beyond financial commitments and reach the determination of who will buy what, and where, in the name of a common European defense. It is also noteworthy that there is a great deal of debate on defense spending and very little about economic growth, which is absent in Germany and France. Europe has a lot of problems, as Washington often likes to remind themselves and so it has even more reasons to manage it itself.

This also applies to US allies beyond the Atlantic. One of the main doctrines of the Maga movement is that China is the only force with real hegemonic ambitions that America has to intercept. In this context, Asia is considered the only region where the strategy of “distance balance” would be too dangerous, mainly due to the threat of Beijing to Taiwan. However, Trump appears undecided there -from recent trade talks to his statement that Beijing can continue buying oil from Iran. The US is also considering the Aukus security deal with Australia and the United Kingdom. Conditions last as long as they say, as de Gaulle.