In 2004, after a conversation with then-Mexican President Vicente Fox, Russian Vladimir Putin acknowledged that his country did not have the same resources as the Soviet Union to invest in relations with Latin America, even though he considered that the region deserved such attention.
Eighteen years later, evidence remains that Putin found resources and, above all, motivation to expand his influence in Latin America.
The onslaughts only gained more attention with the invasion of Ukraine and after the stance in favor of the Kremlin or neutrality that some Latin American countries adopted in UN votes or in statements by rulers – such as Jair Bolsonaro.
In the last two decades, Russia has extended its tentacles in the region on seven fronts: trade in general, arms sales, nuclear cooperation for civilian purposes (with Argentina and Bolivia), oil (Russian oil company Rosneft helps Venezuela evade US sanctions on its largest source of foreign exchange), debt forgiveness or renegotiation (mainly favoring Cuba and Venezuela) and political-diplomatic support.
In the cyber field, the strategy has not been so much direct interference to influence electoral results (despite suspicious activities of Russian computers in the 2018 Mexican presidential campaign), as minister Edson Fachin, president of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court) fears.
The biggest effort is the dissemination of pro-Kremlin propaganda through the TV channel Russia Today (RT) and the website Sputnik News and the promotion, on social networks, of fake news and apocryphal memes with the aim of disrupting the political debate- electoral. The Russian interest is to solidify, among the Latin American public, the perception of the decline of the model of liberal democracy adopted by the United States.
These were, therefore, the resources committed by Putin. But what were his motivations? In this regard, scholars are basically divided into two groups.
The first interprets the movement towards Latin America, the geopolitical backyard of the USA, as a response to the expansion of NATO, a western military alliance, in the former space of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. The second credits the approach to commercial pragmatism (opening foreign markets) and the search for new international allies for the construction of a new multipolar world order.
The researchers of the first group observe that Russia’s trade with Latin American countries is negligible, despite the growth in nominal values ​​in the period. Trade is concentrated in agricultural commodities, minerals (including for the production of fertilizers) and fossil fuels. The exception is military equipment.
Among the countries that have purchased Russian weapons and helicopters in recent years are Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico and, most notably, Venezuela. In 2013, Brazil began negotiations to acquire the Russian-made Pantsir anti-aircraft system, but the intention lost strength under the Michel Temer government (MDB). Two months ago, Vice President Hamilton Mourão (Republicans) said that Brazil’s partnership with NATO was an obstacle to closing the deal.
Defenders of the pragmatism hypothesis argue that, as the world’s second largest arms exporter (behind the US), it is only natural for Russia to focus on opening new markets in the sector. Already adherents of the reasoning that Russia’s growing influence in Latin America is a retaliation to NATO’s expansion, note that efforts to sell arms are often accompanied by military cooperation agreements that allow the Kremlin to effectively plant its boots in the region.
This is especially true in the cases of Venezuela and Nicaragua. With dictator Daniel Ortega, Russia forged an agreement that allows it to dock military vessels in the country’s ports without prior authorization. There is also cooperation in the areas of police training, surveillance against drug trafficking and cybersecurity — US experts see these initiatives as covert Russian intelligence activities in Central America.
In Venezuela, Moscow’s cooperation with Caracas goes beyond what is available for public consultation in official documents. According to Colombia’s intelligence service, Russia operates spy radars in Venezuela near its border.
On at least three occasions since 2008, Russian long-range nuclear-capable bombers have participated in military exercises in the Caribbean from Venezuelan airports. And in 2019, at the height of tensions with the US, Nicolás Maduro received a hundred Russian uniforms to advise Caracas in the event of an armed intervention by Washington.
In favor of the “take back” hypothesis is also the fact that the moments of greatest rapprochement between Russia and Latin America, especially those of a military nature, took place in 2008, after the short war in Georgia, which led to the declaration of independence. of two pro-Russian territories, and from 2014, when Putin annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and was punished with US sanctions.
Therefore, it is to be expected that the redoubled international isolation of Russia will motivate the Kremlin to further intensify its presence in Latin America, seeking allies among governments in the region without ideological distinction. As far as Brazil is concerned, the attitudes of Bolsonaro and Lula towards the war, both committed to minimizing Russian aggression, demonstrate that Putin’s strategy has worked.
