Opinion – Vinicius Torres Freire: Understand how Lula can turn to support in Congress

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has about three months to assemble at least a draft coalition to support his government.

PT, left and aggregates have always been in the minority in the Chamber, with something between 30% and 35% of federal deputies elected in the years in which PT led the federal government, for example.

At the beginning of the 2023-2026 legislature and government, the left is somewhat more in the minority. The biggest problem is not there, however. The configuration of the Congress is very different from the toucan-PT years (1994-2014).

Assembling a coalition was, in principle, more difficult for the PT than for the PSDB in the years when the two parties held the federal government, 1994-2014. The situation got worse.

The party that gave the biggest and central ballast to the alliances, the MDB, is small, as is the center. Smaller parties of these coalitions of the old regime, the “physiological”, are sometimes allies, dominant and supported Jair Bolsonaro in this year’s election (PL, PP and Republicans).

The PT says its first objective is to take the entire MDB (42 deputies) and PSD (also 42) into the government. “Integers” is never possible. In this 2022, even less.

Half of these parties adhered to Lula or can do so without great difficulty after the PT victory. But at least a third are Bolsonarista or from southern or western states. Power and positions resolve part of the issue. The agreement will be more precarious and costly.

The federation Brasil da Esperança, PT, PC do B and PV, elected 80 federal deputies — a federation is a party bloc that has to last four years. The coalition that elected Lula has, for the time being, 122 seats in the Chamber (it also includes the PSOL/Rede, PSB, Solidariedade and Avante federations).

“Sobrando”, there are the 17 of the PDT, which the PT rarely deals with in public. There would then be 139. If Lula took MDB and PSD behind closed doors and believing too much in this political arithmetic, there would be 223 deputies. Little.

PT members say they will look for the PSDB-Citizenship federation, with just 18 deputies. Of them, 13 are from the toucans, often disguised Bolsonaristas.

There is no MDB, as between 1994 and 2014, large, well distributed by states and cities, in general with no intention of disputing the Planalto, in the center of the game. The toucans also had the facility of having a constant and then numerous ally, the PFL (later DEM).

During this period, the MDB elected an average of 83 deputies. In the Tucano years, the PFL elected an average of 94. “Physiological” parties with between 20 and 40 deputies, rarely 50, and strays from other parties completed the board.

This system was moribund from June 2013 and the corruption scandals. He died in 2018.

In 2022, dominant is the Bolsonarist coalition, PL, PP and the Republicans of the Universal Church, with 187 seats. For Lula, there is a threat that an even larger right-wing bloc will be formed, with the União Brasil, with 246 deputies, a remote threat, but already explained by Arthur Lira (PP-AL), president of the Chamber candidate for reelection.

PP and even the PL, which now houses Bolsonaro, are malleable, even having elected parliamentarians committed to the hard or extreme right. Lira exchanges support for the command of the Chamber and fat amendments for a less difficult life for Lula, as is well known.

União Brasil, joined by the DEM with the rest of the PSL, is the biggest unknown, but it would not go as a block to the government either, as part of the party is a militant anti-PT.

In short, Lula will have to negotiate with a tougher right-wing or negotiator that is dominant. Worst of all, it may only take pieces of the split parties it will negotiate with. Even if it works, it’s a more unstable picture.