The first court ruling on the Tempi Multipurpose Convention was issued by the One -Member Court of First Instance on the death of the passenger train controller, seeking compensation of € 800,000 in the spouse, two children and his sister.

Decision (number 966/2024) accuses Responsibilities to OSE SA and Hellenic Train, which, according to the court, although they knew that telecommunications and signaling were not operated by the first and the transfer of passengers or the second “by exposing both the latter and its employees at the risk of life and health”.

The Court obliges OSE and Hellenic Train to pay for total repayment, € 200,000 to each of the applicant members of the auditor’s family, and an additional 12,000 euros for the costs that both companies bear “dual” liability. about the accident.

In the rationale of the decision, which has 25 pages, it is found for the two companies, against which they turned to the worker’s workshop, his relatives, ‘Heavy convergence negligenceAnd illegal behaviorwith a lot of omissions on the necessary protection measures that led to the tragic result.

As the judge who issued the decision explains:

“The basis of the above legislative checks illegal conduct of the responsible bodies of defendants lies in the omission of installation and position in operation on the network and the trains of the aforementioned security systems, the use of which would have certainly preventing the collision of the train and were More appropriate, in view of the aforementioned conditions in this case. “

The decision describes the authority that led to the tragedy with the “fatal mistake” of Larissa Commander but it is precisely pointed out what it was that made the human error “fatal”: “The original mistake of Larissa Commander was fatal precisely because the insurance valves did not work. The mistake that the commander -in -chief would be stopped by the telecommunications, that is, the most experienced commander -in -chief to practice teleikos. In the context of the teleikos would exist and signal and it would never be possible to engrave two trains in one line. In the absence of telecommunication and signaling in this particular part of the route, the deprivation of the commander -in -chief who was only on the shift was completely inadequate for traffic management. On the basis of all the above and as it turned out, the appropriate security systems were not operational and the railway lines were not properly operational, the routes should not be carried out at the critical time. The second defendant is OSE as an infrastructure management body as well as the first defendant Hellenic Train, a transport operating body that proved to be aware that signaling and telecommunications did not work and yet the first OSE allowed transport the second Hellenic Train Passengers by exposing both the latter and the workers at the risk of life and health are cumulatively responsible for the next result. “

In the decision it is noted that “This employee had the specialty of the Auditor Training and Tickets at the Hellenic Train and at the time of the accident in question he had completed his work and after the end he returned for an overnight stay at a hotel provided by his company in order to take over the next day. on a train on a route from Thessaloniki to Athens. “