The decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania to cancel the first round of the presidential elections, two days before the scheduled second, largely justifies why Europe has turned its gaze with concern towards the political developments in the country, following this electoral battle. and avoiding the worst. Once again, however, he seems to focus more on the threatened “evil” and less on its roots. The fear stems from the possibility that far-right Kalin Gheorgescu will prevail, taking advantage of the general rise of the nationalist Right, which was also recorded in last week’s parliamentary elections. The decision of the Court confirms, however, that the problem is much deeper and has structural characteristics. After all, it cannot be a matter of pride for the EU to cancel elections in one of its member countries.

However, what worries the EU and NATO headquarters in Brussels the most is the fact that this particular politician is considered pro-Russian and his possible election could significantly affect the country’s stance on the Ukraine war both politically and operationally, in a at a time when the processes for this conflict are running.

Denunciations and excommunications

The fears may be justified, but to deal with them, especially in terms of their consequences, aphorisms and denunciations of Moscow’s interventions are not enough. Gheorgescu, the case of Romania, the resounding emergence of a simmering nationalism is not a unique phenomenon. One cannot forget Orban in Hungary, Fiko in Slovakia or Kaczynski in Poland, with the difference that the latter cannot be accused of pro-Russianism.

But not all of them fell from the sky. The naivete with which the West believed that the former Eastern Europe after the fall of the regimes in 1989/1990 would adopt “one for one” the Western political system and turn into a “valley of young, functioning democracies” is punished here and years. Very often a… upside down election result raises concerns about the orientation of an “unruly” country and the cohesion of the EU. However, the discussion does not reach such a depth that would allow past mistakes to be recognized and an interception strategy to exist.

Dealing with “defection” with threats or decisions to cut European funds will not bring the defection to the right path. It simply reinforces in most Eastern European societies the perception, which is also not foreign in countries of the European South, that the EU is a Union of opportunities, a big piggy bank, a milking cow.

The signs were there

Stumped democracy, authoritarian notions, nationalist populism should have been dealt with much earlier. The signs have been there for decades, but in the West they preferred not to see them. Perhaps because they didn’t want to admit how opportunistic the rush to expand was after all, in countries that were primarily treated as virgin markets. Perhaps again because the tendency for nationalist entrenchment is now flourishing in an emphatic way in almost all the countries of Western Europe. It had begun long before the Europeans diagnosed Moscow’s subterranean effort to crack their cohesion.

Even if we accept all the often unsubstantiated allegations of Putin’s “dirty ways,” the problem is not of his making. He merely identified weak points, struck at existing cracks, which had created the exaggerated prophecies and unacknowledged errors of the time when some waved the banner of the “End of History.” A history that sometimes likes to take revenge.