Plumbers, vaccinators, creationists, astrologers, telepaths, numerologists, homeopaths …
For scientific institutions, these practices and movements fall under the category of “pseudosciences”. That is, doctrines based on foundations that their adherents consider scientific and, from there, create a current that moves away from what is normally accepted by the academic world.
But how to distinguish what is science from what passes for science?
This task is much more complicated than it seems, according to Michael Gordin, a professor at Princeton University in the United States and an expert in the history of science. Gordin is the author of the book On the Fringe: Where Science Meets Pseudoscience (“On the Frontier: Where Science Meets Pseudoscience” in free translation).
His book details how pseudosciences operate and how, from his point of view, they are an inevitable consequence of scientific progress.
In an interview with BBC News Mundo (the BBC’s Spanish service), Gordin details the complex relationship between what is considered true science and what he calls marginal doctrines.
You claim that there is no clear line separating science from pseudoscience, but science has a clear and verifiable method. Wouldn’t this be a clear difference from pseudoscience?
Michael Gordin – It is commonly believed that science has only one method, but this is not true. Science has many methods. Geologists do their work very differently from theoretical physicists and molecular biologists from neuroscientists. Some scientists work in the field, watching what happens. Others work in a laboratory under controlled conditions. Others do simulations. In other words, science has many methods, which are heterogeneous. Science is dynamic, and this dynamism makes it difficult to define that line. We can take a concrete example and say that it is science or pseudoscience. It’s easy with a concrete example.
The problem is that this line is not consistent, and when you look at more cases, there will be things that were once considered science and are now considered pseudosciences, like astrology. There are themes such as the drift of continents, which was initially considered a marginal theory and is now a basic theory of geophysics.
Almost everything that is considered pseudoscience today was science in the past, which has been refuted over time and those who continue to support it are considered lunatics or charlatans. That is, the definition of what science or pseudoscience is is dynamic over time. This is one of the reasons for the difficulty of this judgment.
But there are things that don’t change over time. For example, 2+2 has always been equal to 4. This means that science works based on principles that do not allow for interpretation…
Well that’s not necessarily right. Two UFOs plus two UFOs is four UFOs.
Interestingly, you have chosen mathematics that is not, in fact, an empirical science, as it is not about the outside world. It’s a series of rules that we use to determine certain things.
One of the reasons why the distinction is so complicated is that the marginal doctrines observe what is considered established science and adapt their arguments and techniques to it.
One example is “scientific creationism”, which holds that the world was created in seven days, 6,000 years ago. There are scientific creationism publications that include mathematical graphs of the decomposition ratios of various isotopes, to try to prove that the Earth is only 6,000 years old.
It would be great to say that using math and graphing is science, but the reality is that almost all marginal doctrines use math in some way.
Scientists disagree about the type of mathematics used, but there are, for example, people who argue that the advanced mathematics used in string theory is no longer scientific because it has lost empirical verification. It is high-level mathematics, done by doctors from the best universities, but there is an internal debate in science, among physicists, who are debating whether or not it should be considered a science.
I’m not saying that everyone should be a creationist, but when quantum mechanics was first proposed, some people said, “this sounds very strange”, “it doesn’t measure up to the way we believe it works” or “this is it really science?”
So mr. claims that pseudosciences or marginal doctrines have any value?
The point is that many things we consider innovative come from the limits of orthodox knowledge.
What I mean is basically three points: first, that there is no clear dividing line; second, that understanding what lies on either side of the line requires understanding the context; and, third, that the normal process of science produces marginal doctrines.
We cannot dismiss these doctrines as they are unavoidable. They are a by-product of the way the sciences work.
Does that mean we should be more tolerant of pseudosciences?
Scientists, like everyone else, have limited time and energy and cannot research everything.
Therefore, any time that is devoted to refuting or denying the legitimacy of a marginal doctrine is time that is no longer used to do science—and perhaps it doesn’t even have results.
People have been refuting scientific creationism for decades. They’ve tried to unmask telepathy for even longer and it keeps hovering around us. There are different types of marginal ideas. Some are highly politicized and even harmful to public health or the environment. It is to these, in my view, that we need to devote attention and resources to their elimination or at least explain why they are wrong.
But I don’t think other ideas, like believing in UFOs, are specifically dangerous. I believe that even creationism is not as dangerous as being anti-vaccinate, or believing that climate change is a hoax.
We must look at pseudosciences as inevitable and approach them pragmatically. We have a limited amount of resources and we need to choose which doctrines can cause harm and how to address them.
Should we simply try to reduce the damage they can do? This is the case with mandatory vaccination, whose aim is to avoid harm, but without necessarily convincing opponents that they are wrong. Should we persuade them that they are wrong? This needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
How then are we to deal with the pseudosciences?
One possibility is to recognize that they are people interested in science.
An earth planner, for example, is a person interested in the configuration of the Earth. It means that it is someone who was interested in researching nature and, for some reason, went in the wrong direction.
One might then ask why this happened. You can approach the person by saying, “If you don’t believe this evidence, what kind of evidence would you believe?” or “show me your evidence and let’s talk.”
Is it something we could do, but is it worth doing? It is a doctrine that I do not consider dangerous. It would be a problem if every government in the world thought the Earth is flat, but I don’t see that risk.
The contemporary version of earthworks appeared about 15 years ago. I think academics still don’t quite understand how it happened, or why it happened so quickly.
Another thing we can do is not necessarily persuade them that they’re wrong, because maybe they won’t accept it, but try to understand how this movement came about and expanded. This can guide us on how to face more serious threats.
More serious threats such as antivaccines…
Vaccines were invented in the 18th century, and people have always opposed them, in part because all vaccines carry a risk, albeit a very low one.
Over time, the way the issue has been handled has been to put in place an insurance system that basically goes like this: you need to get the vaccine, but if you get it and you do poorly, we’ll compensate you for that damage.
I’m sure this will happen with the Covid vaccine, but we still don’t know the full spectrum, nor the seriousness of the damage it could cause. But the damage and the probability of its occurrence appear to be very low.
With regard to antivaccines that believe, for example, that the covid vaccine contains a chip, the only action that can be taken for the good of public health is to make it mandatory. That was how polio was eradicated in most of the world, even with the existence of opponents to the vaccine.
But making it mandatory can make someone say that science is being used for political or ideological purposes…
I’m sure if the state imposes a mandatory vaccine, someone will say so. But it’s not about ideology. The State already requires so many things and there are vaccines that are mandatory.
And the state makes all sorts of scientific claims. It is not allowed to teach creationism in schools, for example, nor to research human cloning. In other words, the State has intervened many times in scientific disputes and seeks to do this according to scientific consensus.
People who embrace pseudosciences do so on the basis of skepticism, which is exactly one of the fundamental values of science. It’s a paradox, isn’t it?
This is one of the reasons why I believe there is no clear dividing line between science and pseudoscience. Skepticism is a tool we all use. The question is what kind of subjects you are skeptical about and what might convince you of a specific fact.
In the 19th century, there was a great debate as to whether atoms really existed or not. Today, virtually no scientist doubts its existence. That’s how science works. The focus of skepticism moves back and forth over time. When this skepticism addresses issues that have already been accepted, problems sometimes arise, but there are times when it is necessary.
The essence of Einstein’s theory of relativity is that the ether—the substance through which light waves are supposed to travel—does not exist. For this, Einstein focused his skepticism on a fundamental postulate, but he did so saying that much other knowledge that was already considered established could be preserved.
Therefore, skepticism must have a purpose. If you’re skeptical just because you are, this is a process that doesn’t make progress.
Is it possible that, in the future, what we consider science today will be dismissed as pseudoscience?
In the future, there will be many doctrines that will be considered pseudosciences, simply because there are many things we still don’t understand.
There are a lot of things we don’t understand about the brain or the environment. In the future, people will look at many theories and say they are wrong.
It is not enough for a theory to be incorrect for it to be considered pseudoscience. There needs to be people who believe that it is correct, even if the consensus says that it is a mistake and that scientific institutions consider that, for some reason, it is dangerous.
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