The Brazilian claim to have a nuclear submarine, which has already consumed billions of reais in 43 years, now faces one of its biggest challenges: obtaining international approval for the use of the vessel’s fuel, thus avoiding the risk of suffering sanctions for fear of proliferation. atomic.
On June 6, Brazil made a formal request to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency, linked to the UN) to negotiate a package of safeguards so that it can use enriched uranium in the submarine’s reactor — whose prototype began to be built in 2021. by the Navy, in Iperó (SP).
The negotiation is highly complex because it sets an unprecedented precedent: a country without nuclear weapons using atomic fuel for military purposes — which always raises the concern of different uses. THE Sheet heard from diplomats with transit at the agency, in Vienna, that such authorization is unlikely to occur without Brazil giving in to some historic positions.
For the so-called Special Procedures, said endorsement, to be approved, it will almost certainly be necessary to establish a new legal framework in the form of an additional protocol between Brazil and the IAEA to ensure the inspection of the facilities that handle the submarine’s fuel and reactor. .
It so happens that Brasilia has always resisted adherence to the Additional Protocols to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is a signatory, as it considers them a form of guardianship of the atomic powers over other countries. This generated a small crisis in the 2000s, when the IAEA wanted to know more about Brazilian ultracentrifuges.
These equipments are responsible for enriching uranium, and have been starring in the news of the crisis with Iran’s nuclear program for years. The confusion in Brazil was resolved, but to this day the IAEA demands that the country adhere to the Additional Protocols modeled in 1997 —138 countries and the European sector agency signed them.
This has already been defended by its active director-general, the Argentine Rafael Grossi, in a recent interview with Sheet. The report sought him out to talk about the current negotiation, but he was on a trip and could not respond. The Brazilian delegation at the agency did not respond to the contact request.
The nuclear submarine issue is a new opportunity to put the goat in the room. According to people close to the matter, Brazil would agree to place its military nuclear program under a specific umbrella of safeguards, perhaps using mechanisms already in place in ABACC, the agreement with Argentina and the IAEA for mutual inspections.
At Itamaraty, however, there is fear that the demand will be broader, and the initial determination not to give in.
“The absence of an additional protocol should be seen as incompatible with the fact that Brazil has a military program”, evaluated Ian Stewart, a British expert on nuclear submarines at the James Martin Center (USA), in a text on the subject in the “Boletim dos Atomic Scientists”.
The negotiation is highly complex and takes place in the context of the Cold War 2.0 due to the case of Australia. On March 10, the IAEA was officially informed of the terms of the agreement known as Aukus, between the Oceania country, the US and the UK.
Announced in 2021 as a reaction to Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Aukus has as its centerpiece an arrangement so that, within 18 months, a way to provide Australia with nuclear-powered, conventional weapons-launching submarines is established. Beijing obviously did not like it.
As one of the seven official nuclear powers, China sits on the IAEA’s 35-member steering committee, and has already openly questioned Australia’s handling of nuclear fuel. This is because the American and British models of submarines, which should be sold to Canberra, use uranium with a higher degree of enrichment than in the case foreseen for Brazil, for example.
Of course, it’s all politics. Beijing does not want to see Australia sailing stealth boats in its strategic backyard, and that differentiates the Brazilian case. As it has never faced such negotiation, however, the IAEA may eventually find a solution that encompasses both requests.
The negotiation is one more step in the very expensive ordeal of the Brazilian nuclear submarine, which already has a name: Álvaro Alberto, in honor of the admiral father of the sector’s program. It has been a military wish since the beginning of the Navy’s nuclear project in 1979, and became its centerpiece after the country abandoned the idea of having the atomic bomb.
In 2009, the signing of the Brazil-France military agreement breathed new life into the program. It earmarked €2 billion for the nuclear model, within a €6.75 billion package that provided for technology transfer, construction of a shipyard and assembly of four adapted diesel-electric submarines of the Scorpène class.
In corrected amounts, the entire program has already spent almost R$30 billion by 2021. Álvaro Alberto’s line alone had estimated R$475 million for this year, although implementation has been restricted several times over the years. This, according to the military’s allegation, has led to several delays: the vessel should only reach the sea in the late 2030s, perhaps 15 years after the estimated deadline.
There are several technical issues, too: it is a complex product, and the French are going to transfer the ability to integrate the nuclear reactor into the hull of the submarine. Only the US, Russia, China, France, the UK and India operate this type of weapon.
Such as Sheet showed in March, Brazil has struggled to certify the fuel it intends to use. The country dominates the uranium enrichment cycle, but does not carry out the entire process here. So, after being sure that the US would not help with the task, the government turned to a controversial supplier: Russia.
During his controversial visit to Vladimir Putin in February, President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) sought to open negotiations on cooperation to obtain nuclear fuel technology in Moscow. The Ukrainian War, which started a week later, put the brakes on the process.
