Boris Johnson probably reached the end of this Wednesday (7), when MPs from his party went to Downing Street to ask for his departure, as on the day of the Brexit referendum: with a speech to defend the United Kingdom’s permanence in the European Union. and another to celebrate leaving the country.
A master of the art of intrigue, Boris has an aura that stems from his lack of moral compass. He was just the most visible and indeed exotic face of the process of British institutional degradation initiated by Brexit.
Not by chance, characters who participated in its fall were also protagonists of the main political event in Europe in this century. Among them are Michael Gove, a former minister and persistent traitor who managed to be sacked from the last three governments, and the theatrical Jacob Rees-Mogg, one of the only deputies who refused to abandon Boris until the end.
Potential conservative candidates for prime minister have lost some political capital in recent months. Rishi Sunak, an up-and-coming finance secretary who presents himself as a product of immigration, was forced to reveal family ties to one of India’s biggest tech companies.
Anglo-Iraqi Nadhim Zahawi succeeded him days ago only to stab Boris with the final knife. Usual Brazilian political slogans such as “the worst job in the world” and “we will not die of boredom” apply perfectly to the centenary and hypercoded world of Westminster politics.
If the Talking Party has long been known as the “nasty party,” the nasty party, due to the dirty tricks of its members, the level of political cannibalism that characterizes it today can’t just be explained by its internal culture. He is also blamed on the vices of the Brexit process, which has left British politics stuck in contradictions. The landslide victory of the Conservatives in the 2019 elections, followed by the signing of the agreement to leave the European Union, opened a structural flaw.
On the one hand, the conservatives established a new hegemony by conquering industrial bastions that had voted for the left since World War II. The party, previously elitist and urban, had to compose with a base of deputies who depend on the voter attracted by the nationalism of Brexit.
On the other hand, the Labor Party, the main opposition force, lost its base in Scotland, which strongly supported the local independence party. Since then, its leaders have become helpless spectators.
As politically unsustainable as it is, the conservative hegemony is too strong to be overthrown. This fundamental problem is the engine of the crisis that shakes conservatives. The controversies about parties during the pandemic or Boris’ private life are just the most folkloric manifestations.
But the impasse is not synonymous with state apathy. With a hyperreactive foreign policy, the United Kingdom developed a unique pro-Brexit identity in the Boris era, standing out for its proactiveness in the Ukrainian War, its endless provocations to the European Union and its aggressive trade agenda.
But these pyrrhic victories, won through political maneuvers that consolidate the prime minister’s reputation as an erratic and unreliable partner, also expose the absence of a discussion about the country’s project. The UK essentially has to choose between two destinations.
The Japanese, from an aged and autonomous country from the geopolitical point of view, which manages to renew its industrial park and remain relevant as a counterpoint to regional hegemony, or the Italian, characterized by a political model that prevents its renewal and accelerates its decadence.
The UK’s problem has never been how to get rid of Boris Johnson. That’s what to do with Brexit.
