On February 4 — three weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — Vladimir Putin met with Xi Jinping in Beijing. A joint statement by the two leaders announced that the friendship between Russia and China “is boundless”.
Seven months later, Xi may have regretted those words. Speaking ahead of a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Uzbekistan, Putin vowed to address the “questions and concerns” China has over the Ukraine War.
Neither Putin nor Xi chose to air these concerns in public. But it’s not hard to guess. The war weakened Russia, destabilized Eurasia and strengthened NATO, the western military alliance. None of this looks good from Beijing.
The February 4 statement made it clear that the basis of Russian-Chinese friendship is common hostility to the US global leadership. A quick Russian victory in Ukraine — just months after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan — would have been another blow to Washington’s prestige and power. That would have served Beijing well, and might even have set the stage for a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
On the other hand, a protracted conflict in Ukraine — and the prospect of Russian defeat — is a serious strategic setback for China. As Nigel Gould-Davies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies says, “There are plenty of reasons why China is very unhappy.”
The most obvious is that Russia is China’s most important international partner. The two countries are not formal treaty allies. But they rely on international forums and carry out joint military exercises. Xi’s first foreign visit after becoming leader was to Moscow. He referred to Putin as his “best friend”. But now his friend looks like a loser. And China’s friendship with Russia seems like a nuisance, not an advantage.
In addition to weakening the Chinese partner, the war produced a revival of the Western alliance. The US leadership looks confident and effective once again. American weapons helped change the course of the conflict. New countries are lining up to join the alliance. Chinese state media love to emphasize the West’s inexorable decline, but suddenly NATO is looking pretty excited.
Beijing could at least take comfort in the fact that the “Global South” appeared neutral, and sometimes even tacitly pro-Russian, in this conflict. This matters because the struggle for the loyalty of countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas is an important part of China’s rivalry with the US.
But the feeling is changing. At the Samarkand summit, Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, publicly rebuked Putin, telling him that “today’s era is not one of war.” The Russian only promised: “We will do our best to stop this as soon as possible.”
At the UN General Assembly, India joined 100 other countries in voting to allow Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, to deliver a virtual speech. Only six countries allied with Russia in opposition to the speech; China abstained.
At home and abroad, Xi likes to emphasize his desire for stability. But the war fueled instability across Eurasia. Azerbaijan has just attacked Armenia, which is an ally of Russia. There were also clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
A seriously weakened and shamed Russia is already a far less useful partner for China. And the results of the war are still unfolding. The ultimate nightmare for Beijing would be if Putin fell and was replaced by a pro-Western government — which is unlikely, but not impossible.
Of course, a weakened Russia also has some benefits. Moscow is now increasingly economically dependent on Beijing. Putin recently made a grim reference to the tough stance China takes in trade negotiations. Some Washington analysts go even further, arguing that the Ukraine War will drive Moscow permanently into Beijing’s arms, while distracting the US from focusing doggedly on confronting China.
This school of thought argues that a crucial turning point in the Cold War was the Nixon-Kissinger overture to China in 1971. Now they fear the opposite is happening — and the China-Russia axis is hardening. But this argument treats great powers as worthless pieces on a strategic chessboard.
The reality is that Russia and China formed an informal alliance because their worldviews have so much in common. It is implausible that one of them would step aside and decide to align itself with the US. Washington is the problem they are trying to solve.
The Russian-Chinese axis presented on February 4 was also, to a large extent, a personal agreement between two strong leaders. Putin and Xi clearly liked each other’s style and saw each other as the embodiment of their respective nations. They were, in the words of Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, “the tsar and the emperor.”
But with Putin now looking more like Nicholas II than Peter the Great, Xi must regret having embraced his Russian counterpart so enthusiastically.
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
