A scholar of relations between Russia and Ukraine, the American Paul D’Anieri, 57, believes that the possible internal displacement of Ukrainians in the regions recently annexed by Moscow in facade referendums could cause the Kremlin to encourage migration to these places — in a movement similar to the one that, in the 1930s, would give rise to the Russian-speaking portion of Donbass, which is at the root of the current war.
On a trip to Brazil for an event at the University of São Paulo, the analyst spoke with Sheet about the reasons for the conflict and possible ways to resolve it. “Anyone who thinks the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was bad should condemn the invasion of Ukraine. This war is ten times worse.”
The two countries have a common past and similar cultures. Why is there anti-Russian sentiment in part of Ukraine? Ukrainians consider themselves to have been colonized by the Russians for decades. The colonized of the Russian Empire were Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, Belarusians, Kazakhs.
The Soviet Union collapsed, in part, because many Ukrainians wanted an independent state, others wanted more autonomy from Moscow because they felt they could be richer. Since 1991 [independência do país], Ukraine has become more independent, more Western-oriented. Russia, meanwhile, has become more authoritarian.
How is the relationship between people? It’s very strong. Especially in eastern Ukraine, people often have relatives across the border, they went to Moscow to study when they were younger. Before the current conflict, there was a dispute among Ukrainians about how close they should be to Russia. since 2014 [quando protestos anti-Rússia eclodiram], for example, several people stopped speaking Russian. Now, with the war, even those who supported the closeness with Moscow changed their minds.
How did the Maidan Revolution of 2014 differ from the Orange of 2004 to become the trigger of the war today? In 2004, Putin was still consolidating his power and eliminating internal opposition. But even before 2014 it was very clear that Moscow’s plans for Crimea were already being drawn up. The Russians had infiltrated the Ukrainian army, so when Maidan happened, the Kremlin was able to organize everything quickly. In eastern Ukraine, however, local leaders stopped the advance, and in Donetsk and Lugansk, Russia began to provide money, weapons and organization to the separatists.
Putin has always underestimated Ukrainians’ aspirations for independence. He believed that those who wanted to maintain economic ties with Moscow wanted to join the country. His biggest block was to think that, by speaking Russian, people considered themselves Russian. This even worked to some extent in Belarus, but in Ukraine the west of the country did not support it.
Is it feasible for Russia to control the four annexed regions, in highly contested referendums? The Russians could have a hard time in these territories, dealing with insurgents like the US did in Afghanistan and Iraq. But there’s also the possibility that violence will drive people who don’t support them to leave these regions — and Russia will need to call on citizens to occupy them, offering land and jobs.
This happened after the Second World War; so many soldiers from Soviet republics died that Moscow had to send citizens to these regions. Also in the 1930s, when millions starved to death in eastern Ukraine [o Holodomor] —that’s why there are so many ethnic Russians in Donetsk.
Before being elected, Volodymyr Zelensky he said he would talk to Putin to end the war in Donbass, but the opposite happened. What were your mistakes? Zelensky was an ideological and naive person who thought he could be president without being a politician. It was a project of oligarchs who wanted to control it. He was sincere in his belief that he would achieve peace with Russia, be less hostile to the Kremlin — unlike his predecessor, Petro Porochenko. But then he realized that Putin’s only wish was for Kiev to accept the Russian interpretation of the Minsk Accords. When he tried to accept this, protests erupted, and he saw that the only way out was to strengthen ties with the West.
Mr. Do you think that the end of the war involves the removal of Putin? It’s hard to imagine peace with Putin in power, but there’s no reason to think that an eventual ouster would bring peace immediately. He could be replaced by someone worse or weaker, who is influenced to keep the war going. See what happened to [o ex-presidente dos EUA] Barack Obama: Said he wanted to end the War in Afghanistan, but he couldn’t because of domestic politics.
I don’t see the end of the war very close. This will only happen if the Russian army collapses, but even so, Putin would not agree to leave Ukraine without having conquered some region. At the same time, Kiev will not accept an end to the conflict as long as Moscow controls parts of the country.
X-ray | Paul D’Anieri, 57
Born in New York, he is the author of a series of books on Ukraine and the Soviet Union. The most recent, “Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War”, was released in 2019. He is a professor at the University of California and Vice President of the American Association of Ukrainian Studies, funded by Harvard
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
