Will Russia use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine? It’s a question Western intelligence services are pondering 24 hours a day and Western leaders have been weighing it carefully.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has already warned that Russia has this right. Thanks to that, even when he seems to downplay that possibility, the risk that we are closer to a nuclear confrontation than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 becomes an inescapable reality.
On the one hand, Putin has few good options for winning his war. In the last nine months his strengths have shown that they are incapable of achieving the goals that their leader has outlined. Russian troops were not adequately prepared for this conflict, their weapons are old and defective, the Ukrainians have resisted effectively, the West has armed and financed the Ukrainian government and Armed Forces and, as a result, Russian morale is low, which is not surprising.
Russian troops may be able to defend some of the territory they took in the first few weeks of the war, but they seem incapable of conquering new territory. Russia can inflict suffering on the Ukrainian people, but it cannot defeat them on the field. In short, Russia cannot win the war Putin has launched, and an emboldened Ukraine sees no reason to compromise.
However, Putin’s speech indicates that his maximalist goals remain. He insists that the US is using Ukraine to thwart Russia and that only the total subjugation of Ukraine and its reintegration into a “great Russia” will be able to save his country.
There is no public pursuit of a compromise, which no one is proposing, anyway. In addition, there are many voices in the Russian media, including political and military authorities, that echo the nuclear threat. This is only possible in Russia because the Kremlin authorizes it.
There is no doubt that the Kremlin is feeling the pressure to show results. Putin understands that it is much easier to gain support at home for his war if that support does not require any sacrifices from the Russian people. And Russia’s ability to absorb the first waves of Western pressure on its economy may have encouraged Putin to think he could win the war on those terms.
Since then, however, reality has set in. While Putin insists that Russia is not “at war”, he has been forced to mobilize an additional 300,000 troops to prevent a military collapse, and Russians clearly see that many others have already left the country to avoid military service.
Putin can hide from the Russian people what is happening in Ukraine, but he cannot hide what is happening in Russia, and, with no successes to show in his “special military operation”, his options for forcing Ukraine, Europe and the US to retreat are running out. In other words, Russia’s leader has found himself in a dead end. Could the use of a nuclear weapon offer him a way out?
Putin has made multiple empty threats. When the governments of Finland and Sweden proposed joining NATO, Russian officials warned of unspecified catastrophic consequences. The two countries applied for membership anyway, doubling the length of the land border between Russia and NATO in one fell swoop. Russia has done virtually nothing in response, perhaps for lack of effective options.
In response to recent Ukrainian advances against Russian troops, Putin announced the annexation of four Ukrainian provinces that include much territory that his soldiers do not and cannot control. In insisting that these territories were now part of Russia, he declared that any continuation of the war in these areas would attract a forceful Russian military response.
Ukraine and its Western supporters immediately made it clear that they had no intention of respecting these statements and defied Russia, continuing the war as before. Russia has launched artillery strikes against Ukrainian cities and key infrastructure targets, but none of these responses have made much difference to the balance of power on the battlefield.
When Russian ships in the Black Sea were attacked with drones, Russia withdrew its support for a UN-Turkey brokered deal that allowed Ukrainian grain to be exported to other countries. The threat implied in the revocation was that Russia could attack the ships. The transport of grain continued anyway, and Putin, aware that attacking ships carrying grain bound for starving people in other countries was of no use, again reversed his position.
To what extent can all these defeats, challenges and humiliations lead Putin to consider the unthinkable?
Perhaps Putin’s real “red line” (the limit of what he can accept) is the border of Crimea, territory that the Russians took in 2014 and which was incorporated into Russia. Or perhaps the truly impassable boundary will come when the Ukrainians retake the city of Kherson, in northwest Crimea, because control of that province will allow Ukraine to restrict Crimea’s access to water.
Western governments have taken note of the effort Russian officials have made to warn that Ukraine could use a “dirty bomb” to force overwhelming Western retaliation against Russia.
No one in Washington or European capitals believes that Ukraine will use a radiological weapon against its own population to induce it to attack Russia, but some fear that the Kremlin has leaked this story so that, in the event that Russia itself launches hand of such a weapon, your chances of denying the fact in the court of global public opinion are strengthened.
Another question: how would the West react if Russia actually used a dirty bomb or a tactical nuclear weapon? Political leaders themselves do not say so, but most knowledgeable military analysts theorize that the US would not respond by launching a nuclear weapon of its own or attacking Russian territory. But they would attack Russian positions in Ukraine, damage or destroy the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and end the war quickly in Ukraine’s favor.
This is certainly the message Washington wants the Kremlin to hear and consider.
In this truly dreadful scenario, the world would enter uncharted territory. The risk would be much greater than in 1962. During the Missile Crisis, there was only one casualty – the pilot of an American spy plane. No one knew of this death until after the crisis had been resolved.
The aforementioned scenario in Ukraine would leave thousands of Russian soldiers dead and a deeply weakened Russian army and navy. It is not a scenario that anyone in power in Moscow, Washington or Europe is willing to see come to fruition. However, this is the risk the world now faces. There is no sign that Russia has altered the alert level of its nuclear forces.
The risk is low, but considering the importance of what’s at stake, it’s not low enough.
In the next few weeks winter will come to Ukraine. Combat will subside. The war will freeze, for the most part. But that fact will only postpone a careful analysis of nuclear risk, something we will continue to live with for some time to come.
With a wealth of experience honed over 4+ years in journalism, I bring a seasoned voice to the world of news. Currently, I work as a freelance writer and editor, always seeking new opportunities to tell compelling stories in the field of world news.
