A phone call from Moscow in 1991 interrupted the Bush family’s Christmas celebrations at Camp David. On the other end of the line, in search of his American counterpart, was Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, less than two hours before he resigned, left the Kremlin and sanctified the end of the USSR, one of the central figures of the 20th century.
Bush acknowledged the deference. For the second time, in that fateful month for the Bolshevik empire, the American president was treated with zeal by a Russian interlocutor. On the 8th, he had received a call from Boris Yeltsin, to learn, even before Gorbachev, of the Soviet disintegration.
“Today, a very important event took place in our country, and I want to inform you myself, before I know it from the press,” said the Russian leader. At the beginning of the conversation, the clock in the White House Oval Office read 1:08 pm. It was a Sunday.
Yeltsin was flanked by leaders from Belarus and Ukraine, then units, as well as Russia, of the USSR. The multiethnic country consisted of 15 republics; in practice, provinces controlled by a centralizing and dictatorial Kremlin.
In the 1980s, the system collapsed. Gorbachev tried to save him, with reforms responsible for unprecedented political opening and a tragic economic crisis, the biggest since World War II.
Strengthened by promises of “shock therapies” in the economy and separatist speeches, Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders met in Belarus and announced, on December 8, 1991, the end of the USSR. They would no longer recognize central power.
“We see objective reasons for the formation of independent states to become a reality”, pondered Yeltsin in the dialogue with Bush. After detailing the initiative, the Russian leader remarked: “I need to tell you confidentially, President Gorbachev does not know of these results.”
According to the official transcript of the conversation, available on the web, Yeltsin added, about Gorbachev: “We will certainly send him the text of our agreement straight away, as he will surely have to make decisions at his level.”
Of course, the Gorbachev resignation, announced on December 25, 1991, was anticipated. The Nobel Peace Prize of 1990, adored in the West above all for efforts to demolish the Cold War, suffered an unavoidable political defeat.
In December’s talks with the US, Gorbachev and Yeltsin converged on two points. They strove to allay fears about control of the nuclear arsenal and emphasized desires to preserve and deepen relations between Washington and Moscow.
Yeltsin’s case was even more emblematic. Anticipating the information of the end of the USSR to Bush clearly embedded the offer of closer ties between the Kremlin and the White House, with the Russian desire to receive urgent US support for economic recovery.
The American reading of the historical moment was different. Among Democrats and Republicans, mistrust of Russian leaders with new proposals, but coming from the Soviet system, prevailed.
In Washington, the vision was to contribute to a “stable but weakened Russia”. In Moscow, since then, the idea that flirting with the US was a colossal mistake has been strengthened.
Different perceptions of a historical moment that took place three decades ago fuel the Russian-American rivalry to this day. It is time, for the sake of global stability, for the White House and the Kremlin to finally come to terms with the meaning of the 20th century’s death throes.
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