The promise of “unlimited friendship” drew attention at the meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin this month. An eventual Russian invasion of Ukraine could be a major test of the pledges of comradeship between Beijing and Moscow.
For the Kremlin, the first signs are promising. For the first time, China has formally opposed the expansion of NATO, which appears in the joint declaration just adopted between the two leaders.
Chinese officials have said that one country’s security cannot be built at the expense of another’s insecurity. In other words, they reject the idea that Ukraine’s security is made possible by the expansion of NATO, because that implies bringing insecurity to Russia’s beards. However, the joint statement of more than 5,000 words does not say “Ukraine”.
When speculating about what China would do in an invasion in 2022, it is worth remembering what happened in 2014, when Russia annexed part of Crimea.
Beijing has not publicly condemned Moscow — but to this day it does not formally recognize Russian occupation. He abstained when the matter was brought to the UN Security Council.
When the US and EU imposed sanctions on Russia for annexation, Beijing was the lifebuoy Moscow needed. Financing and trade with China helped to cushion the impact of European and US restrictions. As a result, one of the side effects of the sanctions was to bring the two countries closer together.
Despite not benefiting from an eventual military confrontation, Beijing can reap the rewards of ongoing tensions. First, they take away the focus that Joe Biden needs to deal with China’s rise — which, according to the American establishment, is the real threat to the United States.
And with few friends, Russia needs its neighbors to the south even more — including to ensure it can monetize its gas reserves. And Beijing thanks you, its energy security problem is serious. It’s worth remembering that weeks after the annexation of Crimea, China and Russia signed a 30-year gas supply agreement, involving US$400 billion. Now, with tensions in Europe rising, there have been more understandings on energy between Xi and Putin.
There’s something else for Beijing there: many analysts compare the situation in Ukraine and that of Taiwan. The argument is that the US’s lack of determination to defend Ukraine from a possible Russian invasion would be a sign that, in the event of an attack by Beijing on Taiwan, the same would occur.
China has an interest in raising doubts about the credibility of US security pledges. The Chinese propaganda machine did just that when the US let Afghan allies watch ships — or watch US Air Force aircraft hurriedly take off from Kabul airport.
The Ukraine-Taiwan analogy has its limitations, and in essence, Taipei’s future does not depend on how the US responds to an invasion of Ukraine. But China benefits from the insecurity generated on the island. THE Taiwan’s leader, not by chance, created a strategic group to monitor the crisis in Ukraine.
It would not be surprising that, in the event of a new invasion of Ukraine, there would be no opposition — or silent support — from China. Possibly, Beijing would help ease the sanctions burden and blame the US and NATO for failing to heed Moscow’s security concerns.
But then to endorse an invasion would be asking too much of friendship with the Chinese. There is indeed a ceiling on the promises of unlimited partnership.
